

How Authoritarian Legacies of Social Order and Extraction
Impact Democracy:
Evidence from Portugal

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Abstract. How do authoritarian legacies linked to the requisitioning of citizen support for national projects impact how voters behave under democracy? We examine this question in the context of Portugal, where a deeply authoritarian regime conscripted hundreds of thousands of citizens to fight colonial wars and then collapsed in 1974, giving way to democracy. We use original data on military recruitment and exogenous variation in regional exposure to recruitment to examine how rates of military service impacted subsequent voter turnout and expressed partisanship in Portugal's founding set of democratic elections. Higher rates of military recruitment are associated with lower voter turnout and with voting against military-backed candidates. While the findings reveal vulnerabilities in participation for new democracies that are formed in the wake of major war, they also suggest a previously underexamined mechanism that can serve to support democratic consolidation by relegating the military to the barracks and out of politics.

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1 Introduction

How does citizen participation in the goals or duties of an authoritarian regime impact political participation and democratic consolidation in new democracies? Consider enlistment in the military. Military service is a fundamental civic activity, and sometimes an obligation, that can have a transformative impact on those that serve (Parker 2009). It can also affect society writ large during and after wartime. Military conscription, for instance, can impact social solidarity and the burden of taxation among the rich and the poor as wartime contributions and fairness are balanced (Scheve and Stasavage, 2011; Skocpol, 1995). Soldiers who return home from war may press to fundamentally reshape the social contract (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). And conflict involvement can impact the ability to manage post-conflict ethnic or demographic turbulence back home (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012).

Important existing scholarship typically examines the link between national service – and especially military service – and politics in the context of relatively stable political regimes.¹ For instance, scholars have studied how military socialization has affected political participation among waves of United States veterans serving in different wars (Teigen, 2006), how military service impacts volunteerism in the United States (Nesbit and Reingold, 2011), and how combat exposure influences attitudes for conflict rivals and voting for political parties in Israel (Grossman et al., 2015).

But millions of people over the last century have fought for their countries under dictatorship and then lived to see the government crumble and be replaced by democracy. How does prior military service among a substantial sector of the population impact the robustness and nature of democracy that transpires in these cases?

This paper examines how military recruitment under dictatorship impacts patterns of voter engagement and expressed partisanship after democratization in a way that impinges on democratic consolidation. It does so in Portugal, where dictatorship was deeply entrenched for decades under António Salazar and Marcelo Caetano and conscription became widespread in the regime’s waning years. Portugal engaged in an increasingly costly set of wars in the 1960s and 1970s to forestall independence movements in its colonial possessions of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. By the early 1970s, roughly 8% of Portugal’s labor force was in the military (Card and Cardoso, 2011, pg. 3). Hundreds of thousands of others had migrated abroad to avoid the

¹There is also a growing literature on conflict involvement and its effects on political behavior and social cohesion in the context of civil war (e.g., Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014).

draft (Baganha and Marques 2001, Table 2.10).

It is widely accepted that Portugal's colonial wars played a key role in the authoritarian regime's ousting (e.g., Schmitter 1986; Maxwell 1995). In the face of a costly series of wars that showed no sign of victory or abatement and changes to military promotion rules that served to bolster the military's ranks but generated officer resentment, a set of middle-ranking military officers toppled the dictatorship in 1974. These military officers engineered a ceasefire in the colonies and led Portugal through a turbulent transition to democracy. The military then explicitly cast its weight behind selected political parties in early elections. Portugal's transition to democracy was historically monumental: it sparked the third wave of democracy that would come to wash over dozens of countries in ensuing decades.

Existing literature suggests that war does not present fertile ground for democracy. It arms citizens, creates specialists in violence, generates distrust among individuals, and can aggrandize, provoke, or humiliate militaries (Berghahn, 2002; Bermeo, 2003). In Portugal, however, scholars argue that a crushing defeat in the colonial wars helped to underpin democracy. Bermeo (2007), for instance, argues that the war's costs and its impacts on the state's capacity and the political culture of the military officer corps propelled the country toward stable and robust democracy.

To date, however, there are no studies of how military recruitment at the local level in Portugal – or elsewhere – impacted key metrics of citizen engagement and support for democracy in the context and immediate aftermath of democratization.

Portugal is a particularly propitious case in which to examine this relationship not only because of the outsized importance of its democratic transition but also because of the scope and process of military recruitment, the timing of elections that ushered in democracy, and the partisan nature of the military in early elections. The Portuguese military practiced broad male conscription in the 1960s and early 1970s and conducted recruitment sessions in towns and rural areas across the country that were used to enlist men. The extensive nature of recruitment meant that nearly all Portuguese families had at least one of their members fighting in Africa by the early 1970s. Conscription therefore impacted not just conscripts themselves but also members of society around them.

The timing of the democratic transition also makes Portugal a good case in which to examine the link between recruitment and politics. The military staged constituent assembly elections when it was still firmly in control; this was followed by a first set of legislative elections that inaugurated democracy and sent the military to the barracks; subsequent legislative elections

occurred entirely under civilians with the military on the sidelines. In the first two elections, the military endorsed specific parties and candidates and therefore revealed partisan preferences. This was less true in the third set of elections.

We gathered original data on military recruitment in Portugal based on military archives of recruitment sessions from the late 1960s. We link rates of male enlistment at the parish level to subsequent patterns of turnout and partisanship in Portugal's elections in 1975, 1976, and 1979 that were key to introducing democracy. Because factors such as patriotism and ideology could have impacted both military recruitment and subsequent voting patterns, we rely on differential spatial patterns of military recruitment and instrument rates of enlistment in the late 1960s with distance to the nearest military base in the 1960s. This generates exogenous variation in enlistment.

We find that parishes with higher rates of male enlistment exhibit lower rates of voter turnout in founding democratic elections. We take this as evidence of apathy – or even antipathy – toward a state that conscripted its youth to fight a highly unpopular set of wars. Furthermore, we find that parishes with higher rates of male enlistment systematically deviated from the military's preferred political candidates in early elections. Rather, greater rates of enlistment are associated with voting for more mainstream political candidates, and especially the ideological polar opposite of the political forces favored by the military. The findings shed light on the early risks to democratic transition in Portugal and one of most potent factors supporting rapid democratic consolidation through civilian supremacy over an increasingly politically impotent military.

The results also help to shed light on cases of democratic transition and consolidation in which large sections of the population formerly served in the military of an unpopular authoritarian regime. Examples include Argentina in the 1980s, Chile in the 1990s, Iraq in the 2000s, Tunisia in the 2010s, and Pakistan through several transitions in recent decades. Whether and how authoritarian-era military service impacts participation and voting patterns in these cases is critical to understanding subsequent political trajectories. The findings also speak to broader questions about citizen service and citizen experience in national political projects under dictatorship and how these shape a nascent democratic electorate.

2 Militaries in Dictatorship and Democratic Transitions

A large, rich literature has developed to examine the role that militaries play in political life under dictatorship and in the context of democratization. Militaries are always fundamental to authoritarian rule and in some regimes they rule directly (Geddes, 1999). They are also enormously consequential in the context of democratic transitions. For instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1991) illustrate how militaries that support an authoritarian regime manipulate the terms of transition in their favor and then maintain resources and autonomy post-transition to protect their interests. Recent scholarship supports this contention (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2018).

This suggests that militaries can enforce their interests even after they go back to the barracks. Sutter (1995, pg. 110) indicates one way these interests can be enforced: “The possibility of reintervention allows the military to ensure compliance by other parties and overcome the punishment dilemma.” Another way authoritarian-era elites and their military allies can protect their interests after transition is through the endurance of dominant parties that survive the transition and afford them a greater likelihood of recapturing office after democratization (Wright and Escriba-Folch, 2012). In still other cases, these elites can use personal or professional connections or their reputations to return to positions of power under democracy (Albertus, 2019).

Of course, militaries do not always retain their political power and influence during and after transitions to democracy. Militaries sometimes purposely retreat straight to the barracks in order to lower their profile and avoid prosecution, as in Brazil after 1985. In other cases, such as Argentina in the 2000s, the political power of the military is hollowed out by transitional justice mechanisms that seek to redress past state abuses. Lustration and related policies that reduce the power and autonomy of authoritarian-era military officials and officers who possess coercive tools that could be used to subvert democracy or democratic legitimacy can help to make democracy “the only game in town” (e.g., Diamond (1999)).

Existing literature, however, tends to focus on how the military as an organization, or military elites, impact democratization and democratic consolidation. There are very few studies of how contemporary or former military rank and file impact these outcomes.

2.1 The Military Rank and File Through Democratization

While few studies examine how military service impacts political behavior in the context of democratization, we can nonetheless generate hypotheses by building from other contexts. Most

studies find that the political effects of military service are positive. Military service has been linked, for instance, to higher voter turnout (Teigen, 2006) and volunteerism (Nesbit and Reingold, 2011). Even the challenging circumstances of fighting in a civil war can increase political participation (Blattman, 2009) and social cohesion (Gilligan et al., 2014).

