"Memories of Underdevelopment" after Area Studies

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In this essay, I examine how the “desire” called “area studies” was founded on the privilege attached to fixed spatial containers, such as geographic area, culture region, or directional locality (East Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia). The model for these spatial regularities has undoubtedly been the nation-state—itself a spatial figure—and its capacity for modernizing makeovers. These have led to the formation of rationalities such as the liberal-democratic state, capital accumulation, and the primacy of the “self-regulating market,” which have come to collectively signify an unchanging modern structure.

Even the transmutation of area studies into its most recent avatar—identity studies, which presumes permanent ethnocultural determinations—persists in privileging the spatial over the force and forms of time. This “end of tem-
porality” excludes time’s agency (although not chronology) and spatializes certain world regions, transubstantiating multiple temporalities (with their different histories and modes of production) into a singular temporality that marks the distance between developed and undeveloped. This spatial privileging converts a purely quantitative measure of time — chronology — into a qualitative yardstick, whereby a different temporality becomes a symptom of backwardness. What was misrepresented as “modernity” with the concentration on the new is in fact a misrecognition of capitalist accumulation, whose repetitive functions seek to mask, if not eliminate, the regular cycles of existential time in everyday life. Capitalism’s immense conceptualization of time accountancy produced the temporal coordinates of the modern nation-state, which then became the placeholder of capitalist accumulation.

I offer instead a containment strategy that seeks to identify specific space/time relationships, recalling M. M. Bakhtin’s chronotope, which aims to restore time to any consideration of space and opens up the possibility for conjunctural analysis of multiple and distinct forms of temporality, drawn from social formations and modes of production, despite the dominance of capitalism. Louis Althusser associated this idea of conjuncture with the “material philosophy of the encounter,” an optic through which to understand the historical reality of those moments when diverse circumstances confront each other and create a “world, torn between powers in collusion and the ‘crises’ which unite them in a circle.” Althusser was convinced that while historical periods have their laws, “they can also change at the drop of a hat revealing the aleatory basis that sustains . . . without reason . . . without intelligible end.” This is the history of capitalism: a series of contingent encounters that produce practices, subsequently recoded as categories, into a logic of relationships that becomes the mature form of capitalism. By uncovering heterological temporalities and histories — recognizing uneven flows and the never-ending prospect of untimeliness — “progress” is released from its unilinear mooring and rethought as a relative term that considers missed opportunities and defeated possibilities.

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, scholars have nervously scrambled to rethink the university’s long-standing commitment to the study of societies geographically and psychologically consigned to the outside of Euro-America. This frenzied search
for new pedagogical purpose was prompted by the recognition that the circumstances that had authorized area studies programs had virtually disappeared, and the need to justify the rather large investment in an institutional infrastructure that appeared to have no place to go. Dazzled by the prospect of unlimited market access, private corporations momentarily seized the opportunity to make sure that universities, especially business schools, were prepared to train people to meet the challenges of a globalized environment. Area studies faced the problem of reacquainting a new generation of students with the task of changing the received image of a peripheral world filled with known enemies, potential foes, and societies seen as incapable of vocalizing their own interests. If area studies ignored the historical experience of colonialism, it dismissed the destinies of decolonization by affirming the Cold War strategy of sandwiching new nations between the monologic discourse of two superpowers. For a brief moment in the 1950s, countries recently released from colonial bondage sought to find their own way in the world, by appealing to an autonomous form of regionalism captured by the classification “third world.” Yet this effort to avoid being overtaken by either the “free world” or the Soviet bloc became one of the first casualties of area studies programs looking for ways to serve the national security state. Later, it became the vocation of postcolonial discourse, which presented the voiceless as capable of enunciating tactics of resistance and negotiation, elevating them as subjects worthy of study and inclusion.

But while this effort to breathe new purpose into area studies has produced no paradigmatic or conceptual breakthrough, the aggregate activity suggests an overdetermined concern that, perhaps inadvertently, acknowledges the obsolescence of older models and the bankruptcy of their knowledge systems. In fact, area studies was always constrained by its instrumental purpose to supply the national security state with accurate information concerning the United States’ enemies. This displaced both the necessity for criticism (since its purpose was not necessarily understanding but policy objectives) and an explanation of the unwillingness of the targeted to be won over by the assumption that they were pale reflections of ourselves—surrogate US citizens fulfilling the desire for modernizing makeovers of their societies. The goal of modernization was to remake former colonies into replications that reflected the logic of the Same, whose content derived
from an idealized representation of the United States that required conformity to its demands for democracy and the free market.

The ideological binary that divided the world was inscribed in area studies programs, bolstering US capitalism as the natural expression of democracy, although actually cementing contradictory claims of equality and inequality. While modernization theory served the US security state and implemented development and aid policies to win the hearts and minds of the unaligned, barely concealing its own imperializing impulse, the Soviet Union was forced to offer a competing model that, in its own way, risked cleaving to forms of colonialism. In this respect, modernization theory “endowed” a world historical narrative (Hegel) with a “civilizing grammar and direction” and the task of overseeing a transnational experience by administering capitalism as it “ideologically captures historical time and deploys it as means.” During the Cold War, modernization theory aimed to “manage” life in the third world through the imperial instrument of developmentalist policy, which was perceived as a form of neocolonialism. This involved tolerance for the worst kinds of political anomalies among US allies, including the brutal authoritarian regimes of Central America and the Middle East and the oxymoronic single-party democracies of Mexico and Japan. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the US model of capitalism, unconstrained by a “free market” that defines freedom itself, has proceeded on an unchallenged rampage throughout the world to realize what momentarily and euphemistically was described as a “pure form of economic liberty” and “free market fundamentalism.” Ironically, the brutality of this savage, neoliberal capitalism was matched by a US aptitude for torture against its last standing foes. The loss of purpose in area studies after the Cold War has been imprinted in the wreckage of its misshapen mission to provide expert knowledge of “strategic world regions.” In this regard, area studies has been a silent accomplice, duplicitous in its capacious desire to serve a state that sought to refashion the world through unbound capitalism, whose destructive effects have been amply dramatized by an explosion of excess that now threatens to take everybody down.

