“Party Factions and Co-partisan Campaign Support.

Congressional Campaigning in Mexico.”

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ABSTRACT.

When and why do seated elected officials support co-partisan federal legislative candidates in their campaigning activities? We expect executive office holders to help their party’s legislative candidates, given that they hold strong incentives to work with members of their own party in the legislature and create political loyalties. This work employs the case of democratic Mexico and hypothesizes that elected executives – such as mayors and governors – should support co-partisan legislative candidates in their campaigns, except when internal party factions are strong and antagonistic. The author employs dozens of interviews with former congressional candidates and party leaders as well as a database containing a sample of the campaign activities of 1,200 Mexican congressional candidates to test the paper’s arguments about how intra-party factions mediate co-partisan aid in federal legislative campaigns.

Why do some legislative candidates campaign more intensely than their rivals from other parties or more than their own party brethren? Most answers in the literature from the United States posit that incumbency, candidate quality, and greater campaign resources explain these differences (Jacobson and Kernell 1980; Jacobson 1990; Schlesinger 1985). Comparative campaign research, on the other hand, concentrates more on the effects of electoral rules and constitutional arrangements (Bowler and
Instead of concentrating exclusively on candidate quality or electoral incentives, this paper explores a different set of political factors and actors – co-partisan officials who currently hold elected office – who have both the incentives and resources to support more intense campaigning on the part of their co-partisan federal legislative candidates. To do so, the present work focuses on differences among parties and among congressional candidates within a single nation – Mexico – to hold constant electoral and constitutional rules, allowing us to concentrate on these less studied sub-national executives.¹

A great deal of work has been done on coattail effects: that is, how the popularity of the candidate at the top of the ticket allows candidates running for lower-level posts to enhance their electoral results because voters often opt for a straight ticket when a popular figures heads it (Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; Garmendia Madariaga and Ozen 2015; Magar 2012). Furthermore, popular executives who are serving in office may also indirectly aid co-partisan legislative candidates because voters connect the popularity of the already-elected executive to candidates who run under the same label.

However, in newer democracies, which tend to have weaker agencies of transparency and accountability (O’Donnell 1998; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999), sitting co-partisan officials in sub-national posts, such as mayors and governors, may

¹The president also has good reasons to support her co-partisan candidates. However, this paper concentrates on sub-national executives because they are less visible, but still central actors in federal democracies.
offer their party’s legislative candidates support that goes beyond coattail effects.

Some of this support verges on the illegal, and includes: pushing the party organization and mayors in the locality to be more proactive; lending materials and supplies; and obligating their bureaucrats to participate in electioneering activities. Shared partisanship can lead to campaign support, even in newer democracies in which party identifications are not as strong as in their more consolidated counterparts (Greene 2011). Because auditing institutions tend to be weaker and sub-national media outlets better controlled in developing nations as compared to their developed counterparts, informal and outright illegal campaign support on the part of co-partisan elected officials is to be expected.

Little has been written on the interest and ability of sitting executives to support their co-partisan candidates in their campaigning efforts (either formally or informally). Yet, co-partisan executives who govern in overlapping areas of political authority often have strong incentives to support legislative candidates from their own party (Ames 1995; Jones et.al 2002; Samuels 2003). Perhaps most importantly, governors might require a larger co-partisan contingent in the federal legislature to bring more federal resources to the state; and so they help their political kin win election to the federal legislature. Further, many single-member-district (SMD) winners return to state or municipal politics, and it behooves governors to support their ongoing career efforts. Co-partisan mayors may wish to continue their political careers to the federal level, and to do so, they may aid their predecessor in the hopes she returns the favor in the near future.
The present work hypothesizes that while all governors (and to a lesser extent, mayors) have the incentives to aid electioneering tasks; their ability or willingness to do so is affected by the structure of their party’s factions. Where parties have cooperative internal groups, their candidates should see more co-partisan support from seated sub-national executives. But the governors from those parties with contentious internal factions will not be willing or able to support their co-partisan candidates because any gain by another group is a loss for theirs.

This work employs federal congressional campaigns in Mexico, a presidential, federal democracy with a mixed-majoritarian electoral system, to investigate the relation among co-partisan elected officials, party factions, and the campaign capabilities of legislative candidates. Studying Mexico allows us to test our hypotheses in a difficult case because neither mayors nor governors can stand for reelection in the following term, so their discount rate of the future should be quite high; therefore, they should not expend many resources in supporting their party allies. 2 Yet, other Latin American democracies also have low rates of consecutive reelection, so this case is comparable across the regime (Altman and Chasquetti 2005; Samuels 2003). 3

This work develops and employs three types of data to test its arguments: first, the author conducted dozens of interviews with candidates and party leaders. Second, to

2 Legislators and mayors can run for the same post again after waiting out at least a term, while governors and presidents can never run for the same office again. This law has been changed and the reelection of sitting deputies and mayors will be permitted in 2021.

3 For more on the consequences of weak auditing and transparency in Latin American nations, see Cejudo, López Aylón, and Ríos Cazares (2012); Morris and Blake (2010); Power and Taylor (2011); and Pérez Yarahuán (n.d.).
strengthen the argument about party factionalism, the author amassed the prior professional trajectories of almost 400 state cabinet secretaries to demonstrate that the governors from the least fractious party allows politicians from a larger number of factions into their governing coalitions than the two other main parties with contentious internal groups.

Finally, the author searched for the congressional campaign activities of a random and representative sample of 1,200 plurality candidates from the nation’s three main parties across two federal deputy campaigns (2009 and 2012). Because of the impossibility of actually counting how many activities each of the sampled candidates undertook, this work employs a different measure of campaign intensity: the number of different kinds of campaign activities carried out by each deputy candidate, which include: rallies; interviews in media; canvassing; promotional videos; and participation in social media such as Facebook and Twitter.