These positive effects can be driven by several mechanisms. Military service may inculcate values of patriotism and service to country through a process of socialization, which can in turn affect political participation (Teigen, 2006). Veteran organizations' historical origins and political clout can also work to increase veterans' participation in politics (Jensen, 2003).²

Positive effects of military service on forms of political participation such as voter turnout may be especially likely to obtain during democratization if the military played a strong role in supporting popular authoritarian legacies linked to outcomes such as security or strong economic growth. Effects are also more likely to be positive for members of volunteer armies as opposed to conscripts who are compelled to serve.

But there are also reasons to believe that military service under dictatorship can have a negative impact on political participation in elections at the founding of democracy. This is particularly likely to obtain if those who served were conscripted instead of volunteers, and if they were involved in an unpopular war. Teigen (2006), for instance, finds lower rates of voter turnout among American veterans of the Vietnam war in contrast to veterans of World War II or the Korean War. The military rank and file may also vote at lower rates at the founding of democracy if military experience breeds apathy or antipathy to the state. Serving unwillingly in an authoritarian regime whose military leaders remain unprosecuted through a transition to democracy could breed strong distaste to participating in politics.

What about the impact of military service on the partisan patterns of voting separately from turnout? This question is particularly important where there is military partisanship in politics, either because military members from the authoritarian past continue in positions of political power or because the military as an institution takes partisan positions from the barracks (e.g., by endorsing a certain political party). On the one hand, military service may increase support for the military's preferred candidates if military socialization has been successful and veterans have positive affect for the military. This could in fact be deleterious for democracy if the military leadership simply swaps out their uniforms for suits and become powerful actors under

²Of course, the relationship between military service and participation could merely be epiphenomenal in some cases, especially in volunteer militaries. Characteristics that drive enlistment, such as a priori patriotism or a sense of civic duty, may also drive later participation.

democracy in such a way that protects the autonomy and political clout of the military. On the other hand, military service may reduce support for military-backed candidates if veterans have negative affect for the military. This could bolster civilian candidates and civilian control over the military while keeping the military in the barracks, giving a new democracy a better chance at consolidation.

These hypothesized effects are not limited only to those that serve in the military. After all, the departure of a family member to serve in the military impacts everyone else in the household and can also impact broader communities. These communities form opinions over the necessity and value of service, and whether it merits the sacrifices that it entails. Consequently, there are strong reasons to believe that there should be broader societal legacies to military service that extend beyond veterans per se.

3 Military Service and Democracy in Portugal

Portugal is an ideal case in which to examine the link between citizen service under dictatorship and political behavior during democratic transition given the vast enlistment of men into military service under the Salazar-Caetano regime followed by the regime's collapse and replacement by short-lived military rule that ushered in democracy.

3.1 Military Recruitment and Return

In the latter years of the Estado Novo (1933-1974), Portugal found itself embroiled in a number of colonial wars and sought to increase the size of its armed forces by requiring that men serve a minimum of two to four years in the army upon turning 18 or 21 (depending on the year of recruitment and whether the regime had officially declared itself to be in a period of peace or war).^{3 4} What this meant in practice is that young men in their late teens to early twenties were typically drafted into the army and put through basic training before being shipped out or stationed in a regional military base somewhere in the country (Accornero, 2013, pg. 1044). Rates of male military recruitment increased steadily throughout the 1960s and reached a peak

³There is some inconsistency in the reporting of this figure. According to Card and Cardoso (2011), the minimum military service requirement was two years until 1969 (3; Table 1). Cutileiro (1971) suggests that military service had a three-year minimum in the 1960s, two of which were typically spent in Africa (67). Finally, Bermeo (2007) notes a four-year military service requirement (392). This is likely on account of the changing terms of conscription throughout the Estado Novo.

⁴Lei n.º 2034 Publicação: Diário do Governo n.º 156/1949, Série I de 1949-07-18, Article 35. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/259921/details/normal?q=lei+2034>. Accessed: January 20, 2020.

at 46.9% of eligible men in 1970. This number dropped to 23.4% in 1972 only to pick up again after the Revolution in 1974 (Card and Cardoso 2011, Table 1).⁵

The duration of mandatory military service similarly dropped to eight months in 1970-71 and four months from 1972 onward (Card and Cardoso 2011, Table 1). Nonetheless, by the end of the autocratic regime, military conscription was so widespread that “it was rare to find a Portuguese family who did not have someone fighting in Africa” (Bermeo, 2007, pg. 391). In the early 1970s, Portugal’s population of eight million was still fielding a full 282,000 troops, producing a rate of civilian recruitment rivaled only by Israel and Vietnam since the end of WWII (Bermeo, 2007, pg. 391). But given the declining duration of military service, the majority of individuals recruited into the military in the early 1970s would have already returned to Portugal prior to the end of the autocratic regime.

While all military-aged men were required to serve in the armed forces – with some exemptions or postponements for students, seminarians, widowers with children, sole family breadwinners, and those unfit for duty – evasion of the draft was not entirely uncommon.⁶ According to Accornero (2013), somewhere between 11 and 20 percent of those individuals called up to the army failed to report for duty between 1960 and 1970. Many of those who failed to report, however, were forced to flee the country. The reason for this is that the consequences for draft evasion for young men, including failing to register, intentional incapacitation, bribery, or lying about one’s qualifications, were severe and ranged from anywhere between large fines to several years in prison.⁷ People caught aiding evasion, such as recruitment officers, doctors, and individuals hiding potential recruits could be similarly punished.

The decision to comply with conscription or otherwise exile oneself was driven by a number of factors beyond simply not wanting to fight in far-away wars. Accornero (2013, pg. 1045) notes that an individual’s political affiliations might have influenced their tendency to evade the draft: while members of left-wing student organizations typically opposed the wars and resisted being conscripted, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) opposed draft evasion altogether, “encouraging its militants to join the armed forces, to undertake military service, distribute

⁵Interestingly, enrollment in military academies does not correlate perfectly with the rate of recruitment as the Caetano regime eased the training requirements for new recruits in the latter years of the Estado Novo (Graham, 1979, pg. 227-30).

⁶Decreto n.º 42937: Publicação: Diário do Governo n.º 94/1960, Série I de 1960-04-22, Articles 53-4. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/281607/details/maximized?perPage=100sort=whenSearchableq=%22Serviço+Militar%22sortOrder=ASC>. Accessed: January 20, 2020

⁷Lei n. 1961: Publicação: Diário do Governo n.º 204/1937, Série I de 1937-09-01, Articles 76-82. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/434592/details/normal?q=lei+1961>. Accessed: January 20, 2020.

propaganda, and to foster boycotts from ‘within.’” Moreover, Cutileiro (1971, pg. 67.8) notes that some young men volunteered for the army before they reached the age of conscription in order to complete their service as soon as possible. Military service was even welcomed by some, “in spite of the new risks attached, because it opens the way for an escape from the hardships of rural work.”

Starting in 1974-5, soldiers that had been fighting in the colonies and Portuguese citizens living in Africa returned to the metropole in droves, leading the country’s population to grow by roughly 5% during that two-year period alone. Estimates suggest that as many as 600,000 *retornados* entered Portugal during the transition period (Carrington and De Lima, 1996, pg. 331; 335). In order to deal with this rapid influx of military trained men and stave off the risk that they would become radicalized and mobilize against the government, the transitional and first civilian governments quickly established generous resettlement and social welfare programs aimed at easing their transition to civilian life. Some *retornados* were even put up in “luxury tourist hotels” (334).

Despite what many feared, however, *retornados* “did not become a resentful and radicalized constituency” (Oliveira, 2017, pg. 15). One reason for this is that, in contrast to cases of civil war or inter-state wars on the home front, soldiers who fought in Portugal’s colonial wars did not anticipate that fighting would continue upon their return home and, therefore, left their weapons—and seemingly their militarism—in Africa. Moreover, many of these individuals were re-assimilated into Portuguese society; many took up positions in the civil service or worked in the banks that were nationalized following the revolution. All in all, Bermeo (2007, pg. 395) suggests that “[the] most telling evidence of their absorption perhaps is the fact that no extremist elites were able to mobilize the *retornados*’ discontent with much success.” Overall, they did not categorically support a single political party or particular partisan ideology.

3.2 The Carnation Revolution, Democratic Transition, and Early Democratic Elections

The military’s role in both politics and society changed dramatically with the military coup launched by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974 (Bermeo, 2007, pg. 393). Composed of a range of officers of different rank, the MFA organized around a growing frustrating over the Caetano regime’s attempt to maintain Portugal’s colonies and called for the installation of General António de Spínola as president (Maxwell, 1986, pg. 111).

This group of officers was immediately supported by a broad swathe of civilians who crowded the popular Largo do Carmo in Lisbon in order to witness the surrender of the former dictator and the public arrest of members of the repressive military police, the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE). By the end of the day, the *Estado Novo* had effectively been toppled and the country found itself in the hands of General Spínola and an assorted group of military advisors.