It is, of course, easier to describe a regime of knowledge that prevailed throughout the Cold War than it is to portray what has taken its place since. The paradigm that authorized the system of knowledge for area studies
during the Cold War was more systematically conceived than its putative successor and was driven by explicit instrumental goals. Its successor revealed itself at first as a vague silhouette, occupying the vacated space of area studies, just as nature gradually encroaches upon an abandoned settlement. But while nature’s return is a reconquest of space from which it had been driven, the new knowledge system can make no such claim. In fact, the paradigm is simply an inversion of the old practice—promising inclusion of the formerly excluded, whereby the object now occupies the position of subject, and equal status replaces the hierarchical classification that separated the West from the Rest. Area studies has drifted from its initial purpose of gathering useful information for the national security state into its capture by identity studies, which had already established its presence in the academic procession of disciplines. In the wake of the Cold War, the United States realized its postwar aspiration of global hegemony, at last unhindered by military rivals. Among social scientists and allies in business, globalization evoked notions of a utopian borderless world of commodity flows, underscored by respect for difference among a vast army of global consumers. This appeal to the multiplicity of subject positions had all of the force of a Benetton advertisement, masking the reality of homogenization with symbolic representations of world heterogeneity.

Area studies was infiltrated by a gush of identity studies, which valorized difference and Otherness, challenging the logic that had been dedicated to the Same. This putative transfer of logics announced the return of the native, so to speak, and with it, the authority of knowledge claims steeped in cultural authenticity and lived experience. This transformation was accompanied by a profound move from a social scientific theorization of modernizing societies to a revival of the humanities through the expansion of cultural studies, with its emphasis on identity and the reconfiguration of Otherness. Both logics share a concern for inclusion: the older modernizing strategy called for the development of an Other that lacked fullness and completion into a modern self, whereas the newer theory authorized a complete, full Other to press its claims for equivalence. (Here, equivalence means “sameness,” though there are contexts in which it actually implies “difference.”) Ironically, the logic of the Same paraded its dedication to the figure of demos, as promised by the spread of democracy and capitalism for
the multiplicity of ethnos. But this has merely led to the quest for analogues, such as the heralded “Asian values,” to show how cultural endowments result in economic success (a vulgar Weberianism), as well as appeals to native theory, cloaked by something called “East Asian theory,” which supposedly reverses the inordinate privileging of a Western perspective. This return of the native is less a settling of accounts than an overcompensation and repayment for neglect and exclusion. But it is also a natural response to the interpretative strategies of narrow national and imperial interests, which had previously posed as scientific and universal.

The residues of modernization theory and its post–Cold War political strategy resulted in efforts to substitute China for the vanquished Soviet Union, to maintain continued support for the “free world,” which was the United States’ client states. But once the need for development exhausted its productivity in the new global environment (with the removal of the Soviet competitor), attempts appeared that sought to envision and reconfigure the globe. Showcase clients such as Japan and, to some extent, South Korea, claimed textbook status as models for less-developed societies, but were eventually dropped, despite the former enthusiasm for their miraculous modernizing achievements. This was particularly true of the accomplishments attributed to Japan, which included managerial genius and a harmonious consensus society. Its image frayed into that of a fading global power, exporting a banal popular culture and steadily increasing its inventory of social problems. Japan, which had long exemplified successful modernization, was one of the first casualties of the post–Cold War world. Today, Japan appears regularly as a static economy teetering on the edge of deflation, dragged out as a warning of what the United States must avoid. This is especially the case now that the country has been thrown into a tailspin by a massive earthquake and devastating tsunami. Yet, once the tremors passed and the waters receded, the scene was not simply a ruined landscape of destruction, littered with debris and thousands of displaced people (resembling the plight of poor African-Americans in New Orleans after Katrina), but a region that had been marked by historically uneven development, dating back to the nineteenth century. The construction of nuclear facilities along the perilous Sanriku coast in the early 1960s was a belated attempt
by the state to promote development in the regional economy, even though much of the power they generated was sent south to Tokyo.

In the new disposition, the reorganization of global hierarchy positioned societies according to their emergent economic power. But appearances by India, China, and South Korea have been accompanied by the recognition that their new standing also reflects ethnic proficiency, often resembling arguments around Japanese culture in the 1970s and 1980s, which repeatedly congratulated that country’s native aptitude for technological success, and ascribed political and economic achievement to a transhistorical cultural proficiency that had remained unchanged since the stone age. Like the earlier portrayal of Japan as a treasure trove of untold wealth, which lured young US business majors to learn Japanese, today’s representation of China’s inexhaustible riches recruits students into Chinese language courses, and deludes university administrators with repackaged fantasies of Cathay’s treasures dating back to the time of Marco Polo. Universities now seek funding to establish campuses in China, India, and South Korea, when before, interest was underwritten by the US government and some private foundations. Conversely, the frantic pursuit of foreign financing has often resulted in accepting, if not inviting, to American campuses foreign-sponsored and even foreign-administered programs dedicated to disseminating the specific language and culture among American students. The most prominent, if not notorious, has been the establishment by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of a number of Confucius Institutes on campuses, which not only fund the teaching of language and culture, but usually place a representative of the PRC on the local administrative committee. On its part, the Korean National Research Foundation has been active in encouraging diasporic Koreans to carry on Korea-related research projects. But these countries are also exporting more students to the United States to study not just the sciences, as had been the case for many years, but also the history, culture, and literature of their own societies. It is interesting to compare this recent trend among Chinese, Indian, and South Korean students with the Japanese students who came to study science and technology, and then invariably returned home. The consequences of this shift in audience for the teaching of areas like Asia
will no doubt be far reaching, with critical effects on research, which is already showing a disturbing revival of reductionist strategies authorized by appeals to cultural authenticity and exceptionalism.