Literature and Expectations.

A wide array of authors has demonstrated that electoral rules are important determinants of whether campaigns are more party or candidate-centered (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, and Taylor-Robinson 2004; Duverger 1954). But if electoral institutions were the only factors affecting the campaign behavior of office seekers, then the ability of some

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This work focuses on federal deputy campaigns in 2009 and 2012 because 2009 was the first electoral year that social media were used widely (YouTube arrived in Mexico in 2007, Facebook in 2007; Twitter in 2008), and the first election in which parties did not pay for their spots in radio and TV.
parties and their candidates in the same nation to campaign substantially more than others should not diverge so greatly as these rules affect all candidates and parties equally (taking into account the differences between PR and SMD candidates in mixed-member systems, see Shugart and Wattenberg 2001).

Political leaders —whether they be part of the party’s structure or elected officials— control resources that matter for the political careers of other ambitious politicians. Directly-elected governors are often important political actors in federal regimes, largely because they control fiscal and human resources, nominations to elected office, and other political bases of support (Beck 2009; Gibson 2005; Jones et al. 2002; Montero 2010; Samuels 2003; Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). If mayors and governors benefit from their co-partisans working in the legislative branch, then we should see support for campaign activities coming from sitting sub-national executives.

In federal regimes in Latin America, such as Brazil and Argentina, sub-national executives exert strong influence over political careers of co-partisan politicians because of electoral rules (such as multi-member PR districts that are based on the states’ boundaries, as in Argentina) and weaker institutions of accountability and transparency that allow mayors and governors to allocate resources discretionally (Beck 2009; Gibson 2005; Montero 2010; Powers and Taylor 2011). As a result, scholars have found that both mayors and governors are able to support their co-partisans in their political careers (Ames 1995; Jones et. al 2002; Samuels 1999), although these works do not specify how they support federal legislative campaigning.
State and municipal political arenas often provide jobs, resources, and elected offices that form a large part of the structure of opportunities for ambitious politicians in federal policies (Schlesinger 1966). In nations such as Canada and Brazil, many members of the political class choose to return to the sub-national arena to further their careers (Samuels 2003). Governors are often informal party leaders in federal regimes (Hernández Rodríguez 2008; Jones, et. al 2002), and part of their job is to promote allies for political office. Tax policy and annual budgets are decided at the national level of government, so it is reasonable to expect governors to groom candidates for the federal congress. If governors wish to extend their careers to future office, they must show their capacity for winning office in all of their state’s elections: municipal, state, and federal, as this demonstrates their popularity and political control; and if they are of the president’s party, they must demonstrate their loyalty to the Executive by increasing their party’s seat count in congress. As will be discussed in more detail below, Mexican governors can send out public bureaucrats to leaflet; lend materials for rallies and other activities; and hire campaign experts to work with their allies. They can also force their co-partisan mayors to support the campaign efforts of the plurality candidate.

Mayors, of course, have different reasons for supporting their co-partisan legislative candidates as their scope of authority is narrower, and their place in the overall political opportunity structure is below that of a governor (Schlesinger 1966). A party may place more emphasis and resources at the municipal level instead of the state arena, making local elected officials a strong base of support for candidates.
Depending on the nation’s tax structure, mayors may require help from the national legislature to increase their resources or to raise municipal debt. If municipal executives wish to become federal representatives, they might support the campaigns of their co-partisan colleagues for future support. Finally, mayors from larger cities may wish to run for higher executive office such as the governorship, and so will help co-partisans whose district overlaps their boundaries to build their coalition. Mayors are able to carry out many of the same activities as the governors, albeit on a smaller scale, especially lending materials and “volunteer” labor. Municipal executives have extensive local political knowledge and are able to identify the neighborhood vote brokers, and can facilitate the use of municipal property or the local square for mass rallies (Auyero 2000; Szwarcberg 2011).

If elected office holders in federal regimes have both the ability and the incentives to support co-partisan candidates, including those for the federal congress, then all legislative candidates should count on this support from their party’s respective elected officials. However, as the data on Mexico will demonstrate, this is not the case: the campaign support provided by co-partisan elected officials varies across parties even within the same nation. Factions within party organizations play an important role in determining whether or not governors and mayors support their co-partisans running for office.

Almost all parties have factions: they can be based on powerful political leaders, ideological differences, or different avenues of entry into the party (Basedau and Köllner 2005; Harmel and Janda 1994; Hine 1982; Panebianco 1982; Rose 1964). Many
parties in diverse, federal regimes will have regional or state-based factions (Willis et al. 1999; Riker 1964), while others develop factions based on personal leaders who are able to distribute clientelist resources to party followers and voters (Belloni and Beller 1976). Because political parties almost always labor under resource scarcity, it can be difficult to allocate money and candidacies among the different internal groups such that all are satisfied.

Many parties with internal factions find ways to handle these groups successfully, such as the Liberal Democrats in Japan or the Christian Democrats in Italy (Carty 2004; Cox and Rosenbluth 1996; Golden and Chang 2001; Hine 1982; Waller and Gillespie 1995) while others lose important elections (the KMT in Taiwan in 2000) or fragment and disappear due to the actions of their internal groups (the Kenya Africa National Union). Factions do not become dangerous for the continued success of a party if their leaders have ways to divide resources; or when one faction simply dominates the others and can impose new rules (Harmel and Janda 1994).

Where parties and their leaders successfully integrate internal factions, one can expect their co-partisan elected officials to support the congressional campaigns of their party brethren. But where the gains of one faction come at the expense of the others, it will be difficult for a candidate to rely on one’s mayor or governor because of the likelihood that the candidate does not belong to the same faction.