In the months that followed, the MFA publicly framed the coup as a liberation of the Portuguese people from both the dictatorship and, more specifically, from the horrors of the colonial wars. In a particularly poignant piece of propaganda, it claimed the following: “The Portuguese people suffered, for tens of years, the greatest misery, dragging themselves into a degraded life, seeing their best children persecuted, tortured, murdered”; “The Portuguese people saw, for a dozen long years, their children leave for a war in Africa, many not returning, many returning diminished, all deeply disturbed by what they saw in the war zones.” In contrast to this dark history, the MFA both framed the coup it had launched as an “overthrow of fascism” and positioned itself as the driving force behind Portuguese democratization.⁸ It even developed a “Cultural Dynamization Program” oriented around informing civilians about the function and significance of elections and emphasized the importance of civilian engagement in bringing about a successful democratic transition (Fields, 1976, pg. 98-122). Inasmuch, the MFA sought to portray itself as a fundamental break from both the former regime and from the extractive and violent legacies of the military institution from which it emerged.

Between April of 1974 and 1976, the MFA established a series of provisional governments to oversee the eventual transition to democracy.⁹ The first three of these provisional military governments—established on May 16th, July 19th, and October 1st of 1974—were led by relatively moderate officers intent on providing stability to the country (Bermeo, 1986, pg. xv). By the end of the year, however, it became clear that various factions within the MFA sat at opposing sides of the political spectrum and had radically different visions for how the country ought to be governed. The event that brought these political disagreements to the fore and introduced an overt partisan logic to the MFA was the failed coup attempt of March 11, 1975 by recently-resigned president Spínola who sought to bring the MFA closer to the right. Following this failed internal shuffle, the fourth provisional MFA government, led by Gen. Vasco Gonçalves, took a definitive

⁸(March 21, 1975), Sem Título, CasaComum.org, Disponível HTTP: <http://www.casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04791.024>. Accessed: August 24, 2019

⁹DL-203/74 (May 15, 1974) on the vision of the MFA. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/623386/details/normal?q=203%2F74>. Accessed: August 21, 2019.

turn to the left and adopted a radical political agenda closely in line with, and in support of, the Portuguese Communist Party (Maxwell 1986, pg. 121; Costa Pinto 2001, pg. 68; Bermeo 2007, pg. 399-400).

With the backing of the MFA, the PCP, along with several other political parties, participated in the Constitutional Assembly elections on April 25, 1975, exactly one year after the revolution began. While the Communists failed to perform well at the national level and lost out overall to the Socialists (PS) and Social Democrats (PPD), it received overwhelming support in the southern region of the Alentejo, particularly among rural workers supporting its campaign to bring down “what they saw as the two pillars of the old regime”: the great landowners and the oligarchic cartels (Costa Pinto, 2001, pg. 118-9). With this backing, the PCP continued its mobilization of the rural poor into cooperatives and called for the immediate expropriation of all under-used or fallow land in the region (Bermeo, 1986, pg. 54).¹⁰ Soon after, on July 29th and 30th 1975, the MFA government passed a series of laws which established a landholding ceiling, authorized the expropriation of land above that ceiling, and set in place financial mechanisms by which to provide credit to newly formed agricultural cooperatives (UCPs).¹¹

These pieces of legislation kicked off the Hot Summer of 1975, which saw the mass occupation of large agricultural estates in southern Portugal and waves of anti-left violence in the more conservative north. According to da Silva and Ferreira (2019, pg. 31), violence in the north was sparked by a fear “that the April Revolution had opened up the possibility for the implementation of a Marxist/Communist/collectivist/totalitarian dictatorship worse than Salazar’s.” Meanwhile, from August to November of 1975, approximately one million hectares of land were expropriated and occupied by agricultural cooperatives under the PCP’s direction (Maxwell 1986, pg. 121; Costa Pinto 2001, pg. 68; Bermeo 2007; King 1978; Rutledge 1977).

Two critical events interrupted the PCP’s momentum, however. First, on September 19, 1975, the sixth provisional MFA government backed by the Group of Nine, a contingency of moderate military leaders who supported the PS, came to power. Second, the failed Gonçalves coup attempt on November 25, 1975 shifted the government even further behind the PS and led

¹⁰Interestingly, the PCP was originally opposed to land occupations and labor strikes in the post-revolutionary period, largely because they feared that promoting such measures would weaken their chances at electoral victory nationally (Lomax, 1983, pg. 114-121).

¹¹DL 406-A/75 (July 29, 1975) on the expropriation of land. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/346075/details/normal?q=406-A%2F75>. Accessed: August 21, 2019. DL 406-B/75 (July 29, 1975) on the basis for provision of agricultural credit. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/346076/details/normal?q=406-B%2F75>. Accessed: August 21, 2019. DL 407-A/75 (July 30, 1975) on the nationalization of state-irrigated land. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/668330/details/normal?q=407-A%2F75>. Accessed: August 21, 2019.

it to adopt a stance hostile to the PCP in the months leading up to the first Republican Assembly election on April 25, 1976 which dismantled the provisional government system (Bermeo 1986, pg. 79; Maxwell 1986, pg. 128; Costa Pinto 2001, pg. 49).¹² In this election, the PS received 38% of votes and 107 out of 263 legislative seats, allowing it to form a minority government with the center-right PPD, which received 26.4% of votes and 73 seats. The PCP, for its part, trailed behind the Christian Democrats (CDS) and only received 12.5% of votes nationally, even though it held a majority of seats in the Alentejo (Bermeo, 2007, pg. 401). Once in power, the PS-PPD government began to undo many of the PCP's achievements and agricultural policies during the transition. Through a series of laws passed in September of 1977 known as the Barreto Laws, the first democratic government of the Second Republic adopted policies aimed at rolling back the agrarian reform (Bermeo 1986, pg. 197-9; Pires de Almeida 2016, pg. 193-4; Barreto 1987, pg. 334-5).¹³ By this time, the military had extricated itself from politics on account of its fear that "the politics its officers sought to control had so politicized the armed forces as to threaten its institutional integrity" (Graham, 1979, pg. 233).

The outcome of the election for the second Republican Assembly in 1979 saw the rise the Democratic Alliance (AD), a coalition of rightist parties led by the PPD, which displaced the centrist PS and trounced the United People's Alliance (APU), a leftist coalition including the PCP and the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP-CDE). The Social Democrats quickly passed the Sa Carneiro laws in 1979 and 1981 that sought to seize land from cooperatives and distribute it to farmers who applied through a state-system process to farm the lands privately (Pires de Almeida, 2007, pg. 67).¹⁴ Some of these seizures became violent, particularly when cooperatives were forced to return land to the state, or its previous owners, in order to pay off mounting debts when their workers did not have new plots lined up (Pires de Almeida, 2016, pg. 194). By the end of 1980, after the AD's second victory, nearly 50% of the land originally under cooperative control had either been privatized or re-appropriated by the government (Raven, 1988, pg. 42). Since 1983, the Republican Assembly has remained firmly under the control of either the PS or the PPD.

¹²da Silva and Ferreira (2019, pg. 31) note that this centrist shift in the MFA put a definitive end to the violence of the extreme right in the north by managing anxieties related to a potential "communist invasion."

¹³Lei 77/77 (September 29, 1977), <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/278704/details/maximized?filterEnd=1980-01-01&filterStart=1976-01-01&q=77%2F77&filterAction=TRUE&fqs=77%2F77&perPage=25>. Accessed: August 21, 2019.

¹⁴Portaria 246/79 (May 29, 1979) is first of the Sa Carneiro tenancy laws which sets the groundwork for the return of expropriated land. <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/383618/details/normal?q=%22246%2F79%22>. Accessed: August 21, 2019. Portaria 797/81 (September 12, 1981) is the second of the Sa Carneiro tenancy laws and lays out how lands will be taken away from UCPs <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/562988/details/normal?q=797%2F81>. Accessed: August 21, 2019.

4 Data

To test the effects of military recruitment on patterns of voter turnout and expressed partisanship, we analyze data on the distance of parishes to the nearest military base, the percentage of young men who were recruited into the military in 1967, data on voter turnout and political party vote share, as well as a number of covariates such as parish population, population density, proximity to a major urban area, and other patterns of civilian organization that emerged during the dictatorship or the Carnation Revolution. The unit of analysis is the parish. Parishes in Portugal are the smallest administrative units in the country, nested within both municipalities (of which there were 274 in 1960) and higher-level districts (of which there are 18). The median parish population in 1970 was 1,036 individuals, making these political units four times less populous, on average, than contemporary census tracts in the United States. We aggregate variable values to parish boundaries at the time of the democratic transition. This yields 3,848 parishes.

4.1 Dependent Variables: Voter Turnout and Party Vote Share in 1975, 1976, and 1979

We explore the role of military recruitment on two sets of dependent variables related to Portugal's early elections: participation and partisanship. We first examine voter turnout during the 1975 constitutional assembly election, which occurred during the period of regime transition. Next we examine the 1976 and 1979 republican assembly elections. The 1976 election cemented the transition to democracy and the 1979 election took place fully under democracy. Voter turnout is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes cast by the number of registered voters present in a given parish in the years in question.¹⁵

Second, we examine the vote share received by a selection of parties in each election to investigate whether the military backing of one of these parties influenced their electoral success. Vote shares are calculated by dividing the number of votes cast for a given party at the parish level by the total number of valid party votes cast in that parish. As Table 1 makes clear, a number of marginal, often Communist or radical left-wing, parties competed in Portugal's early legislative elections. In order to restrict the number of parties to those that were the most electorally viable, we have only included in our analysis parties that succeeded in gaining more than one legislative seat in any given election cycle.

¹⁵All of the data on early elections were collected from Portugal's General Secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Administration (SGMAI).