The idea that identity should be the vocation of area studies threaded its way through cultural studies and ethnic studies programs that emphasized the hyphenated experience of immigrant groups and minorities in the United States. American studies programs enabled this diffusion, aping the imperial expansion of English departments that had responded to Saidian calls for colonial discourse, by housing diverse hyphenated programs where administrations were reluctant to establish new departments, claiming them as a necessary intellectual and curricular enhancement of their commitment to study an area. While English departments expanded their reach by including the literatures of certain world regions such as South Asia and Southern Africa—Anglophone literatures—the compass of American studies broadened to accommodate the distinct experiences of certain groups in the United States. The emphasis on different ethnic experiences within a single society meant expanding disciplinary treatment to cover diverse experiential terrains and a continuing effort to link up with metropolitan communities.

This fusion of area studies and ethnic studies reinforced the nativist claims of both the metropole and newly configured studies of diasporic communities. As China, India, and South Korea became emergent economies, driven by massive outsourcing from the United States, Japan, and even Europe, the headiness of new expressions of nationalism and national amour propre further secured the relationship between home cultures and their diasporas, reducing the geographical distance between them by recalling inclusion and irreducible forms of identification.

If area studies diminished after the Cold War by failing to overcome its own barriers to engaging the hyphenated identities of the new world order or addressing postcolonial disappointments, it was also complicit in its own subsequent seizure by identity studies. This capitulation was noticeable in its approach to language training and the gradual empowerment of the figure of the native informant and constituted a hangover from an earlier practice in area studies, whereby scholarship relied on the cheap, exploited labor of the native informant to read difficult texts and serve as interpreter
in the field. In fact, the activity of “field work” derived from an imperial anthropology that believed it was encountering primitive, premodern societies. The model predominated in research devoted to China, India, Africa, and Japan after World War II, and it generally guided socialization in higher education. In this regard, the change from prewar patterns of training was considerable, since scholars of that generation were less anthropological than philological.

Unlike students of the United States or Europe, who consult libraries and archival collections, the first students in area studies went out to the field to observe, record, and report back what they saw and heard. This research often required knowledge of the local language and reflected the switch from a text-based study of the Orient to daily contact with native populations. The model for area studies was anthropology, which emphasized immediate experience, proficiency in the spoken language, and recruitment of a native speaker as junior partner in the research team, a reflex that, in time, became an unquestioned criterion in job descriptions for language instructors. In principle, the criterion was necessary, so long as language styles and diverse historic modalities remained part of disciplinary training programs, where learning how to speak a language was separated from cultural ideologies derived from the study of its literature, philosophy, religion, and so forth. By opening the portals of area studies to identity, and making native language proficiency its irreducible authority, the way was clear to reconfigure the vocational paradigm by validating the authenticity of identity and the qualification to speak for its idiom. All this began with the simple advertisement: “Native and near native fluency desired.”

As in the older form of area studies, with its prescriptive modernization theory, the newer emphasis on identity has been driven by an unacknowledged theory of ethics and rights. We catch glimpses of this impulse in postcolonial discourse, such as the self-vocalizing subaltern subject, previously drowned out by the din of colonial coercion and violence. This theorization often relies on poststructuralist (Derridian) notions of indeterminacy and the sign, Lacanian subject formation, and a postcolonial distancing from both the colonial past and subsequent disappointments of decolonized nationhood, with its ceaseless melancholia. But the most current practice derives from an ethics that demands respect for difference. In earlier area
studies, the native informant mediated the relationship between subject (colonizer/researcher) and object (subordinate), but only as a “vanishing mediator”—like the kuroko of Japanese kabuki theater: stage hands dressed in black who move the scenery around while the drama unfolds and are not supposed to be noticed by the audience. By contrast, in the new paradigm the shadowy figure of the native informant is now in full view on center stage.

If the dialectic of the Same and Other ensures the absence of the Other in thought and suppresses all genuine experience of it, then today the Other has returned, challenging self-Same identity with its claim of difference. This return has been enabled by an appeal to an ethics that conceives the Other as anterior to the construction of self-Same identity, to a prior law of founding alterity. But if the former modernization logic of area studies has been replaced by an enunciation on difference as ethical imperative but retained within the privilege of capitalism, we have a case of fetishistic inversion. This inversion of logic from Same to Other is simply a return to what had once prevailed in a different historical register. For Alain Badiou, what lurks behind this conceptualization of Otherness—and what contemporary proponents of it no longer wish to see—is the religious prescription of an Other so remote that it commands devotion, in the place of a deity—the altogether different—and the piety of belief accorded to it. While this “god” remains hidden at the heart of Otherness, appeals to identity and cultural necessity have filled its place. The distant Other has vanished, leaving a call to Otherness that any identity can satisfy. The appeal to difference thus produces a pervasive culturalism that insists on unmediated absolute difference and knowledge putatively derived from the humus of native history. No real light is thrown on any concrete situation by an insistence on recognizing the Other, and valorization of difference does no more than remind us that “differences are what there is, and precisely what truths depose or render insignificant.”

We can only guess what it means to place even more emphasis on difference and the qualifications to speak for it. Apart from the antidemocratic reflex implanted in such privileged knowledge, bespeaking the recruitment of personnel to vocalize and reconfigure the content of area studies, it further specializes our research agendas and curricula, more than we should
accept in this moment when specialization and splintering is the problem we must overcome. Even worse are the appeals to resuscitate native theories, as if they remained uncontaminated throughout the long duration of modernization, waiting to be summoned once the culture in question was retrofitted with alternative modernity and capitalist wealth. The new paradigm puts up even higher barriers than the attempts of older area studies to return to a historical singularity and specificity indifferent to difference, as a condition for thinking about comparative possibilities. One of the failed promises of area studies was comparative study, before it disappeared in the frenzied desire to solve the problem of comparability by making everyone look like us, which only revealed the bankruptcy of situating societies hierarchically according to their proximity to the modern. Reversing this demand can only reproduce the earlier failure and recall what still needs to be done.

The inversion has unleashed a strident call for greater attention to the relationship between subject formation and identity and native expressions of address, as the voice of the subaltern asserts its claim to inclusion (in what or where is rarely clarified). The growing support for “native theory” and core cultural values calls for hitherto nonnatives who monopolized enunciation (and theory) to show greater sensitivity (“respect for difference”16) toward representatives of the Other and to practice interdisciplinarity, once identified with older area studies, though it never went beyond simple coverage.