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5 For the factions in the KMT, see Chen (1996) and Cheng (2009). For Kenya’s KANU, see Cowen and Laakso (2002) and Kimathi (2010).
Hyp. 1. In states or municipalities with a co-partisan governor or mayor, candidates from a less factionalized party (or with well-ordered factions) should run campaigns with a wider portfolio of activities than their competitors from more factionalized parties.

Hyp. 2. In states with a co-partisan governor or mayor, candidates from a party with well-ordered factions should run more active campaigns than their party brethren running in states without a co-partisan governor.

Of course, the presence of co-partisan elected officials is not the only factor that explains varying levels of campaign activity on the part of candidates. Because of the similarity of the two parties in the United States, much of the literature on US congressional campaigning explains variation in levels of candidate effort (as measured by spending) by focusing on “candidate quality,” defined as prior elected experience (Jacobson and Kernell 1980; Schlesinger 1994) and incumbency (Fiorina 1977; Jacobson 1990). Candidates with longer political trajectories should have both the experience and the networks of support to run more intense campaigns. The level of competitiveness of the district also creates more active campaigning as better candidates are drawn to winnable races and more resources flow to competitive districts (Jacobson 1990; Jacobson and Kernell 1980; Schlesinger 1994; Seabrook 2010). This literature leads to specific expectations for systems with plurality legislative districts outside of the U.S.: candidates in more competitive districts, with more background experience tend to run more active campaigns.
Hyp. 3. Candidates in competitive (rather than losing or bastion) districts will campaign more intensely – no matter what type of party they run under or their co-partisan status with the governor or mayor.

Hyp. 4. Candidates with greater prior experience will campaign more intensely – no matter what type of party they run under or their co-partisan status.

Alternative Hypotheses.

A simple alternative hypothesis to consider is that the party with the greatest amount of resources, both legal and illegal, should also have candidates who campaign most actively. Figure 5 below presents the legal public financing the three major parties received from the public coffers through the National Electoral Institute (INE in Mexico). It should be noticed that in this table, the figures for the PRI and the Green Party are separated, although they were partial alliance partners. The author made this decision because it is not obvious that the PRI demanded and won campaign finance resources from the Greens.

Figure 1. Public Resources Allocated to Parties, 2009 and 2012. In US Dollar Equivalent.
From this figure, one can see that the PRI did not enjoy a significantly larger amount of legal campaign funds in the period under study, so this cannot explain divergent levels of electioneering.

It could also be argued that the PRI had the greatest number of governors during the period under study and so was able to spend more on its congressional campaigns (both legally and illegally) than the other two parties. Two points suggest this cannot explain party differences. First, the governors from the PRD and the PAN had plenty of resources within their respective states, which they could have spent supporting their candidates, even though there are fewer co-partisan governors from these two parties. Second, the PAN was in control of the federal government, and so could have spent...
copious amounts of money that would have been difficult to track, and thereby raise its candidates’ capacity to campaign.

III. Party Organization, Elected Officials, and Congressional Campaigning in Mexico.

Mexico has a two-tiered electoral system for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a stronger majoritarian element. Sixty percent of the 500-person Chamber is filled through plurality elections in single-member-districts (SMD). The remaining 200, or 40 percent, are placed through five multi-member districts in closed lists with forty candidates each. Voters have a single ballot for both tiers, so votes in each of the plurality districts are aggregated to one of the five regional multimember districts (each includes several states), which then determines how many proportional representation (PR) seats each party gains. Since 1933, consecutive reelection has been constitutionally prohibited in Mexico, such that no elected official can run for the same office in the next consecutive term, and governors can never run for the same post again.

The 60 percent plurality tier places more emphasis on victories in plurality districts, because, as one former party strategist remarked, “It is much easier to win another (plurality) district than raise the national vote by one percent.” However, party leaders constrain the campaign activities their plurality deputy candidates carry

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6 Interview with a former PRI electoral strategist in the early 1990s, Maria de la Heras, November 22, 2001.
Public campaign financing from the national electoral authority (INE) is not delivered directly to candidates, but to the national party offices (National Executive Committees or CEN in the Spanish acronym), which then allocate it to the plurality candidates in a highly arbitrary manner. Federal legislative candidates must adhere to relatively low spending limits that have risen from US$70,000 to US$100,000 during the 2000 to 2012 period, although these limits were difficult to monitor in practice. This upper limit does not mean, however, that the parties must allocate this amount to each of their candidates. In fact, during the period of this study, many candidates reported receiving the peso equivalent of between US$35,000 to approximately US$50,000 from their national party HQs, or about half the spending limit. And because federal deputies cannot “bring home the bacon” to their districts in the form of geographically targeted budgetary expenditures, they do not receive as much private funding as mayoral candidates, for example. Single-term limits also mean that candidates cannot build up a permanent mobilization team (as in Japan). Therefore,

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7 Thanks to the 2008 electoral reform, federal legislative candidates are prohibited from taking out personal ads in radio and television; and they cannot hang banners or signs on public property, such as light posts.
8 The district spending limits for 2006 were US$75,000 (or MX$950,186.00); for 2009, US$70,000 (or MX$812,680.60), and in 2012, the limit was raised to US$98,000 (MX$1,120,373.61). See, http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/DIR-SECRE/gaceta_elec/gaceta94/5-G94-05.pdf, http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CGacuerdos/2009/Enero/29enero/CGo290109ap15.pdf, and http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/2011/diciembre/CGex201112-16/CGe161211ap3.pdf for more.
9 One losing hopeful from 2009 reported that a typical campaign cost about MX$5 million in 2009 or about US$400,000. Another candidate from the same year reported that he received about US$27,000 from his party and when asked how he campaigned with so little money, he said, “Friends. I have many friends.” Interview with a successful PRD candidate from Mexico City, July 29, 2011.
when a candidate runs for the Chamber of Deputies, she must start from scratch:
organize her team, find local vote brokers, and search out resources to carry out her
electioneering activities.