For 1975, we look at the votes shares of the following parties: the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which received MFA backing, the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), which was viewed in a favorable light by the MFA, the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democrats (PPD), and the Christian Democrats (CDS).¹⁶

For 1976, we look at the vote shares of PS, PPD, CDS, and the PCP. The more moderate faction of the MFA in power at the time endorsed the PS. Finally, in 1979, we explore the support received by three main parties/coalitions. The first is the PS. The second is APU, a coalition between the PCP and MDP. Both of these political groupings had previously been directly supported by the military. The third is AD, a coalition which included PPD, CDS, and the People's Monarchist Party (PPM), none of which was ever endorsed by the MFA. In contrast to previous elections, the military did not explicitly support any party in this last election.

Figures 1-3 display maps of the distribution of votes for these parties in the 1975, 1976, and 1979 elections. Overall, we can see that the PCP garnered the majority of it's support in southern Portugal, where it had mobilized landless farmers just prior to and during the transition period, that the PPD and CDS were most popular in northern Portugal, and that the PS received support from all across the country.

4.2 Key Independent Variable: Military Enlistment

The key independent variable is military enlistment. Our data on military enlistment is for 1967 and comes from a registry of recruitment sessions that took place in the summer of that year at the parish level.¹⁷ ¹⁸ These sessions were coordinated across, and undertaken by, sixteen army district regiments (DRMs) and cover the entirety of continental Portugal. Typically, daily recruitment sessions would target 60-70 young men (mancebos) for conscription. This meant that smaller parishes were usually lumped together into a single session (in order to reach the daily recruitment threshold) and larger parishes were visited multiple times over several days.

We use these data to construct a measure of the total number of men recruited from each parish in the country. We then normalize this measure by the total number of men present in

¹⁶Later we also mention results for the share of blank votes cast over the total number of votes cast. This is because the leadership of the Cultural Dynamization Campaign, an MFA-led organization that worked with civilian progressives to educate the population on major political issues ostensibly to ensure that the largely illiterate rural population would not be manipulated by right-wing forces, encouraged individuals to cast blank ballots in order to show support for the MFA and against the "bourgeois" party system (Bermeo, 1986, pg. 65-6).

¹⁷"Recrutamento de 1967—Disitribuição dos Mancebos pelas Sessões das Juntas," Arquivo Historico Militar (Lisbon, Portugal), Seccao: GG, Fundo: 7A, Serie: 9, Caixa: 25, Numero: 3, Ano: 1967, Observacoes: 1.101.6.

¹⁸We have found no evidence to suggest that the internal geographic distribution of recruitment changed over time.

the parish as reported in the 1970 population census multiplied by the proportion of males aged 15-34 at the municipal level.¹⁹ The resulting variable therefore captures the proportion of the young male population recruited to the military at the parish level in a single year at the height of the military’s conscription efforts.²⁰ Figure 4 maps the spatial distribution of recruitment rates across the country, overlaid by DRM boundaries.

4.3 Controls

We include several covariates in our analysis whose omission could otherwise confound the results. First, we include the log-transformed population present at the parish level in 1970. Parishes in Portugal are meant to represent roughly the same number of people across the country. However, parishes in southern Portugal tend to be geographically larger than those in the north; consequently, they often have more people in them. While this trend would lead us to believe that population size at the parish level ought to be related to higher rates of voter turnout (on account of more, early political mobilization related to the land reform by the PCP in the south) and voting for more left parties, it is also the case that parishes in urban areas tend to be more populous than rural areas overall. To capture this latter difference, we also include a measure of population density at the parish level which has the effect of identifying urban areas across the country and, in particular, the belt of cities that run along the western coast of Portugal. Consequently, we expect that population density will be related with higher voter turnout – on account of the higher rate of education and political engagement in cities relative to rural areas – and higher vote shares for left and center-left political parties, which tended to dominate in major cities.

While capturing the rural/urban divide across the country is critical, it does not effectively account for the outweighed influence of Portugal’s two largest cities, Lisbon and Porto, and the number of satellite cities that tend to cluster around these two regional hubs. As areas of economic growth and industrial production, Lisbon and Porto were primary targets for seasonal migrants, centers of cultural and political exchange, and, notably, periodic hot-spots for leftist agitation, particularly around university campuses (de Figueiredo 1976, pg. 133; Moniz 2008, pg. 8). To capture the specific effect of being close to one of these two major urban agglom-

¹⁹This is the census most proximate to the 1967 recruitment data. Population data are from “11th Recensamento da Populacao—Continental e Ilhas Adjacentes 1970: Dados Preliminares,” 1971, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE), Servicos Centrais. Table 3, Pages 11-101.

²⁰In future iterations of this paper, we will explore whether this measure is sensitive to using the *resident* parish population, rather than the *present* parish population, in 1960, rather than 1970.

erations, we mapped the coordinates of every major city in Portugal, weighted them by their relative population sizes in 1960, and calculated inverse-distance weights which we assigned to a raster object covering continental Portugal.²¹ We then masked this raster onto Portugal’s parish boundaries and extracted the mean value for each parish and assigned it to the parish. The final variable captures general proximity to either the Lisbon or Porto urban hubs.

Finally, we control for the number of social conflicts that occurred at the parish level between 1947-1962. These data come from Pereira (1982) in the form of an event-level dataset, which was generated by coding and contextualizing 450 events reported in a PCP newspaper called *O Camponês* (The Peasants). To correct for and address the biased nature of this source of information in favor of the rural poor and in opposition to the latifundarios in the South, Pereira goes to great length to interpret the identification of events in the newspaper in light of evidence from external sources. For each event where possible, he codes the location, date, and type of conflict, as well as the number of workers involved, objectives, outcome, and duration of each conflict episode. Using Pereira’s definition, social conflicts include strikes, organized refusals to work (e.g. walk-offs), sit-ins, occupations of state buildings (e.g., national guard posts), marches, manifestations, and organized restrictions of harvest yields. For the purposes of our analysis, we aggregate the temporal data into a single variable by locating the geographic coordinates of the localities affected by conflict and intersecting these coordinate points with Portugal’s parish boundaries. We anticipate prior social conflict to be positively linked to voter turnout through a legacy of social solidarity and political action. It is also likely to be most closely associated with voting for the Communist Party, which was the chief political force behind organized collective action during Portugal’s dictatorship.

Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses are in Table 2.

5 Research Design

It is conceivable that rates of military recruitment at the local level could themselves be driven in part by political views, the likelihood of upward social mobility, or local activism. For instance, individuals with poor employment prospects may have been more likely to join the military when it came to recruit. Because these factors could themselves directly impact patterns of political participation and partisan voting under democracy, it is important to isolate a driver of military

²¹See “spatstat” R package documentation, pg. 615: <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/spatstat/spatstat.pdf>

recruitment that is orthogonal to these factors.

We therefore identify a plausible instrument for military recruitment and use it to conduct two-stage least-squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) analysis. A valid instrumental variable must satisfy the exclusion restriction: its effect on the dependent variables should work exclusively through the potentially endogenous right-hand side variable of military recruitment. We identify an instrumental variable – distance to the nearest military base within a given DRM and its quadratic term – that, theoretically, should only affect later political outcomes in this indirect manner.

Between May 31-June 23, 1967, the year of our military recruitment data, recruiters fanned out from military bases and held recruitment sessions across continental Portugal. These sessions were coordinated across, and undertaken by, sixteen army regiments that traveled from parish to parish recruiting men. Typically, daily recruitment sessions would target 60-70 young men for conscription as *praças* (the military rank assigned to those enlisted into the army).

There are many possible ways in which distance to a military base could be related to recruitment patterns at the local level. First, populations in areas farther from a military base were less exposed to the military on a daily basis and therefore likely had less negative affect for the military. Generally, the army was not involved in domestic security concerns – which were typically left to the PIDE in urban areas or the national guard (GNR) in rural areas to handle (Raby 1988, pg. 142-3; Pereira 1982). The army was, however, occasionally called in to provide support in putting down a violent protest or revolt (Porch, 1977). While the military always remained relatively politically autonomous (Gallagher, 1983, pg. 123), from 1961-68 in particular, “the war in Africa functioned...as a factor in the subordination of the Armed Forces to the Salazar regime” (Barreto and Monica, 1999, pg. 58). Moreover, the military worked closely with the PIDE in order to track down conscription deserters (Pimental, 2007, pg. 505). In this sense, the direct repressive capacity of the military close to military bases that faded with distance may have aided its recruitment efforts in far-flung areas as a function of deflating incentives to evade military conscription.²²

Second, many military bases in Portugal during the Estado Novo were located in or around towns or cities scattered across the country. Because of lower rates of physical mobility in rural areas that were far from military bases and the fact that recruitment sessions were easier to publicize and control in these areas, military recruitment was more effective the farther the

²²See, e.g., Bautista et al. (2019) for a treatment of the effect of military bases on repression in the context of Pinochet’s Chile.

distance from a military base. It was easier for the military to round up all of the eligible young men in a rural township than it was for them to do so in the middle of a sprawling urban environment. This is especially the case given that a large number of Portuguese citizens left urban areas to work abroad.