All this is simply a redressing of older practices to appear different. While this reverse course reinforces a critique of the privilege enjoyed by the fiction of a unified West and its putative universalism and promise of achieving a “universal history,” its goal has been to shed the charge of incompletion and the stigma of unrealized self-representation. Whether deconstructionists project Western “unity” in their endless routine to undermine it, as if it had no outside (likewise for “Western Marxists,” whose horizon of the perceptual seems constrained by the same geographical limits), the promotion of its opposite can offer no improvement. Any program that invites the non-native to collude with a nativist enterprise in the name of core Asian values can only lead to the worst example of what Herbert Marcuse described as “affirmative culture,” fusing liberal philosophical idealism with fascism that traded facticity and materiality for transcendence and timelessness.
Moreover, the demand for recognizing native theory has frequently presumed that, since the West has monopolized theory as a condition of its claim to subjective status, the East must now rescue native resources of theory to assert its own subjectivity. Too often this inversion spills over into an embracing of regionalism. But this move also presumes geographical contiguity as a promise of cultural commonality. Here, too, is the desire to overlook the configuration of regions by the global expansion of capital and the mediation of the geography and culture that mark a region’s claim to sovereign autonomy by economic and political forces and the dialectic pulsations of global-local relationships. In fact, the category of “regionalism” only works if we take into account the specific encounter of time and place, historicality and contemporaneity, between capitalism’s expansion and the conditions it generates or confronts, such as colonialism, semicolonialism, and national independence; only then is it possible to envisage the totality to which these regional inflections seek to summon.

James Scott’s recent book, *The Art of Not Being Governed*, is an illustrative and imaginative departure from conventional expressions that have appealed to the irreducibility of regional cultures as an alternative to the nation-state, or those tired declarations of new regional cooperatives that invariably recall the dubious heritage of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Ultimately, regional cooperatives rely on the authority of one “national culture,” reduced to a locality. Scott’s study offers a critical regionalism, manifested in an anarchist politicality that avoided the nation-state form and its model for a new area studies.

The recent chain reaction of revolutionary demonstrations in the Middle East (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria), which shook up long-encrusted despotic dictatorships, may well disclose another possibility for critical regionalism, resembling what has also occurred in Bolivia and Venezuela and signifying a movement away from, or at least a breakdown of, the neoliberal global order. It is equally possible that such movements may lead back to atavistic forms of religious reaction. What once seemed years away—that is, what would come after the global pretension of neoliberalism—has become immediate. Though it might only mean a lot of educated people searching for employment, this move underscores the prospect of greater unevenness in the development that neoliberalism has
accelerated, to the extent that it will no longer be possible to conceal its role in making the present, and concealing what its socioeconomic system of classifications had displaced or simply dismissed.

Uneven Presents, Unpredictable Pasts

Recognizing unevenness requires a moratorium on the endless discourses that recuperate categories of East and West, North and South, and all their dire combinations that classify underdevelopment, despite their critical intentions and professions of solidarity with Otherness. This moratorium must also include claims to a pristine, unmediated native theory, as if it had interpretative and explanatory force outside East Asia. More often than not, calling upon unmediated native theory from its grounding in a history-less culture is as unimaginable as the binaries of East and West that still manage to generate the desire for Otherness. A swing in this direction might finally bring a welcome end to area studies itself.

Instead, we must look at specific experiences of uneven development that occur everywhere, not as societies waiting their turn to move along a linear trajectory and catch up to the head of the signifying chain, but as expressions of untimeliness and thus temporalities that belong to the register of difference, but not to the classification of “before” and “after.” The charge of unevenness has always been leveled at sites outside Euro-America, even though it is an active and unwritten law of capitalism from which no region can claim exemption. In this regard, uneven development is more than a memory of the experience of defining the third world. It is a historical process that has been present everywhere, especially in those societies that exported their own unevenness and thus masked their complicity with a development that supposedly represented the maturation of a singular temporality—the fullness of time itself. We know now that the memory of underdevelopment was really the history of untimeliness, of how societies have lived and negotiated its temporalizing effects, and the noncontemporaneity that capitalism produces in various social formations, where people live not in the same present or past to our present, but in their own presents that are different from ours, yet which share an immanence that Marx recorded in the *Grundrisse*. Gilles DeLeuze’s observations on time are useful
here, because the past and the future constitute temporal tenses of the present rather than autonomous times. This would be true of any “present.” But it is ironic that once the capitalist present became the normative temporality, it sought to classify societies that were backward as belonging to a separate past. The production of unevenness is still a law of capitalist accumulation, in its continued reproduction across spatial and temporal registers. In this regard, capitalism has yet to resolve its own past.

In acknowledging that the paradigms of area studies have arrived at an endgame, it is still reasonable to propose that its commitment to the making of modernity constitutes a legacy of lasting value. By linking this preoccupation with forming the modern to the conditions implicated in the constant production of contemporaneity—capitalism’s penchant for creating unevenness, especially now that it has been quickened by neoliberalism—we can see an exit from the endless play of binaries, trading places with each other in a global game of musical chairs that always ends up reaffirming a logic of the Same. Such a move brings back the political imperative into any subsequent attempt to make sense of the spectacle of contemporaneity, in view of a historical present always filled with reminders of mixed temporalities generated by uneven development, poised to disrupt stability and fixed identities and shatter any complacency in the unity promised by homogeneous time. Hegel’s invocation of the Greek myth of Zeus and his decision to establish the State to counter the ceaseless destructions inflicted by Chronos—Time in the form of change and thus negativity—identified the modern nation-state as timeless, complete, and thus obliged to oppose any instant of temporal heterogeneity as a challenge to its changeless eternity. Where these heterogeneous and discordant temporalities collide is both the moment of politics and the vocation of history.