Table 1. Differences among Parties in Co-partisan Support.

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<th>PAN Percentage</th>
<th>PRD Percentage</th>
<th>PRI Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Co-partisan Mayor</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Co-partisan Governor</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>400</td>
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The PRI’s legislative candidates enjoyed a much higher probability of running with
a co-partisan governor or mayor than their rivals: in this sample, 57.5 percent of the PRI
candidates ran with a co-partisan governor and 50.2 percent with a co-partisan mayor.
Almost 22 percent of the PAN candidates campaigned under a co-partisan governor and
this figure rose to only 26 percent for mayors. The PRD saw similar figures: 21.75 percent
for co-partisan governors and 21.5 for co-partisan mayors.

This work now turns to a short description of each party’s factional history. The
large, non-ideological Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) is a former hegemonic
party that depended on and continues to employ clientelist networks to win votes
(Brandenburg 1964; Bruhn 1997; Estévez, Díaz-Cayeros, and Magaloni 2008). It is not a
programmatic party; rather, its ideological promises depend on the president or
presidential candidate of the moment. The party enjoys electoral support from all areas of
the nation and retook the presidency in 2012 after two (six-year) presidential terms out of
office. Between 2005 and 2015, PRI politicians governed between 19-21 states (out of the
31 states of the Union and a Federal District that shares many characteristics of a state). During its 70 years in power, the multi-class party devised ways to control its factions; and during its time out of the federal executive, its governors and national leadership were able to find new strategies to include different party groups in the distribution of power.

After the PRI’s defeat in 2000 presidential elections, the governors have been transformed into the strongest element of the party’s organization and its most eligible presidential candidates; they guarantee votes and are king-makers in the internal party decisions. Once ousted from the presidency, the PRI’s national leaders could not obligate their governors to recruit and aid members of other PRI groups within their states. However, even without a third party enforcer (who had been the President of Mexico) to force party leaders to cooperate, between 2000 and 2012, the PRI governors continued to both select and support PRI candidates from a variety of state party factions. And because of this tendency to accept candidates from other groups, the state executives were also more willing to support all their party’s legislative candidates.

The PRI governors were (and continue to be) the informal leaders of their state party organizations, and they gain loyalty from members of other party factions by nominating them to elected posts. By winning elections, they gain power within their state and the party at large. While the PAN and PRD governors are important political actors, they do not play the same electoral role as do their PRI counterparts: the PAN governors
do not recruit their cabinet secretaries from their state parties, and those of the PRD tend to belong to contentious national factions that cannot cooperate.\textsuperscript{10}

According to interview sources, the PRI governors support their co-partisan candidates in several ways, including: materials such as trucks and chairs and money; human resources from state government; and media support.\textsuperscript{11} The governors travel around the state and tout new public works while promoting their co-partisan candidates.\textsuperscript{12} When the PRI governor is popular, candidates from the same state use their governor’s name in their campaign efforts. The governor’s role is so strong that if she is not allied with a certain candidate, other operators will not work with the deputy hopeful until the governor openly supports the candidate by telling party operators to support her campaign.\textsuperscript{13} The difference with the other two parties is that the increase in electoral competition has not caused factional infighting to worsen, and PRI governors support candidates from non-aligned factions.

\textsuperscript{10} This tendency became so marked that the PRD finally split after the 2012 elections as its most charismatic leader left the party to form another left partisan option, the Morena (Movement of National Regeneration).

\textsuperscript{11} Author interview with Jesús Maria Ramón, a former PRI deputy from Coahuila, June 15, 2004. Deputy Francisco Jiménez Merino (May 26, 2004) reported that if a politician is an ally of the governor, the governor will groom him.

\textsuperscript{12} Author interviews with PRI Deputy from a PRI governed state, Francisco Jiménez Merino, May 26, 2004 and with PRI deputy Juan Carlos Pérez Góngora, May 2004, who ran concurrently with a strong PRI gubernatorial candidate. Only one PRI candidate related that his PRI governor was unable to support the campaigns (interview with Jorge Esteban Sandoval, May 22, 2002 who ran in Chihuahua with a co-partisan governor in 2000.

\textsuperscript{13} Former PRI deputy José Luis Flores Hernández (author interview, April 26, 2004).
Sitting PRI mayors also support candidates under most circumstances. As a winning PRI candidate stated: mayors are the base of the PRI, and when a PRI governor is in power, she will force the party’s mayors to work for co-partisan legislative candidates. Positive performance in office by the governor and the mayor helps the electoral prospects of the deputy candidate. Finally, PRI mayors are often the closest elected official to the neighborhood vote brokers; so if the governor prompts the mayors to help the candidates, the mayors will coordinate with the neighborhood intermediaries to speak to their neighbors, distribute selective benefits, and gather them together on election-day. If the candidate does not run with a PRI governor or mayor, electioneering is more difficult. A former PRI deputy running from a state without a PRI governor reported that without a co-partisan state executive, he was responsible for providing his own campaign materials and workers.

The center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is a clientelist party that also relies on a clear set of left-leaning programmatic appeals. However, strong factions deeply divide the party, and this affects its governors’ and mayors’ willingness to support co-partisan candidates. The center-left party was born of a split from the PRI of more left-leaning bureaucrats who claimed the pro-market economic policies pursued by neo-liberal leaders of the PRI government in the 1980s would eventually destroy the economy and its protections for workers and peasants (Bruhn 1997; Combes 2004; Özler 2009).

14 Author interviews with Francisco Jiménez Merino and with PRI deputy Mario Zepahua, May 31, 2004, and with former PRD governor of Zacatecas Ricardo Monreal (now with the Workers’ Party (February 17, 2009) and with former PRI governor Manuel Bartlett (May 2009).