Third, the method by which military personnel came to identify viable conscripts at the local level may have been a factor driving higher military recruitment in areas further away from military bases. Recruiters typically relied on the most recent national census to track down young men who had just, or were about to, reach the legal age of compulsory military service.²³ Given that “[the] general census is the responsibility of municipal councils, neighborhood administrations, municipal committees and district administrations,” it might be the case that more sparsely populated municipalities located further away from urban military bases provided more accurate representations of the demographics of their subject population. For instance, communities in these more far-flung parishes could have been more legible to municipal authorities given the relative stability and immobility of rural populations. If this were the case, fewer young men eligible for military service would fail to be identified and contacted during recruitment sessions.

Data on the location of military bases in continental Portugal at the time of our recruitment data come from declassified internal military documents listing the regional deployment of operational military units across bases within the country and the number of soldiers and corporals assigned to each unit for each of the years 1967-70.²⁴ We identified the coordinates of the localities in which there were military bases and calculated the Euclidian distance from the centroid of each parish to the nearest military base within a given DRM (Figure 4). This measure, therefore, captures the distance from a given parish to the nearest military base that was likely involved in recruiting young men from that parish. While indicative of the general proximity of a given municipality to the closest military installation, these measures do not account for the actual length of time it would likely have taken to travel from a given military base to a municipality within its “sphere of influence.” That being said, given how small of country Portugal is, and how few parishes there were in any given DRM, it is unlikely that our measure of “distance” would differ in any systematic way from one based on road-network travel times.

The theoretical discussion thus far justifying the validity of the instrument raises several

²³Lei 2135 (July 11, 1968), Articles 6 and 7 on the recruitment process: <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/272665/details/normal?q=2135>. Accessed: August 25, 2019.

²⁴Secção de administração de mobilização de pessoal, Ministério de exército, Estado maior de exército, 1. Repartição. Arquivo Historico Militar, Fundo: 7/A, Serie: 29, Caixa: 49, Numero: 3, Ano: 1967, Observacoes: 1.103.5.

potential concerns regarding violations to the exclusion restriction. The first has to do with cities. Because military bases were often located in or near cities, individuals who were close by were more educated on average and may have been harder to recruit due to exemptions and deferments, though these were granted sparingly.²⁵ Furthermore, cities – especially large ones like Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra – were wealthier and more prevalent in the north and were therefore not the epicenters of the most radical leftism that blanketed the rural south.²⁶ These dynamics, however, should work *against* finding a negative link between recruitment on the one hand and turnout and left-wing voting for MFA-backed parties in the 1975 and 1976 elections on the other hand. Nonetheless, to more directly address these concerns we reran the core models after dropping all parishes hosting cities as well as all those parishes spatially neighboring those urban parishes.²⁷ The results are largely robust to this restriction (see Appendix).

A second potential threat to the exclusion restriction is parish size. Parishes are physically smaller in northern Portugal, which meant that recruiters would have needed to group parishes in the north together more often than in the south to meet the 60-70-person recruitment session threshold. This could have led them to be more intensive in their identification and recruitment of young men in the north if they had professional incentives to cover parishes quickly. At the same time, northern Portugal differed politically from the south in substantial ways (e.g., support for the PCP was much lower and small-scale agriculture rather than large estates prevailed). In larger parishes in the south, by contrast, recruiters could have identified a sufficient number of young men with more ease and left preemptively after several successful recruitment sessions prior to enlisting all eligible young men available. To address this, we separately tested the models after restricting our analysis to only those parishes not identified as urban or adjacent to urban areas that were north of the Tagus river, which divides northern and southern Portugal. The results are very similar (see Appendix).²⁸

A final threat to the exclusion restriction is tied to criminality. Individuals who committed serious crimes or were deemed hostile to the state were less likely to be recruited.²⁹ If criminality was higher in areas closer to military bases (e.g., due to illegal strikes by industrial labor unions),

²⁵Bermeo (2007) indicates that evading the draft was difficult absent fleeing the country.

²⁶However, within northern Portugal urban areas did have somewhat more liberal and politically active populations, and leftist agitation was present in selective quarters such as universities.

²⁷Our definition of cities comes from the 1960 census, prior to recruitment. We identified spatial neighbors to urban parishes using queen weights.

²⁸That the results are similar when restricting the analysis to just the north, where right-wing parties were much stronger across the board, also further helps to address concerns that places with higher recruitment were simply right-wing or anti-PCP.

²⁹Decreto n.º 42937, Articles 54

and populations in higher crime areas were systematically different than in lower crime areas, this could violate the exclusion restriction. Fortunately, criminality was also associated with social conflict in rural areas, for which we have data. The results therefore include a control capturing social conflict. Furthermore, as pointed out previously, the results are also similar when dropping urban areas where both many bases were located and rates of industrial worker strikes were higher.

6 Empirical Results

We present two different sets of results. The first set examines political participation as measured by voter turnout. The second set examines expressed partisan voting through party vote shares. For each set of results, we examine outcomes from the formative 1975, 1976, and 1979 elections. We include district fixed effects in all specifications to control for unobserved district-specific heterogeneity such as variation in local labor markets and infrastructure that may be associated with voter turnout and preferences.

6.1 Voter Turnout

Table 3 examines the determinants of voter turnout. For each election, we use distance to the nearest military base and the square of that distance as first-stage instruments for military enlistment. Because the Table 3 model specifications are similar aside from the dependent variables, the first-stage regressions are likewise similar across election year outcomes.³⁰

There is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between military enlistment and distance to the nearest military base in the first-stage regressions. The negative coefficient on the squared distance variable, however, indicates that this positive relationship tapers off with distance. A one standard deviation increase in the distance between a parish and a military base (16.5 km.) is associated with a 1.30 percentage point increase in the rate of male military recruitment at the parish level. This effect is substantively significant: it translates into roughly one-third of a standard deviation in the recruitment variable.

Two other variables are also statistically significant in the first stage regressions: proximity to a large city and the size of the population. Enlistment was higher in parishes that were closer to a large city. But it was not highest in urban peripheries. Recruitment was instead highest in less populated rural areas outside of urban areas.

³⁰The only difference stems from very slight changes to the number of observations based on data missingness.

Importantly, the first-stage F-statistics in the Table 3 models exceed the commonly used threshold of ten separating strong from weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Furthermore, Hansen-J tests of the overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the hypothesis that these instrumental variables are exogenous conditional on the validity of one instrument.

The second-stage regressions explore the effect of the rate of enlistment on voter turnout. Enlistment has a statistically significant and negative effect for each year. A five percentage point increase in military conscription, roughly one standard deviation of this variable, yields a 4 percentage point decrease in voter turnout in the 1975 elections, a 8.4 percentage point decrease in turnout in the 1976 elections, and a 5.1 percentage point decrease in the 1979 elections. These are substantively significant effects that represent approximately a one standard deviation reduction in turnout in each election. Overall, these results suggest that communities that shouldered a higher burden in terms of supplying recruits to fight in Africa in the final decade of Portugal's dictatorship were less likely to participate in elections upon the transition to democracy.

Several of the control variables in the second-stage regressions are also statistically significant. Previous social conflict is strongly positively associated with voter turnout across elections, indicating that previous collective action under the dictatorship spilled over into greater voter participation after the transition to democracy. Population density is similarly positively signed, and total population negatively signed, suggesting that turnout was higher in more populous and urban areas.

Further results from subsequent elections indicate that the negative impact of military conscription on voter turnout did not dissipate quickly in Portugal's new democracy. To the contrary, Figure 6 in the Appendix indicates a lingering negative effect that suggests a persistent legacy of one of the dictatorship's most coercive policies for at least a generation.³¹

6.2 Partisan Voting Patterns

Table 4-Table 6 examine major party vote share and the vote share of military-backed parties across the 1975, 1976, and 1979 elections. As with Table 3, the regressions are estimated via 2SLS-IV. Because the model specifications and controls are the same as in the Table 3 regressions with only the dependent variables changed, the first-stage regressions in the Table 4-Table 6 models

³¹This negative effect is above and beyond the general downward trend in turnout in Portugal during this period. In future iterations of the paper, we will examine whether the negative effects start to dissipate with generational change or whether there may be some sort of intergenerational transmission. Furthermore, to strengthen the claim that this effect is causal, we intend to conduct placebo tests of whether recruitment in 1967 had a null impact on turnout prior to recruitment in the 1961 or 1965 legislative elections.

are the same as those in the Table 3 models. We therefore only report the coefficient for the excluded second-stage instrument of distance to the nearest military base and distance squared in these models despite the fact that coefficients are also estimated for the control variables in the first stage, as is common practice.

Table 4 begins with the constituent assembly elections of 1975. Recall that the military was still in the driver's seat during these elections: the MFA convoked and presided over elections. Furthermore, the MFA explicitly backed the PCP in this election. It is therefore striking to note that the party seems not to have done any better in areas of higher military enlistment. To the contrary, the PCP performed slightly worse in these areas.

In contrast to military enlistment, which depressed PCP support, previous social conflict is strong positively linked to PCP vote share. This is as anticipated given that social conflict was highly concentrated in the Alentejo, the region of the country in which the PCP concentrated most of its mobilization activity. PCP support was also higher in more sparsely populated parishes, and in parishes closer to large cities. These are mostly captured by rural areas in the south of the country outside of Lisbon. This is again not surprising given in light of the PCP's organizational role in rural workers' unions and its support for land expropriations during the Carnation Revolution.