In my own work I have tried to locate Japan within larger conjunctures, especially during the interwar period, to explain the formation of an uneven modernity and its temporalizing consequences, marked by a late entry into capitalist modernization. By concentrating on Japan as a local inflection of capital’s international extension, my aim has been to see it, as Tosaka Jun advised in the thirties, “as a fragment of the world.” But even though Japan reproduced capitalism’s unevenness, it did so through the mediation of a historical and cultural endowment that aligned with capital and at the
same time generated what economist Yamada Moritaro called in the 1930s Japanese-style capitalism. This was the beginning of capitalism’s attempts to resolve its specific past in Japan, as in other regions where it prevailed, without ever completing the task. While capital has increasingly subsumed its Other — labor — to complete the commodity relation, it has never really resolved the question of its own history to the extent that “real subsumption” has overtaken history; its traces remain stubbornly embedded in the present. In postponing such a resolution, capitalism, perhaps accidentally, provided a way to see how history failed to correspond to either the temporal rhythms of everyday life or to the narratives of the nation-state. The inability of capitalism to resolve its past validated Marx’s observation that archaic traces in the present coexisted with new economic, political, and cultural practices. Yet during the interwar period, Japan accepted Western judgment of its late development to thus occupy a position of relative backwardness in an imaginary trajectory where completed development was realized only in Euro-America. This verdict entailed living the fiction that capitalism (modernity) would eventually realize self-completion and eliminate all traces of its antecedents, thus authorizing the claims prompted by a later aesthetic and literary modernism. In this way, Japan and societies on the colonial periphery confronted the stigma of a time lag that signaled their “backwardness,” “late development,” or “underdevelopment,” according to a singularizing temporality, and thus the necessity of catching up to the present.

During the Cold War, this categorization was revised to accommodate the unaligned nations that the United States targeted for modernizing makeover — development — as its principal strategy against Soviet Marxist revolution. The result was a representation of the world outside Europe and the United States as having failed to join the temporal rhythms of capitalist production, and thus a judgment that it was unworthy of equivalence. What occurred between prewar and postwar conjunctures was decolonization and the willingness of larger powers to assist in the makeover of the “new nations.” The trajectory became more linear and progressive, its measures quantitative rather than qualitative, whereby historical time could only be successive and could tolerate no other temporality. With time’s naturalization into nationalization and dehistoricization came the possibility of bridging the distance between the self-declared advanced (imperializing)
societies and the Rest, but only if development imitated a logic of the Same. This strategy required transforming qualitative and different temporalities into a single, measureable, quantitative time as the privileged component in a comparative method that authorized the “treatment of human culture in all times and places.” But its axis was simply the temporality of before and after. The commitment to a natural evolutionary time enabled the classification of past cultures and living societies, such that some were consigned to the distant past, struggling to move upstream to the present they empirically shared with more advanced societies. Such societies, despite being in the Now, were considered to be in an earlier time.

During the interwar period, Japan so thoroughly absorbed this standard of evaluation that the country was convinced that contemporary Okinawa exemplified its own seventh-century past—even though in the present, the Ryukyus possessed a cultural form that had been shaped by the state in the late nineteenth century to maintain older social and land relationships so necessary for the production of sugar. While the evaluative scheme provided justification for colonial expropriation, it was formalized into a theory of modernization and convergence (in contrast to the Marxian category of “uneven and combined development”) that offered societies not yet in the (capitalist) present the prospect of catching up without incurring the dislocations of a wrenching, revolutionary transformation. Catching up implied the status of temporal late-comer, existing in the parenthesis of the time gap, and facing a distance that had yet to be covered.

This perception of a time lag is a reversed cultural diplopia—the defect that sees two images as one. Reinforced by a dematerialization and singularization of time, this reverse diplopia eliminated both the spectacle of coexisting, multiple temporalities and the possibility of seeing them as agentic forms of time. In interwar Japan, the figure of the untimely was reduced to the uncanny—a ghostly reminder of the past—a dangerous anachronism that challenged the settled boundaries of the present, a spectral, irrational presence at the heart of a rational society. This transmutation of qualitative into quantitative time and the dematerialization it demanded was already an established principle in the Western temporal project before the war, renamed as “modernity,” which social theorists employed to replace the repetitive process of capitalist accumulation. In time, the visibility of capi-
talist accumulation was effaced (or superscripted) by systems of values and styles of life and a discourse of “civilization,” and identified with the timeless and spatial countenance of the nation-state form, whose enclosing narrative became capitalism’s place-holder.

Postwar attempts to configure alternative and multiple modernities, as in the Japanese example before the war, or to privilege irreducible difference and detemporalize and dematerialize it into the moment of subaltern verbal address, as in the stronger versions of postcolonial discourse, invariably recuperated capitalism’s conception of time accountancy and the time lag it produced, even as they occupied two different global conjunctures. In both prewar Japan and the later era of decolonization, the quest for the modern was based on values associated with specific cultural experiences, rather than capitalism and its economic and social structures. The imperative of catching up was displaced to identification with a modernity drawn from different cultural experiences, instead of the materiality that separated one society from another. Yet this conception of the modern, perhaps most powerfully articulated by Max Weber, was in fact founded on a misrecognition derived from the experiences of manufacturing and technology, which established the primacy of uniform, linear time over circular and cyclical rhythms—the relationship of living to dead labor in the modern factory and city. Hence the calendar and clock measured the ceaseless passage from moment to moment, day to day, year to year, fixing before and after, then and now. Despite its claim to neutrality, the measure was marked by a developmental narrative that located societies on an imaginary, flattened, temporal grid in relationship to the present.

We can see how this strategy, in which claims of culture and quality veiled materiality and quantity, sanctioned imperial interventions before World War II. This surely explains the prewar Japanese call to “overcome the modern” and the later postcolonial demand for an alternative modernity, which valorized cultural identity to attain some sort of recognition of equivalence for having been assigned to the precinct of temporal unevenness. In Japan during the 1930s, the call to overcome the modern was linked to the effort to resolve what Ernst Troeltsch named the “crisis of historicism.” Japanese thinkers of the Kyoto School reinforced the conviction that they were living through a crisis in historical thought, evidenced in the production of
an excess of history and the runaway relativization of values that modernity
had unleashed. Moreover, thinkers blamed this excessive production of his-
tory on accelerated specialization among the disciplines, which undermined
whatever coherence they may have once commanded. The problem con-
fronting historical practice was the loss of a stable ground, provoked by a
modernity dedicated to the ever-changing new, with its inability to capture
a coherent and unwavering representation. At the heart of this crisis was
the perception that the speed of change, embodied in the developmental
imperative, required a historical practice capable of providing a steadfast
image free from the erosion of unconstrained change and the negativity
of relativism. This task was assigned to a new philosophy of world history,
which, it was believed, could overcome a crisis-ridden modernity domi-
nated by frenzied development and social abstraction by returning to the
concrete “real life” that could realize a Japanese modernity. In this scenario,
the sought-after concreteness fused the old received practices, and the new.