The rule structure of the leftist PRD allocates some posts to losing internal groups, which has allowed its factions to remain powerful over time. Aside from the PRI deserters, the PRD organization was also formed from the left wing parties that flourished after the 1977 electoral reform and social movement groups that were centered in the Federal Capital (Bruhn 1997; Hilger 2008; Özler 2009; Tejera Gaona and Rodríguez Domínguez 2003; Wuhs 2008). In specific areas in which the PRD remained in power for years, it eventually became a clientelist party as well, with its greatest success being Mexico City, with its large government apparatus, resource flows, and government jobs (Hilger 2008; Meyenberg 2004; Zaremberg 2011).

The PRD’s factions flourish both within at the national level and those state governments where the party governs, or is traditionally strong (Bruhn 1997; Meyenberg 2004). However, since 2000, the role of these internal party groups has become more conflictual as higher posts and more resources are up for grabs. These antagonistic factions reduce the willingness of the PRD governors to support co-partisan candidates unless they are from the same internal group. Most PRD candidates, whether they won or lost their elections, did not mention their governors in their interviews, although some did report help from their co-partisan mayors.16 Those who mentioned their governors usually stated that he or she had rejected their request to run for mayor or head of the

16 Interview with PRD Federal Deputy María Araceli Vázquez Camacho (2009-2012) on June 10, 2010, who was from a bastion district with a PRD mayor and governor.
borough and had instead given them the option to run for the federal legislature as a consolation.\textsuperscript{17}

As one former PRI politician who moved to the PRD stated, “The governors of the PRD cannot help their co-partisan candidates as much (as the PRI governors) because of the factions. The governor is the leader of one faction so he will not always help members of another.”\textsuperscript{18} Several federal deputy candidates from the PRD relate the same problem: if a candidate is from a different faction than the candidate for mayor in a concurrent election, they will not campaign together (Bruhn 2010; Combes 2004; Hilger 2008).\textsuperscript{19} PRD governors have little interest in supporting their co-partisans because they cannot rely on them in the future as they most likely belong to a different faction.

Finally, the center-right National Action Party (PAN) is a liberal, pro-market, center-right party that has clear programmatic appeals and few stable clientelist networks and held the presidency for 12 years (2000-2012). The PAN was born as a programmatic party in 1939, and for several decades, its members had little hope of winning political office (Loaeza 1999; Mizrahi 2003). During the decades out of power, its factions were largely ideological and strategic; but after the party became competitive in the 1990s,

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with then-Deputy Emilio Serrano Jiménez from a PRD bastion district in Mexico City, July 15, 2010.
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Arturo Núñez, former member of the PRI, and later senator and governor for the PRD (March, 2009).
\textsuperscript{19} Fernando Pérez Rodríguez (August 30, 2010), a losing PRD candidate, reported that he was forced to run outside of his bailiwick and he could not piggy back on the campaigns of the PRD candidate for borough chief because they were from different groups.
different types of activist business people began to enter the party, transforming the structure of its internal groups (Wuhs 2008).

Once the center-right PAN began to win elections in various states in the north and center of the nation in the 1980s and 1990s, ambitious business people began to take greater interest in governing cities and states. As a result, they started to run for office – without sharing the strong ideological base that the original PAN members and leaders had developed through years of political activity in the hegemonic wilderness (Mizrahi 2003; Shirk 2005; Wuhs 2008). This caused distance between the party and state governments as the PAN governors staffed their state cabinets with business-oriented politicians and not with party careerists.

The splits between the party faithful and ambitious newcomers were evident in the state governments the PAN won before and after the final defeat of the PRI in presidential elections in 2000. In many cases, popular businesspeople won state elections for the PAN, but did not always bring party leaders into the state cabinet because the links between the party leaders and business leaders who turned to politics were weak. Furthermore, a good number of former PRI politicians who left their party to run under the center-right’s label also weakened the connection between party and state government. In terms of candidate selection, the PAN developed clear rules for choosing candidates a delegate conventions or a type of closed primary (when the party places several voting stations in different municipalities within the state or legislative district).

Former PRI politicians who ran for the PAN include: in Puebla, Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas; in Sonora, Guillermo Padrés; Mario López Valdez of Sinaloa; Héctor Ortiz Ortiz of Tlaxcala; and Antonio Echevarría Domínguez of Nayarit.
Even so, with the success of the party, the national organization began to take use its power to decide candidacies. Thus, while PRI governors have the informal prerogative of deciding congressional candidates, their PAN counterparts generally do not, which means the PAN state executives have fewer reasons to support them in their races – since they were not able to place them (either because of party primaries or a top-down decision). Because of these factors, we expect that the PAN’s federal deputy candidates will not campaign with a larger portfolio of activities when they run in a state that is governed by a co-partisan.

To strengthen the argument that PAN governors support their co-partisans less than those of the PRI, the author searched newspapers and government web pages to find the prior professional trajectories of almost 400 state cabinet members from the PRI, PAN, (and PRD) administrations between 2004 and 2012. The variable of interest is how many of the PRD and PAN secretaries of state cabinets held party posts versus those from the PRI. If the argument that PAN governors are less connected to their parties is correct, then one should find fewer active party members serving as cabinet secretaries than those of the PRI. Because it is very difficult to gather information on exactly which faction that state cabinet members stem, for the full sample this work assumes that a larger number of active party members in a cabinet implies a larger number of factions that the governor has involved in her government.

Active party members are those who have held elected office under the party’s label or have held party leadership posts. Those termed “bureaucratic career” types have held no party offices and rose through the bureaucratic ranks or have a relevant
professional career, such as a medical doctor serving as the Secretary of Health. “Other party” secretaries are those on a cabinet who held elected or leadership posts for a one party and then went to work for another party’s governor.  