While the MFA explicitly backed the PCP in 1975, the military also expressed clear sympathy for the smaller leftist party the MDP, which had several positions and influence in the MFA and was ideologically close to the PCP. Like vote share for the PCP, military enlistment is negatively linked to casting a ballot for the MDP.³² Taken together, the results for the PCP and MDP suggest that military-backed parties garnered less political support in areas of higher military recruitment.

How did recruitment impact support for the main electoral alternatives to military-backed choices? Of particular note is the finding indicating that the PPD—the most prominent right-of-center party—saw a huge electoral boost in those parishes that experienced high rates of military recruitment. Substantively, a five percentage point increase in military recruitment drives a 21.5 percent increase in the vote share captured by the PPD. The fact that parishes that supplied young men to the military at the highest rates during the authoritarian era in Portugal voted

³²Some military-affiliated leaders of the Cultural Dynamization Campaign also supported casting a blank vote in support of the MFA and against right-wing parties competing in the election. This appears to have had limited success in areas of higher military enlistment, though the substantive effects were negligible. A five percentage point increase in enlistment is linked to less than a 0.1 percentage increase in the share of blank ballots cast. There is also a small impact of enlistment on support for the UDP, but this was a tiny party that only received half a percent of the national vote.

disproportionately for the party that differed most in their ideological commitments from the military's preferred options suggest a rejection of the military in the context of the transition to democracy. The military's extractive history of conscription appears to have been an Achilles Heel in the transitional election following the Carnation Revolution. In other words, while the MFA was universally lauded for toppling the regime it once reported to, voters appear to have voted in part based on their previous experience with the military during the Estado Novo—and punished it accordingly.

Table 5 turns to the 1976 elections for the republican assembly. These elections were slated to send the military formally back to the barracks. Nonetheless, the military again explicitly cast its lot with a political party in the run-up to the elections – this time the Socialist Party (PS). In this election, the military's preferred choice again saw a notable decrease in electoral support in those areas that experienced relatively high military enlistment. A five percentage point increase in former military enlistment leads to an estimated 14.6% drop in vote share for the PS. This contrasts with a statistically indistinguishable link between military enlistment and PS vote share in the 1975 elections when the military did not formally back the PS. Like the 1975 elections, however, military enlistment is again negatively linked to vote share for the PCP.

Consistent with the Table 4 findings, the military-backed party performed worse in areas of higher military enlistment in 1976. By contrast, the PPD again enjoyed the same electoral boost in this election as it had in 1975 in areas of higher military enlistment.

Finally, Table 6 examines the 1979 elections for the republican assembly. This was the first election in which the military was entirely in the barracks. It did not explicitly promote a political party as an institution. Nevertheless, the AD, the rightist political coalition which included the PPD—the sole major party never backed by the MFA—continued to experience an electoral boost in those parishes that fielded a disproportionate amount of young men into the ranks of the military. What is more, the APU, the leftist coalition including both the PCP and MDP, performed worse in areas of higher enlistment.

The PS, however, was no longer strongly punished in 1979 for having received MFA backing in the previous election. One possible explanation is that the PS had effectively distanced itself from the military after being electorally punished for its affiliation in 1976. Another possible explanation, not entirely unrelated, has to do with how competitive the PS was nationally. While the APU received concentrated support in the Alentejo, it performed extremely poorly in other parts of the country. The PS, by contrast, garnered votes from every corner of Portugal and was

the primary alternative to the AD. For this reason, voters may have had a harder time continuing to punish the PS for its perceived connection to the former military regime than they did for the PCP and MDP. Or some voters may have been quicker to forgive it once it no longer received the military's blessing. After all, the military tie to the PS was indisputably weaker than it was to the PCP and MDP.

In future iterations of this paper, we will seek to examine the extent to which the effects of recruitment on partisan voting run through recruits themselves versus the families and communities that they left behind and that were disrupted by large-scale conscription. While it is not possible to obtain individual-level data on vote choice, there are alternative approaches. For example, using the 1980 population census, we can identify parish-level variation in the extent to which military conscripts returned home by examining gender balance in local populations. If the effects of recruitment on party vote choice remain strong in parishes where few men returned home after the war (instead choosing to stay in cities like Lisbon), then we can conclude that the effect of recruitment on voting had a broader social impact beyond the recruits themselves.

7 Conclusion

Authoritarian regimes routinely enlist citizens to participate in national projects ranging from building infrastructure to providing security and order to fighting in international wars. How does this experience impact how citizens interact with non-democratic actors during and through a transition to democracy? And how does it impact the pace and depth of democratic consolidation?

This paper addresses these questions in Portugal, the country that sparked the third wave of democracy. We analyze the legacy of the Salazar regime's military enlistment of civilians to fight in colonial wars in Africa on patterns of voting in the first several founding democratic elections in Portugal. Because the military directly seized the reins of power in the mid-1970s, steered the country to a democratic transition, and explicitly cast its weight behind selected political parties in early elections, an examination of the effects of conscription on both turnout and partisanship helps to shed light on democratic consolidation itself. Whereas the MFA has historically been viewed as a liberating force in Portugal that undid the Salazar-Caetano regime and brought democracy to the country, it nonetheless emerged from deep within the ranks of the military, an institution that played a critical role in implementing the Estado Novo's political agenda.

Consistent with this history, we find that the military's repressive and extractive legacy influenced how voters perceived the transitional government and, ultimately, impacted the ways in

which they participated in elections upon the transition to democracy. Higher rates of military enlistment were associated with depressed rates of voter turnout. They were also linked to a rejection of military-backed political parties in favor of a major center-right alternative.

The findings raise questions about how other forms and cases of mass citizen enlistment to do the bidding of authoritarian regimes has impacted the nature and depth of democracy in transitioning or recently-democratized states. Important examples could include bureaucratic service through the Ba'ath party in Iraq, military service in Myanmar, and police or security service in Eastern Europe under communism.

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8 Appendix

8.1 Main Tables

Table 1: Parties in Portugal’s First Three Legislative Elections

Year	Party	Mean VS	Seats	Notes	Ideology
1975	PPD	39.6	81	Social Democratic Party	Center-Right
	PS	30.9	116	Socialist Party	Center-Left
	CDS	12.4	16	People’s Party	Right
	PCP	6.9	30	Portuguese Communist Party	Left
	MDP	4.1	5	Portuguese Democratic Movement	Left
	FSP	1.4	-	People’s Socialist Front	Left
	MES	0.9	-	Movement of Socialist Left	Left
	PPM	0.9	-	People’s Monarchist Party	Right
	FEC	0.6	-	Communist Electoral Front	Left
	UDP	0.4	1	Popular Democratic Union	Left
	PUP	0.3	-	Popular Unity Party	Left
	LCI	0.1	-	Internationalist Communist League	Left
1976	PPD	31.7	73	Social Democratic Party	Center-Right
	PS	29.5	107	Socialist Party	Center-Left
	CDS	23.9	42	People’s Party	Right
	PCP	7.6	40	Portuguese Communist Party	Left
	UDP	1.1	1	Popular Democratic Union	Left
	FSP	1.0	-	People’s Socialist Front	Left
	PDC	0.9	-	Christian Democratic Party	Center-Left
	PPM	0.8	-	People’s Monarchist Party	Right
	MES	0.6	-	Movement of Socialist Left	Left
	MRPP	0.5	-	Re-Organized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat	Left
	LCI	0.4	-	Internationalist Communist League	Left
	AOC	0.4	-	Worker-Peasant Alliance	Left
	PCPML	0.3	-	Communist Party of Portugal	Left
PRT	0.1	-	Workers Revolutionary Party	Left	
1979	AD	56.2	121	Democratic Alliance (PPD+CDS)	Center-Right
	PS	26.2	74	Socialist Party	Center-Left
	APU	11.4	47	United People Alliance (PCP + MDP/CDE)	Left
	PDC	1.7	-	Christian Democratic Party	Center-Left
	UDP	1.5	1	Popular Democratic Union	Left
	PCTP/MRPP	1.0	-	Re-Organized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat	Left
	PSR	0.9	-	Revolutionary Socialist Party	Left
	UEDS	0.8	-	Leftwing Union for the Socialist Democracy	Left
	OCMLP	0.1	-	Portuguese Marxist–Leninist Communist Organization	Left
POUS	0.0	-	Workers Party of Socialist Unity	Left	