Inverting quantitative measures into qualitative difference (culture and
quality for economic materiality and the advantage and accident of time)
had been common sense among imperializing countries since the nineteenth
century, including “latecomers” like Japan; it also encouraged, if not camou-
flaged, the unevenness that had been common among modern societies of
the industrial West. While colonizers forcibly inflicted this perspective on
their colonies, in Japan, the importation of foreign, material culture (espe-
cially US culture in the 1920s) merely ratified the perception that emulating
these exemplars meant that those societies had already overcome the stigma
of uneven development. In the 1930s, Marxists and progressives expressed
anxiety over visible signs of unevenness. Even conservative folklorists like
Yanagita Kunio warned against the growing separation between country-
side and city, wherein the former was constantly making sacrifices to the
latter. Yanagita saw this domestic relationship as a sign of an internal time
lag that replicated the larger relationship between colony and metropole.

Cultural theorists such as Kuki Shuzo worried about excessive uncritical
imitation of foreign cultures, whereas liberal publicists such as Hasegawa
Nyozeikan and scholars such as Imanaka Tsugimaro were convinced that
Japan’s economic backwardness would lead to fascism. Both Hasegawa and
Imanaka drew comparisons with contemporary Italy to demonstrate the
relationship between a weak economic base and fascism. Hasegawa, along with other Marxists, believed that the Meiji Restoration of 1867 was as much a counterrevolution as an incipient bourgeois revolution, yet perceived that their time lag differentiated Japan and Italy from the more “advanced” liberal democratic states in Europe and the United States precisely because it opened the way to fascism. Marxists such as Tosaka Jun saw the world crisis of capitalism exacerbating Japan’s late-developing economy and confounding its liberal political capacity to resolve the issue. The equation between liberalism and fascism was perceived in both Germany (Herbert Marcuse) and Italy (Giovanni Gentile, Benito Mussolini) at the same time, and it was ultimately articulated in a cultural ideology that displaced economic unevenness with the idea of the folk as a unified, organic national community, to eliminate the conflict produced by clashing interests. In Tosaka’s reckoning, this cultural ideology elevated the ideal of “restoration” (fukko), recalling the incomplete Restoration of 1867 (and Yamada Moritara’s analysis of capitalism’s embodying feudal residues) and summoning archaic values to anchor the new folk community in an unchanging historical identity. In this sense, fascism, which is always about values, exchanged one system of accumulated value — abstract labor — for another based on cultural form, seeking to replace abstraction with concreteness by integrating labor into a folk body and thus replacing economic — materiality — with culture — ideality. (Italian and German fascisms both used this tactic as well.) The importance of Tosaka’s response lay in the observation that the Japanese were no longer living in real historical time, but in the cyclic temporality of an ethnic-cosmic recurrence or an interiorized psychological and phenomenological time, enclosing subjectivity from the external, objective world and its political and economic structures, which both distanced and shielded the subject from the outside and induced acceptance of it as it was.

Economist Yamada Moritaro, also a Marxist, further elaborated this connection between late-comer status and fascism in his powerful 1934 analysis titled, “An Essay on Japanese Capitalism” (“Nihon shihonshugi bunseki”), which supplied a paradigm for grasping the uneven development of capitalism in Japan since the late eighteenth century. Where Tosaka saw Japan’s unevenness transmuted into a unifying cultural ideology that recommended restoring archaic elements from the past, Yamada focused
attention on the “semi-feudal” heritage that coexisted with modern capitalism. In doing so, he showed how Japan’s temporally truncated capitalist development had been shaped by a mixture of practices from both older and more recent modes of production, a hybrid Japanese-style capitalism that diverged from established patterns in England and France. Rooted in the twentieth-century persistence of large pockets of “semi-feudal residues of land-holding” and their corresponding social relationships, Yamada’s Japanese-style capitalism attested to an incomplete revolution promised by the Meiji Restoration and the failure of capitalism to adequately resolve its past and realize a completed modern order. Instead, Japan was left with a distorted copy that led to political absolutism — fascism.

Yamada’s account may have resulted from a misreading of Marx and Capital in particular, and a misunderstanding of the meaning of time lag, since he seems to have been driven by a desire to link contemporary political consequences to capitalism’s failure to resolve its past. Faced with the unwelcome challenge of explaining the persistence of feudal residues and archaic remnants of older modes of production, which stood against Japan’s capitalist development, Yamada believed that the original promise of the Meiji Restoration was undermined by its own past. The result was not revolution but refeudalization, and a political absolutism that sharpened capitalism’s contradictions, and accelerated the passage of fascism at home and imperialism abroad.