Table 3. State Cabinet Secretaries (percentages in bold), 2004 to 2015.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>ACTIVE PARTY MEMBER</th>
<th>CAREER BUREAUCRAT</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>OTHER PARTY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>202</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>189 (47.5)</td>
<td>99 (24.9)</td>
<td>37 (9.3)</td>
<td>36 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data from newspapers and web searches; the base includes 22 of the nation’s 32 states and 31 different state administrations. See the appendix for all states and administrations for each party.

This sample found more PRI state administrations because the PRI has held more than twice the number of state governorships. The table above shows that the PRI governors called a higher percentage of active party members to lead their cabinet secretariats (54 percent versus 38 for the PAN and 45 for the PRD). One can infer that they were willing to include a wider range of party factions in their leadership coalition for the simple reason that more party members signify that a larger number of factions are represented. Since the large difference between the PRI and PAN, one can reject the hypothesis that PAN governors recruit state cabinet members from as many factions as the PRI and as a result, they would be less likely to support their legislative candidates.

---

21 One might argue that PAN and PRD governors employ a lower proportion of active party members because they have fewer party politicians to choose from, given that they were opposition parties in a hegemonic system and so were excluded from elected posts. To avoid this problem, the data base includes only those governments in which the PAN and PRD had held the governorship at least once, so the potential pool of party leaders and members is larger.
However, the assumption that more party actors is equivalent to a larger number of factions may be faulty, especially for the PRD, so the author took a sub-sample and searched out the factional membership of those members of the party to verify this claim. In fact, in the sub-sample, it becomes clear that party members in the PRI were from several internal groups, but in the PAN and the PRD, this was not the case. The sub-sample (more information in the Appendix) includes two states for each party, and in those states, the author discovered five to six factions present in the PRI cabinets, and two to three internal groups for the PAN and PRD factions. Not only do PRI governors invite more active party members to be secretaries on their cabinets, but these party members represent a larger number of factions than their PAN and PRD counterparts.

III. Differences in the Number of Types of Campaign Activities.

Table 2 below presents the number and type of campaign activities undertaken by a random and representative sample of federal congressional candidates from Mexico’s three major parties for two electoral cycles, 2009 and 2012. Of the total universe of 1,800 SMD campaigns (the three major parties in 300 districts for two elections), the author sampled 200 candidates for each party for each election, for a total of 1,200. The author then search these selected candidates in the Google search engine, as well as YouTube, the Organización Editorial Mexicana (OEM), and Infolatina (both newspaper cutting services) and found information on campaign rallies, YouTube videos, canvassing, interviews in media, and the use of social media. It was impossible to count the total

---

22 While OEM is clearly tied to the PRI interests in the states, Infolatina is not, nor is YouTube or the Google search engine, so this bias is mitigated substantially.
number of campaign activities undertaken by each candidate because the news or internet does not report all campaign events. Full information on age or educational status for the entire candidate sample was impossible to obtain, so these two socioeconomic variables are excluded. Finally, because the Electoral Institute’s reporting rules do not separate party spending and candidate expenses at the district level, we cannot use district spending figures.

Table 3. Candidate Activities by Party in Percentages, 2009 and 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRD</th>
<th>PRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Video Spots</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social Media</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interviews</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rallies</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Canvassing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number Candidates</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first finding from Table 2 above is that despite single term limits, low spending ceilings, and a prohibition against purchasing radio and television time, plurality candidates from all three parties work diligently to canvass, win interview opportunities, organize rallies, use social media, and post videos. However, the PRI candidates carry out more types of activities than their rivals. And as will be shown below, the probability is greater that a PRI candidate running with a co-partisan official will have a wider portfolio

---

23 Up to the 2014 reforms, the nation’s electoral commission was referred to as the Federal Electoral Institute or IFE. Today, it is known as the National Electoral Institute or INE.
of electioneering activities than either her PRI counterparts who run without co-partisan officials, or her PAN and PRD rivals.

In Table 3 below, four ordered logit models are presented; one for all three parties taken together (n=1,200) with the dependent variable of zero to five types of activities carried out by Mexican SMD candidates (these same types are found in Table 2, above). The next model considers the candidates of the PRI against those of the PAN and the PRD. The reasoning behind this decision is that the PAN and the PRD act quite similarly on most points of interest. Most importantly for this discussion, indicator variables measuring whether the candidate ran with a co-partisan governor or mayor are included in all models. If co-partisan elected officials support candidates, we assume that this support translates into more active campaigns, so the coefficients on the co-partisan governor and/or the co-partisan mayor variables should be positive and significant.

As noted above, co-partisan officials are not the only reason candidates are able to carry out more active campaigns: candidates with more prior experience should register a wider array of campaign activities. The author measured prior political experience using three different indicator variables of “any municipal experience,” “any state experience,” and “any federal experience.” These are not mutually exclusive variables as candidates for federal office normally hold prior posts in several levels of government. It might also possible that candidates campaign less actively when concurrent local elections are held in their state or municipality simply because the party and its colors are promoted by other candidates, allowing them to campaign with fewer types of activities.
During the two electoral cycles under study, the 46.3 percent of the PRI’s districts were bastions, while 19.2 percent were competitive, and 34.5 percent were lost for the party of the candidate under study. The center-right National Action Party held only 19.6 percent of the nation’s 300 districts as bastion, 16.5 percent as competitive, and 64 percent as historically lost. The PRD fared even worse: 12 percent of the nation’s 300 districts were strongholds for the PRD, eight percent were competitive, and a whopping 81 percent were “losing districts” for the center-left party.