Table 2: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Men 15-34 enlisted in military, 1967 (%)	8.79	4.8	0.28	87.08	3708
Distance to nearest DRM base, 1967 (km.)	21.26	16.48	0	85.43	3733
Log(Number of social conflicts), 1947-1962	0.05	0.29	0	3.53	3848
Proximity to populous urban areas, 1960	4.67	2.66	0	23.6	3848
Log(Population present), 1970	7.01	1.01	4.14	10.92	3798
Log(Population density), 1970	-0.04	1.39	-3.36	6.69	3798
City Located in Parish or Neighboring Parish South of the Tagus River	0.06	0.24	0	1	3848
0.1	0.31	0	1	3848	
Turnout 1975 as % registered	91.51	4.25	53.81	100	3790
Turnout 1976 as % registered	82.35	8.14	38.88	100	3806
Turnout 1979 as % registered	87.10	5.69	44.87	100	3843
Vote Share CDS 1975	12.57	13.03	0	91.82	3790
Vote Share MDP 1975	4.2	5.16	0	50.68	3790
Vote Share PCP 1975	7	11.49	0	74.26	3790
Vote Share PPD 1975	40.18	22.08	0	96.25	3790
Vote Share PS 1975	31.36	18.02	0	82.64	3790
Vote Share CDS 1976	24.12	16.38	0	90.81	3806
Vote Share PCP 1976	7.64	12.74	0	79.98	3806
Vote Share PPD 1976	32.05	16.88	0	91.67	3806
Vote Share PS 1976	29.85	15.75	0	81.61	3806
Vote Share AD 1979	56.18	20.61	2.54	100	3843
Vote Share APU 1979	11.43	13.96	0	83.90	3843
Vote Share PS 1979	26.17	13.7	0	90.08	3843

Table 3: Authoritarian-Era Military Recruitment and Democratic Voter Turnout in Portugal

Outcome:	Voter Turnout, 1975		Voter Turnout, 1976		Voter Turnout, 1979	
	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Military Enlistment		-0.802*** (0.204)		-1.882*** (0.563)		-1.026** (0.432)
Distance to Nearest Base	0.080*** (0.027)		0.081*** (0.027)		0.081*** (0.027)	
Distance to Nearest Base ²	-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.000)	
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	0.023 (0.216)	0.921*** (0.298)	-0.003 (0.217)	2.313*** (0.826)	-0.016 (0.217)	1.810*** (0.365)
Proximity to Large City	0.303*** (0.099)	0.017 (0.173)	0.307*** (0.098)	0.437 (0.481)	0.309*** (0.097)	0.163 (0.272)
Log(Population Present)	-0.977*** (0.121)	-2.022*** (0.254)	-0.980*** (0.120)	-4.407*** (0.815)	-0.973*** (0.119)	-2.565*** (0.589)
Log(Population Density)	-0.169 (0.143)	0.914*** (0.288)	-0.175 (0.142)	1.930*** (0.498)	-0.179 (0.141)	1.318*** (0.246)
First-Stage F-statistic	13.76		14.36		14.22	
Hansen J P-value	0.309		0.922		0.422	
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3668	3668	3683	3683	3706	3706

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Authoritarian-Era Military Recruitment and Partisanship in 1975 Elections

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed		MFA-Backed		
	CDS	MDP	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	0.168 (0.522)	-0.981* (0.570)	-0.787** (0.341)	4.342** (2.125)	-2.561 (1.765)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.184 (0.277)	0.009 (0.449)	5.960*** (0.979)	-1.326 (1.502)	-4.161*** (1.258)
Proximity to Large City	-0.174 (0.233)	0.326 (0.243)	0.882** (0.367)	-0.756 (0.879)	-0.172 (0.714)
Log(Population Present)	-0.601 (0.518)	-0.896 (0.596)	0.238 (0.411)	1.887 (2.276)	-0.363 (1.740)
Log(Population Density)	0.938*** (0.279)	-0.424 (0.302)	-1.176** (0.576)	-1.950 (1.243)	2.717** (1.082)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.080*** (0.027)	0.080*** (0.027)	0.080*** (0.027)	0.080*** (0.027)	0.080*** (0.027)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	13.76	13.76	13.76	13.76	13.76
Hansen J P-value	0.429	0.305	0.985	0.053	0.073
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3668	3668	3668	3668	3668

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Authoritarian-Era Military Recruitment and Partisanship in 1976 Elections

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed			
	CDS	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	-0.276 (1.043)	-1.270*** (0.474)	4.803*** (1.843)	-2.923* (1.528)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.736 (0.670)	5.462*** (1.362)	-1.404 (1.242)	-2.696** (1.167)
Proximity to Large City	0.121 (0.537)	1.135*** (0.400)	-1.045 (0.696)	-0.295 (0.568)
Log(Population Present)	-2.465** (1.239)	-0.275 (0.523)	4.262** (1.950)	-1.051 (1.421)
Log(Population Density)	0.156 (0.559)	-0.887 (0.600)	-1.269 (1.007)	2.372*** (0.898)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.027)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	14.36	14.36	14.36	14.36
Hansen J P-value	0.251	0.971	0.754	0.103
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3683	3683	3683	3683

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Authoritarian-Era Military Recruitment and Partisanship in 1979 Elections

Dependent Variable:	AD	APU	PS
Military Enlistment	4.222** (2.092)	-2.144*** (0.770)	-1.711 (1.472)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-1.624 (1.204)	4.170*** (1.327)	-1.946** (0.957)
Proximity to Large City	-0.516 (0.787)	1.232*** (0.459)	-0.813* (0.477)
Log(Population Present)	1.752 (1.864)	-0.677 (0.705)	-0.734 (1.328)
Log(Population Density)	-0.933 (1.100)	-0.735 (0.611)	2.147*** (0.720)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.027)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	14.22	14.22	14.22
Hansen J P-value	0.155	0.422	0.153
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3706	3706	3706

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.2 Robustness

8.2.1 First Stage

Table 7: First Stage Without Covariates

Dependent Variable:	PrRecH.15.34_Adm3							
	All Parishes		Drop Cities		North Tagus		Drop Cities, North	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance to Nearest Base	0.041*** (0.008)	0.120*** (0.025)	0.031*** (0.011)	0.124*** (0.031)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.123*** (0.028)	0.033** (0.012)	0.125*** (0.035)
Distance to Nearest Base ²		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.001)
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3708	3708	3169	3169	3317	3317	2887	2887
R-Squared	0.112	0.121	0.127	0.137	0.112	0.121	0.127	0.137

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: First Stage With Covariates

Dependent Variable:	PrRecH_15_34_Adm3							
	All Parishes		Drop Cities		North Tagus		Drop Cities, North	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Distance to Nearest Base	0.029*** (0.007)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.020** (0.007)	0.072** (0.033)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.082** (0.031)	0.021** (0.008)	0.069* (0.037)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	0.038 (0.224)	-0.016 (0.217)	-0.072 (0.310)	-0.123 (0.305)	-1.041*** (0.327)	-1.014** (0.339)	-0.994*** (0.323)	-0.969** (0.341)
Proximity to Large City	0.301*** (0.097)	0.309*** (0.097)	0.080 (0.146)	0.112 (0.143)	0.376*** (0.086)	0.387*** (0.084)	0.109 (0.154)	0.141 (0.150)
Log(Population Present)	-1.008*** (0.128)	-0.973*** (0.118)	-0.861*** (0.151)	-0.849*** (0.145)	-0.978*** (0.131)	-0.947*** (0.118)	-0.883*** (0.171)	-0.874*** (0.165)
Log(Population Density)	-0.261* (0.145)	-0.179 (0.141)	-0.648*** (0.157)	-0.583*** (0.155)	-0.399** (0.136)	-0.308** (0.139)	-0.698*** (0.197)	-0.638*** (0.195)
Distance to Nearest Base ²		-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001 (0.000)		-0.001* (0.000)		-0.001 (0.001)
District Fixed Effects	YES							
Observations	3708	3708	3169	3169	3317	3317	2887	2887
R-Squared	0.146	0.148	0.173	0.176	0.149	0.152	0.175	0.177

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.2.2 OLS Regressions

Table 9: Voter Turnout (OLS)

Outcome:	Voter Turnout, 1975	Voter Turnout, 1976	Voter Turnout, 1979
Military Enlistment	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.153*** (0.037)	-0.069** (0.026)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	0.868** (0.322)	2.227** (0.772)	1.779*** (0.357)
Proximity to Large City	-0.196 (0.197)	-0.087 (0.529)	-0.129 (0.268)
Log(Population Present)	-1.290*** (0.267)	-2.615*** (0.581)	-1.580*** (0.342)
Log(Population Density)	1.178*** (0.311)	2.584*** (0.619)	1.682*** (0.319)
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3668	3683	3706
R-Squared	0.224	0.268	0.250

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: 1975 Partisanship (OLS)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed		MFA-Backed		
	CDS	MDP	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	0.046 (0.045)	-0.048 (0.029)	-0.089** (0.042)	0.308*** (0.092)	-0.222** (0.083)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.175 (0.278)	-0.061 (0.423)	5.908*** (1.037)	-1.023 (1.329)	-4.336*** (1.182)
Proximity to Large City	-0.137 (0.172)	0.046 (0.125)	0.673 (0.397)	0.453 (0.742)	-0.873 (0.558)
Log(Population Present)	-0.727** (0.299)	0.067 (0.183)	0.956*** (0.316)	-2.271*** (0.510)	2.049*** (0.503)
Log(Population Density)	0.893*** (0.274)	-0.076 (0.217)	-0.917 (0.676)	-3.451** (1.277)	3.587*** (0.883)
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3668	3668	3668	3668	3668
R-Squared	0.283	0.105	0.744	0.470	0.387

