Andrés Shahidinejad

Ph.D. Student in Economics

University of Chicago, Booth School of Business

Research Interests
Primary: Household Finance, Public Economics
Secondary: Banking, Nonprofit Organizations

CV: [link]

 

Research

“Are (Nonprofit) Banks Special? The Economic Effects of Banking With Credit Unions”
(Job Market Paper)
Nonprofit banks in the U.S. are primarily organized as credit unions (CUs) and have grown steadily over the last two decades, increasing their share of total lending to U.S. households. This paper studies the economic effects of banking with CUs using consumer credit report data merged to administrative data on originated mortgages and detailed data on the locations and balance sheets of CUs. To estimate causal effects, I construct a novel instrument for banking with a CU using a distance-weighted density measure of nearby CUs. I find that banking with a CU causes borrowers to have fewer unpaid bills, higher credit scores, and a lower risk of bankruptcy several years later. I find support for several mechanisms behind these results: CUs charge lower interest rates, price in less risk-sensitive ways, and are less likely to resell their originated mortgages in the secondary market. These results are inconsistent with CUs behaving as “for-profits in disguise”, and suggest that many consumers experience better outcomes with CUs than with for-profit banks.

“Credit Information Sharing: Implications for Credit Card Competition and Household Credit Access”
(with Benedict Guttman-Kenney)
Credit data shared through credit bureaus reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. It increases the efficiency of lending markets by improving the ability to predict risk, price credit, and increase credit access. Using credit bureau data, we study a series of events in which banks stopped sharing credit card repayment information. We build a model to quantify the competitive trade-offs of keeping the data private versus sharing it. We study the effects that the unraveling of information sharing has on a) market-level outcomes and b) household access to credit.

“Nonprofit Price Competition in Banking”
(with Jordan van Rijn)
Price theory models predict that nonprofit and for-profit firms should respond differently to changes in market power. We test this prediction in small geographic banking markets using quasi-experimental variation in market power induced by mergers of large national banks. Linking list price data on loans and deposits from S&P’s Ratewatch to the FDIC’s summary of deposits, we compare Credit Unions’ price response to for-profit banks’ response. Findings are interpreted in the context of theories of firm pricing, nonprofit behavior, and debates on tax policy.

 

References

Matthew J. Notowidigdo
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
noto@chicagobooth.edu
(773) 834-6249

Neale Mahoney
Stanford University, Department of Economics
nmahoney@stanford.edu
(650) 724-4112

Robert H. Gertner
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
robert.gertner@chicagobooth.edu
(773) 702-7203

Constantine Yannelis
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business
constantine.yannelis@chicagobooth.edu
(217) 721-0587