In competitive districts, it should be more likely that candidates would commit to carrying out a wider portfolio of activities because this might make the difference between victory and defeat in the district. In historically losing districts, however, the candidates are less likely to hold a wide portfolio of electioneering activities because they are less likely to receive limited party resources. In bastion districts, one should not expect candidates to shirk because if the party’s historical vote share in that district drops, party leaders will tag the candidate as a selfish, non-team player.

Several control variables are also included; such as rural versus urban districts, measured as the percentage of rural precincts in a district, so that a higher number indicates a more rural district. The wealth of residents in any given district is measured by the percentage of residents with social security coverage (the higher the coverage, the wealthier the district); and the logged population of the state in which the district is found. Finally, an indicator variable is included for the year of the election, in which 2012 is assigned a “1”.
Table 3. Ordered Logit Regression. Dependent Variable: Different Number of Activities (0 to 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Competitive</th>
<th>Bastion</th>
<th>District Competitiveness (Losing District is Excluded)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.358** (*.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.171 (*.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Municipal Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td>.164</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any State Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.344***</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any Federal Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td>.442**</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>.487**</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Partisan Mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>(.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>-0.896***</td>
<td>(.184)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>-1.33***</td>
<td>(.187)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN*co-gov</td>
<td>-0.566**</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD *co-gov</td>
<td>-0.632</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.632***</td>
<td>(.202)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Local Election</td>
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<td>(.132)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Population (logged)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security Coverage</td>
<td></td>
<td>.936</td>
<td>(.718)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(% of District Population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Nomination</td>
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<td>-0.225**</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year Election (2012)</td>
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<td>0.579***</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Psuedo R2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
From Model 1 in Table 3 above, we see that PAN candidates who run in states with governors from their same party are likely to campaign with fewer activities than their PAN colleagues who run in states without PAN state executives (the PANCOGOVR is negative and significant). The PRD co-partisan governor variable is negative, but not significant, so this elected official does not affect the likelihood of campaigning with more or fewer types of activities. PRI governors support co-partisan electioneering efforts more than do their PAN and PRD counterparts, as can be seen from the co-partisan governor term, which is positive and significant. In the Figure below, when a PAN candidate has a co-partisan governor one can see that for a higher number of types of activities (five, which is the red line with the triangle), there is a lower likelihood of carrying out these types of activities. But for zero activities, the line changes its slope: with a co-partisan PAN governor, the probability of carrying out zero activities rises, instead of falls.
Figure 2. The Probability of PAN Candidates Carrying Out Activities with and Without a Co-Partisan Governor.

Source: Ologit regression in Table 3.

PRI candidates are more likely to campaign with a wider portfolio of activities when they run in a district in a state with a co-partisan governor.
Figure 3. Probability of Numbers of Types of Activities for PRI Candidates, With and Without a Co-Partisan Governor.

As the Figure above shows, PRI deputies with a co-partisan governor are more likely to carry out 5 activities than when they run without a governor from their party (the red line with a square). Having a governor from the PRI drops the probability that co-partisan federal candidates will carry out no activities (the blue line with the diamond).

As expected, candidates in competitive districts and greater political backgrounds drive up the probability that candidates will carry out more types of campaign activities. In Figure 4 below, the probability that a candidate (from any party) carries out five types of activities rises if she has prior state political experience and falls if she does not.

Source: Ologit in Table 3.
Conclusions.

This paper explored the relation between different types of party-factional relations and their effects on campaigning, and helps demonstrate that governors from parties with well-ordered factions are heavily involved in supporting co-partisan candidates. Governors from those parties that have non-cooperating factions (the PRD) or groups that simply do not seem to communicate much with state government (the PAN), are less able or willing to support deputy hopefuls in their quest to reach the federal congress, even though it may be in their interests to do so. Only the state executives from the PRI were willing to help their legislative co-partisans, while both PRI and PAN mayors expended efforts for their parties’ Chamber hopefuls where their boundaries of authorities overlapped. The PRD with its hostile and tumultuous factions finds that its governors and mayors are both unlikely to send support, expertise, or resources to its co-
partisan campaigners for the Lower House, who as a result, are less likely to run campaigns with many different types of activities.

While this study has only considered the Mexican case, its findings communicate well with those of Brazil and Argentina, both federal democracies with weaker institutions of accountability. In these nations, sub-national elected officials also support candidates in various ways, both legal and illegal. It is up to future research to determine whether factions play a role in whether governors from parties with different factional structures are more or less willing to support their co-partisan candidates in their campaigning tasks.

REFERENCES


Pérez Yarahuán, Gabriela. “Accountability institutions and Political Bias in Federal Social Programs in Mexico, 2000-2006


ologit fixed i.yearelection i.manl i.allmun i.allst i.fedgov i.copartisa > ngovernor i.tdist2 PANCOGOVR PRDCOGOVR PAN PRD logstatepop i.concurrent_local > _election rural demnom i.copartmayor

38
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -2056.5963
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -1842.0701
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -1838.1946
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -1838.1819
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -1838.1819

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      1,167
LR chi2(17)       =     436.83
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -1838.1819                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1062

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<th>fixed</th>
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<th>z</th>
<th>P&gt;z</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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<td>1.45</td>
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<td>-.057217 - .3861895</td>
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<td>.292147</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</table>

> -----------------
> fixed       | Coef.   | Std. Err. |      z  |   P>z     | [95% Conf. Interval] |
| /cut1       | -7.792371 | 1.276453  | -10.29417 |           |                     |
| /cut2       | -6.838939 | 1.271745  | -9.33153 |           |                     |
| /cut3       | -6.031045 | 1.267869  | -8.516024 |           |                     |
| /cut4       | -5.121717 | 1.26424  | -7.599582 |           |                     |
| /cut5       | -3.851252 | 1.262079  | -6.324881 |           |                     |