Nevertheless, the idea of a Japanese-style capitalism paradoxically opened the way to acknowledging the importance of cultural difference and the risk of slipping into an exceptionalism that anticipated later calls to either overcome the modern or accept an alternative modernity. In fact, a symposium on the modern in 1942 pressed for the possibility of transforming unevenness from a symptom of failure into a sign of exceptional social endowment, to turn the defect of late growth into a distinct expression of modernity capable of retaining cultural residues alongside capitalism. Philosopher Miki Kiyoshi advised the promotion of this tactic on the eve of the Pacific War, when he proposed the retention of a “living culture” (seikatsu bunka) comprising constant interaction between old and new, instead of the 1920s concept of “cultural daily life” (bunka seikatsu) that emphasized consumption of modern commodities. In Miki’s scheme, living culture would be the model
for a new capitalist time and space for the “Orient” — the newly formed East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.29

By contrast, Yamada’s observations on the deformed nature of Japanese capitalism may have been an attempt to capture a positive image of irreducible uniqueness, strangely consistent with Marx’s conviction that the remains of past modes of production inevitably accompany capitalism in the present. It is not clear if Yamada knew about Marx’s late exchange of letters with Russian progressives like Vera Zasulich, in which he conceded the possibility that archaic remainders such as the Russian commune would gradually free themselves from the fetters of capitalism to promote production on a national scale. Yet, “precisely because it is contemporaneous with capitalist production, the rural commune may appropriate all its positive achievements without . . . frightful vicissitudes.”30 Marx, who had already acknowledged in *Capital* (especially in the French translation of volume 1) that he derived his sketch from the example of England’s development but did not exclude other routes, was envisaging multiple possibilities that no longer required noncapitalist societies to replicate the European colonial model. Russia showed that it was possible to draw upon remnants of a prior mode of production to create a new register of formal subsumption, or bypass it. Yamada inched toward something similar when he named Japan’s experience of development as Japanese-style capitalism, even though his analysis dwelled on the negative consequences of its contradictions rather than its new trajectory of development.

Ultimately, seeing through the ideological constraints thrown up by representing unevenness in the figure of a time lag that required societies on the colonial margin to catch up removes the division between the center and its periphery. Ironically, uneven forms were always more visible in the periphery than in the center, which could claim no exemption once the spell cast by the division was broken. According to Neil Larsen, the place of the periphery is where “capital concentrates its most extreme contradictions.” While Larsen sees the boundary between the modern and its Other as more spatial than temporal, I believe that capitalism’s capacity to produce uneven development and untimely, heterogeneous temporalities, which contrast most sharply in the periphery, expresses its contradictions in their most concentrated form. Larsen’s “living emblems” are the great
metropolitan centers of the third world: Mexico City, Manila, or Sao Paulo, “with its towering commercial and financial strongholds enclosed within a massive ring of pillaged human beings living within sight of modernity but yet beneath its plane.” But such spatial difference is marked by different temporalities, obliging residents of these cities to internalize untimeliness and navigate from one sector to another. Historical societies always display the overlay and structural coexistence of multiple modes of production, and even when one mode dominates over the others, the process of combining residues from earlier times persists, though these are assigned a dependent status to the new. Because the vestiges remain partially unassimilated to a dominant system, often assuming the appearance of revenants capable of reminding contemporaries of what has been lost and possessing the capacity for sudden, unscheduled surfacing, they can always challenge the principal mode of production and demand a space of their own, as Ernst Bloch observed in the rise of fascism in Germany during the 1930s.

Fredric Jameson named this configuration of combined residues a “cultural revolution”: the moment when coexisting modes of production become visibly antagonistic, and determinations from different domains combine into a concentration of contradictions — an overdetermination — leading to what Louis Althusser described as “ruptural unity,” the world of zeitwidrig (turmoil of temporalities). In late texts, Althusser aligned this synchronic nonsynchronism and its train of contradictions with the conjunctural event and its subsequent shift from static configuration (synchrony) to dynamic transformation and reconfiguration (diachrony). Jameson’s “cultural revolution” was thus Althusser’s “encounter.” In this connection, the image of China’s 1919 cultural revolution and Mao Zedong’s later imaging of a “culture of revolution” yielded a “revolutionary culture” and a new politics rooted in altered social relationships.

Though he did not actually address the unevenness introduced by capitalist colonial powers by backing off from its presence, Edward Said contemplated the unequal exchange of textual forms implicated in configuring the Orient and “dominating and having authority over it” and unintentionally disclosed the spectacle of what clearly was before him but had escaped his vision: colonialism as a vast terrain of unsynchronous synchrony stemming
from the reproduction of capitalist accumulation. This opening toward colonialism introduced the specularity of unevenness, constituting its sign and defining its relationship to the industrial states of Euro-America. It was precisely this experience among the so-called late developers — colonies and societies on the periphery — that allowed the “enfeebled center” of the West to recognize the temporal immanence of unevenness and its existence in our own backyard.

According to Jameson, late capitalism has witnessed the steady disappearance of the “local”: “expressions of the marginally uneven and unevenly developed issuing from a recent experience of capitalism are often more intense and powerful, more . . . deeply meaningful than anything the enfeebled center still finds itself able to say.” We now recognize that Japan, China, India, and countries in Latin America are capable of seeing what once had been concealed as the condition of the self-arrogation of centrality by industrial societies of Euro-America. Hence the spectacle of backwardness is no reflection of degraded archaic remainders or even failed past resolutions, but it signifies an “integral part of the way modern society” is constituted and “reproduces itself, or . . . as evidence of perverse forms of progress.” For historians of Brazil, in agreement with Roberto Schwarz, and late-comers such as China, India, and Japan, this perspective empowers a “deprovincializ(ing)” that “inscribe[s] these once peripheral regimes on the present.” Though once denied entry, they are now placed within the current global configuration, which had previously “seemed to distance [them] from it and confine [them] to irrelevance.”

While the era when area studies found its vocation has now passed, we still live in the same world of capital accumulation, albeit more advanced and globally hegemonic. Under the ferocious figure of neoliberalism, the world is no less free from the appearance of unevenness and the untimely. Societies once consigned to an underdeveloped, backward periphery have become “distant folkloric remnants.” There should be little disagreement over the proposition that neoliberalism found its momentum by promoting the law of uneven development and accelerating it as a global capitalist project (now that development has vanished from the post—Cold War scene), itself indifferent to the older division of center and periphery and capable
of reproducing new forms of untimeliness on a scale hitherto unimagined. So much so that it is easy to romanticize the return of regionalisms and the offer of delinking.