> -----------------

. ologit fixed i.yearelection man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov i.copartisangovernor i
> .tdist2 i.demnom i.copartmayor i.PAN i.PANCOGOVR rural pobderss i.concurrent_local_elec
> tion logstatepop

Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -2056.5963
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -1842.0701
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -1838.1946
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -1838.1819
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -1838.1819

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      1,167
LR chi2(16)       =     331.89
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -1890.6533                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0807
. ologit fixed i.yearelection man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov i.copartisangovernor i.tdist2 i.demnom i.copartmayor i.PAN i.PANCOGOV OR rural pobderss i.concurrent_local_election logstatepop
>
>    log likelihood = -1842.3681
>    Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1842.3681

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      1,167
Log likelihood = -1842.3681                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1042

fixed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
yearelection |  2012 |    .5701595   .1092911     5.22   0.000     .3559529    .784366
man1 |    .0767318   .1178446     0.65   0.515 -1.4516981    .5951594
1.allmunic |    .2693183   .1112691     2.42   0.016     .0512349    .4874017
1.allstate |    .4795176   .1171951     4.09   0.000     .2498194    .7092158
1.fedgov |    .4896196   .1996657     2.45   0.014      .098282    .8809572
1.copartisangovernor |    .6762503   .1553585     4.35   0.000     .3717533    .9807473
1.tdist2 |  2 |    .4205158   .1544509     2.72   0.006     .1177975     .723234
3 |    .2643049   .1561047     1.69   0.090 -1.0416594    .569270
1.demnom |  -1.446553   .111971     -1.29   0.196 -2.6646721    .7715655
1.copartmayor |    .5337836   .1388935     3.84   0.000      .261554    .8060132
1.PAN |  -0.0175104   .1355267     -0.13   0.897 -0.3834616    .3484407
1.PANCOGOV OR |  -0.8972953   .2557269    -3.51   0.000 -1.395811    -.4058605
rural |  -0.6074369     .20126     -3.02   0.002 -1.000899    -.213975
pobderss |    1.450944   .6978984     2.08   0.038      .0830886      2.8188
1.concurrent_local_election |  -1.039575   .1297857     -8.01   0.000 -1.3952305    -.683920
logstatepop |    4.040756   1.800592     7.569852    .5116598
 /cut1 |    3.104509   1.798263     6.62904    .4200211
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 /cut3 |  -1.473877   1.796199    -4.92854     3.451
 /cut4 |  -2.997997   1.796199    -3.820284    3.220685
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1.PRICOGOVR | .5106234  .2507238  2.04  0.042  .0192138  1.002033
rural | -.6153762  .2028511  -3.03  0.002  -.812957  -0.2177954
pobderss | .9662256  .7139432  1.35  0.176  -.4330774  2.365529
1.concurrent_local_elec | -.1977036  .3212377  -8.15  0.000  -.356283  -.185287
logstatepop | -.2428727  .1006161  -2.43  0.015  -.4389898  -.0467556

/ cut1 | 4.929036  1.842958
/ cut2 | 3.977914  1.840529
/ cut3 | 3.17418  1.838719
/ cut4 | 2.269866  1.837103
/ cut5 | 1.006172  1.836987

ologit fixed i.yearelection man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov i.copartisangovernor i.PRD i.tdist2 i.demnom i.copartmayor i.PRDCOGOVR rural pobderss i.concurrent_local_elec > tion logstatepop
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -2056.5963
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -1871.3401
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -1868.3245
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1868.3140
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -1868.3140

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs     =      1,167
LR chi2(16)       =     376.56
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -1868.314                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0916

                         |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------+---------------------------------------
fixed                  |                                      
                       +---------------------------------------
/ cut1                 | -4.929036  1.842958                 
/ cut2                 | -3.977914  1.840529                 
/ cut3                 | -3.17418  1.838719                  
/ cut4                 | -2.269866  1.837103                 
/ cut5                 | -1.006172  1.836987                 

yearelection | .5741877  .1100495  5.22  0.000  .3584947  .7898807
             | .174175  .1179195  1.48  0.140  -.056943  .405293
             | .2354536  .1119417  2.10  0.035  .0160519  .4548553
             | .4864782  .1173487  4.15  0.000  .2564789  .7164775
             | .3152068  .1996701  1.58  0.114  -.0761393  .7065529
             | .5736269  .1521856  3.77  0.000  .2753485  .8719052
             | -.71981  .138346  -5.20  0.000  -.9909632  -.4486568
             | .3354748  .1556109  2.16  0.031  .030483  .6404665
             | .1327809  .1590117  0.84  0.404  -.1798763  .4444381
             | -.2101058  .1132996  -1.85  0.064  -.4321689  .0119573
```

ologit fixed i.yearelection i.man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov  i.tdist2 i.partycode##i.copartisangovernor logstatep i.concurrent_local_election rural demnom i.copartmayor
margins copartisangov##partycode, predict(outcome(5))
marginsplot

ologit fixed i.yearelection i.man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov  i.tdist2 i.PRI##i.copartisangovernor logstatep i.concurrent_local_election rural demnom i.copartmayor
margins copartisangov##PRI, predict(outcome(5))
marginsplot

Ejemplo de DOS outcomes
margins copartisangov, at(PAN=0 PRD=0) predict(outcome(5))
predict(outcome(1))

Ejemplo de DOS outcomes
margins copartisangov, at(PAN=0 PRD=0) predict(outcome(5))
predict(outcome(1))
ologit fixed i.yearelection i.man1 i.allmunic i.allstate i.fedgov i.copartisangovernor i.PRI i.PRD i.PRICOGVR i.PRDCOGVR i.tdist2 logstatepop i.concurrent_local_election rural i.copartmayor