In this regard, James Scott’s *The Art of Not Being Governed* is instructive. Scott concentrates on the area from the Central Highlands of Vietnam to the northeastern corner of India—what has been known as the “Southeast Asian mainland massif.” Scott’s conception of the region, which he calls “Zomia,” differs from the Japanese construction of an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was supposed to integrate the economies and polities of East and Southeast Asia into an imperial unity. Until its inception, the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had no history, being born of a metaphysical idea, and the political force of Japan’s imperial aspirations determined its geographic dimensions. Zomia’s history has created the “largest remaining region of the world whose people have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states,” though this history is even now passing into memory. Scott is convinced that, until recently, self-governing communities constituted the rule rather than exception in human history. The highland peoples he writes about are “runaway, fugitive, maroon communities . . . who have been fleeing the oppression of state-making projects” in the lowlands, what he calls the “shatter zones.” Scott is, I believe, right to concentrate on those peoples and areas that were either excluded by the state or escaped from its enclosing propensities. In his reckoning, Zomia is marked not by the political unity demanded by a state apparatus but by “comparable patterns of diverse hill agriculture, dispersal and mobility, and rough egalitarianism, which . . . includes a relatively higher status for women than in the valleys.” In some respects, it resembles the world of untimeliness until it was enclosed by capitalism and a discourse of “civilization.”

Scott’s bold attempt to figure a region reveals the silhouette of a different area studies agenda, based on what he calls “riotous heterogeneity.” This singular combination of history (now passing) and geography provides unity without requiring belonging to either nation or state; instead, it is a region capable of manifesting its difference. In this sense, Zomia resembles Bakhtin’s conception of a chronotope that manages to configure the space-time relationship under specific historical circumstances. As a concept,
“Zomia marks an attempt to explore a new genre of ‘area’ studies, in which the justification for designating the area has nothing to do with national boundaries (for example Laos) or strategic conceptions (for example, South-east Asia) but is rather based on certain ecological regularities and structural relationships that do not hesitate to cross national frontiers. If we have our way, the examples of ‘Zomia studies’ will inspire others to follow the experiment elsewhere.” Like the everyday of a modernizing society, with its coexisting temporalities and possibility of multiple histories, Zomia opens up the promise, and indeed necessity, of crossing national borders and the prospect of envisaging comparative study of the political implications of the effort to resist enclosure by the nation-state. Politics and history appear at the juncture where discordant times intersect.

The historicity of unevenness justified practices designed to prevent underdevelopment in any other direction than what models of capitalist achievement prescribed. What the Japanese memory of underdevelopment discloses was the drive, whether Marxian or bourgeois, to free capitalist modernization from carceral categories such as mimicry and emulation, by recognizing the utility of combining practices from past and present to show their claims to both equivalence and difference. In the charge of backwardness, something is advanced, just as the claim to being “advanced” produces backwardness. But difference here becomes a temporal tense. For, the past is never finished with because of its incessant unpredictability in the present, while the present plays out its drama in the garb of the old. If anything, Japan’s historical accounting of the modern has dramatized the moments of rupture produced by capitalism, and the resulting constant collision of heterogeneous temporalities appearing in the figure of the noncontemporaneous contemporary have been inverted into what they are not. Rather than classifying the collisions as common moments of noncontemporaneity, they are judged as examples of time lag and assigned to a developmental trajectory characterized by permanent catch-up. These temporalities are presented as instances of culture talking about itself—and increasingly to itself—a reservoir of autonomous real value—the domain of Asian values—that encourages a romance with a cultural dominant by substituting spatial countenance for temporally prompted change.
What gets lost in this exchange is the world of zeitwidrig, nonlinearity, noncontemporaneity, a sudden discord created by capitalism’s unrelenting propensity for producing “combined and uneven development.” Daniel Bensaid advised that history knows no one-way streets—whether longitudinally, following the sequence of centuries; or in cross-section, when one society lives the life another in thought, while the latter acts out the thought of the former, without philosophy and history, economics and politics, ever achieving reconciliation in the tranquil harmony of some simple ‘correspondence.’ Construed as ‘backwardness’ in relation to an imaginary temporal norm, anachronism ends up imposing itself not as a residual anomaly, but an essential attribute of the present. Noncontemporaneity is not reducible to the immaterial unevenness of its moment. It is also their combined development in a novel historical space-time.\(^{44}\)

If we recognize these mixed temporalities as heterogeneous to one another and articulate this relationship, we open the perspective of a genuinely “noncontemporary representation of historical development,” capable of leading to comparative studies and realizing the original aspiration of area studies, which has always shown its capacity to lose its way.\(^{45}\)

Notes

My thanks to the producers of the prescient 1968 Cuban film, *Memories of Underdevelopment*, and apologies for using the title in a different way. Thanks also to Kristin Ross, Tani Barlow, Rey Chow, and Hyun Ok Park for the help they gave me on this essay.

1. Fredric Jameson proposes that cultural studies, at least in the US, constituted a “desire,” which, among its many ambitions, was the yearning to succeed Marxism and replace it. Before the formation of cultural studies, area studies laid claim to the desire to be an integrative discipline, bringing together several established disciplines to study regions of the world (usually outside Euro-America), and to the aspiration to replace Marxian models of conflict and social change for peaceful modernization makeovers based on a “normative” social science that emphasized the centrality of core values (consensus). Frederic Jameson, “On Cultural Studies,” in *The Theory of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 2008), 598–645.


6. There is ample literature on the relationship between “modernization theory” and the practice of policy, which inevitably displaces or simply ignores the epistemological basis of the “theorization.” For the former, see Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). For the latter, see my *Empire’s New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, distributed by the University of Chicago Press, 2004).


8. Ibid.


12. This is essentially the argument of Badiou, whereby ethics becomes the “ultimate name of the religious, as such,” inasmuch as the Other is related to the “authority of the Altogether-Other” (*Ethics*, 25).

13. Ibid., 22.


15. Ibid., 27.

16. Ibid., 24.


22. This is the argument of Fabian’s classic book (155), and the formulations of Ernst Bloch’s earlier work on “synchronic nonsynchronisms” (Ungleichzeitigkeit), in Heritage of Our Times, trans. Neville and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 39–185.
29. On Miki, see Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, 358–99.
37. Scott, Art of Not Being Governed, 324.
38. Ibid., ix.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., ix–x.
41. Ibid., 19.
42. Ibid., 26.
44. Ibid., 24.
45. Ibid., 22.