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: 1976 Partisanship (OLS)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed			
	CDS	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	0.056 (0.101)	-0.116** (0.043)	0.279*** (0.059)	-0.233** (0.095)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.753 (0.642)	5.405*** (1.461)	-1.179 (0.930)	-2.830** (1.067)
Proximity to Large City	0.020 (0.453)	0.786* (0.423)	0.327 (0.476)	-1.111** (0.487)
Log(Population Present)	-2.121*** (0.498)	0.922** (0.326)	-0.429 (0.444)	1.738*** (0.415)
Log(Population Density)	0.282 (0.569)	-0.451 (0.713)	-2.982*** (0.986)	3.390*** (0.836)
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3683	3683	3683	3683
R-Squared	0.335	0.759	0.348	0.306

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: 1979 Partisanship (OLS)

Dependent Variable:	AD	APU	PS
Military Enlistment	0.347*** (0.112)	-0.171*** (0.044)	-0.187** (0.079)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-1.498 (1.290)	4.106** (1.444)	-1.995* (0.949)
Proximity to Large City	0.666 (0.688)	0.631 (0.491)	-1.277*** (0.321)
Log(Population Present)	-2.234*** (0.510)	1.353*** (0.325)	0.834 (0.481)
Log(Population Density)	-2.409* (1.154)	0.016 (0.756)	2.728*** (0.604)
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3706	3706	3706
R-Squared	0.434	0.727	0.206

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.2.3 2SLS Results After Dropping Parishes with Cities and Their Neighbors

Table 13: Voter Turnout (No Cities)

Outcome:	Voter Turnout, 1975		Voter Turnout, 1976		Voter Turnout, 1979	
	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)
IV Stage (DV):	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Military Enlistment		-0.773*** (0.206)		-1.776*** (0.567)		-0.982** (0.444)
Distance to Nearest Base	0.085*** (0.031)		0.086*** (0.031)		0.086*** (0.031)	
Distance to Nearest Base ²	-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.000)		-0.001** (0.000)	
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	0.041 (0.238)	0.950*** (0.226)	0.012 (0.242)	2.365*** (0.651)	-0.003 (0.241)	1.894*** (0.296)
Proximity to Large City	0.351* (0.199)	0.059 (0.171)	0.356* (0.198)	0.543 (0.426)	0.358* (0.197)	0.184 (0.255)
Log(Population Present)	-0.903*** (0.139)	-2.021*** (0.269)	-0.908*** (0.136)	-4.439*** (0.816)	-0.900*** (0.135)	-2.605*** (0.573)
Log(Population Density)	-0.466*** (0.146)	0.852** (0.372)	-0.474*** (0.144)	1.735*** (0.641)	-0.477*** (0.144)	1.250*** (0.352)
First-Stage F-statistic	10.79		11.31		11.12	
Hansen J P-value	0.432		0.841		0.361	
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3455	3455	3470	3470	3493	3493

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: 1975 Partisanship (No Cities)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed		MFA-Backed		
	CDS	MDP	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	0.255 (0.672)	-0.968* (0.581)	-0.391 (0.324)	3.934* (2.161)	-2.592 (1.881)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.216 (0.281)	0.006 (0.358)	6.091*** (1.003)	-1.172 (1.114)	-4.391*** (1.081)
Proximity to Large City	-0.215 (0.320)	0.397 (0.329)	1.019** (0.420)	-0.868 (0.926)	-0.216 (0.767)
Log(Population Present)	-0.471 (0.532)	-0.820 (0.597)	0.482 (0.425)	1.264 (2.191)	-0.173 (1.668)
Log(Population Density)	1.046** (0.484)	-0.716 (0.440)	-1.349** (0.665)	-1.290 (1.663)	2.509* (1.512)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.085*** (0.031)	0.085*** (0.031)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	10.79	10.79	10.79	10.79	10.79
Hansen J P-value	0.443	0.192	0.723	0.104	0.098
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3455	3455	3455	3455	3455

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: 1976 Partisanship (No Cities)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed			
	CDS	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	-0.163 (1.081)	-0.847* (0.438)	4.490** (1.935)	-3.109* (1.662)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.743 (0.703)	5.668*** (1.382)	-1.305 (0.941)	-2.938*** (1.089)
Proximity to Large City	-0.004 (0.636)	1.295*** (0.450)	-1.144 (0.862)	-0.241 (0.643)
Log(Population Present)	-2.353** (1.127)	-0.013 (0.506)	3.727** (1.855)	-0.903 (1.329)
Log(Population Density)	-0.021 (0.787)	-1.192* (0.716)	-0.343 (1.484)	2.079 (1.294)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.31	11.31	11.31	11.31
Hansen J-statistic	0.260	0.693	0.913	0.138
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3470	3470	3470	3470

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: 1979 Partisanship (No Cities)

Dependent Variable:	AD	APU	PS
Military Enlistment	4.359* (2.341)	-1.825** (0.750)	-2.089 (1.655)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-1.566 (0.977)	4.201*** (1.232)	-2.019** (1.017)
Proximity to Large City	-0.725 (1.029)	1.450*** (0.507)	-0.830 (0.607)
Log(Population Present)	1.477 (1.863)	-0.408 (0.639)	-0.708 (1.326)
Log(Population Density)	-0.313 (1.772)	-1.260 (0.807)	2.177* (1.151)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.031)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.12	11.12	11.12
Hansen J P-value	0.190	0.672	0.150
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3493	3493	3493

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.2.4 2SLS Results After Dropping Parishes with Cities and Their Neighbors and Restricting to North of the Tagus

Table 17: Voter Turnout (No Cities, North)

Outcome:	Voter Turnout, 1975		Voter Turnout, 1976		Voter Turnout, 1979	
	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)	Stage 1 (Enlistment)	Stage 2 (Turnout)
	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Military Enlistment		-0.782*** (0.241)		-1.976*** (0.656)		-0.928* (0.506)
Distance to Nearest Base	0.084** (0.036)		0.086** (0.036)		0.086** (0.036)	
Distance to Nearest Base ²	-0.001* (0.001)		-0.001* (0.001)		-0.001* (0.001)	
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.944** (0.458)	0.870* (0.526)	-1.018*** (0.367)	-0.610 (1.060)	-1.021*** (0.350)	0.531 (0.690)
Proximity to Large City	0.420** (0.189)	-0.084 (0.182)	0.426** (0.188)	0.389 (0.469)	0.428** (0.187)	0.034 (0.302)
Log(Population Present)	-0.929*** (0.155)	-2.174*** (0.277)	-0.935*** (0.151)	-5.019*** (0.881)	-0.928*** (0.151)	-2.728*** (0.637)
Log(Population Density)	-0.530*** (0.174)	1.218*** (0.390)	-0.540*** (0.171)	2.298*** (0.648)	-0.544*** (0.170)	1.634*** (0.350)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.22		11.65		11.20	
Hansen J P-value	0.259		0.835		0.503	
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3110	3110	3125	3125	3148	3148

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: 1975 Partisanship (No Cities, North)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed		MFA-Backed		
	CDS	MDP	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	0.301 (0.758)	-0.921 (0.626)	-0.758** (0.324)	4.387* (2.537)	-2.864 (2.150)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-0.556 (1.152)	-0.828 (0.798)	-0.450 (0.858)	3.514 (3.802)	-1.339 (2.803)
Proximity to Large City	-0.253 (0.416)	0.452 (0.379)	0.473** (0.212)	-0.324 (1.066)	-0.207 (0.987)
Log(Population Present)	-0.499 (0.625)	-0.661 (0.623)	-0.134 (0.391)	2.256 (2.692)	-0.821 (1.973)
Log(Population Density)	1.173* (0.641)	-0.772 (0.531)	-0.390 (0.291)	-2.934* (1.752)	3.094* (1.856)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.084** (0.036)	0.084** (0.036)	0.084** (0.036)	0.084** (0.036)	0.084** (0.036)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.22	11.22	11.22	11.22	11.22
Hansen J P-value	0.438	0.071	0.178	0.094	0.134
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3110	3110	3110	3110	3110

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: 1976 Partisanship (No Cities, North)

Dependent Variable:	MFA-Backed			
	CDS	PCP	PPD	PS
Military Enlistment	-0.004 (1.174)	-1.152** (0.473)	4.879** (2.265)	-3.439* (1.893)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	-1.269 (1.415)	-0.413 (0.856)	4.416 (3.950)	-1.751 (2.294)
Proximity to Large City	0.326 (0.602)	0.729*** (0.281)	-0.931 (1.032)	-0.245 (0.825)
Log(Population Present)	-2.148 (1.337)	-0.531 (0.605)	4.633** (2.260)	-1.611 (1.572)
Log(Population Density)	-0.643 (0.829)	-0.170 (0.334)	-1.304 (1.758)	2.667* (1.602)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.086** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.65	11.65	11.65	11.65
Hansen J P-value	0.261	0.405	0.958	0.163
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3125	3125	3125	3125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Table 20: 1979 Partisanship (No Cities, North)

Dependent Variable:	AD	APU	PS
Military Enlistment	4.876* (2.649)	-2.176*** (0.832)	-2.307 (1.870)
Log(Previous Social Conflict)	2.110 (2.388)	-1.105 (1.192)	0.315 (1.613)
Proximity to Large City	-0.141 (1.128)	0.961*** (0.358)	-0.963 (0.769)
Log(Population Present)	2.562 (2.255)	-1.011 (0.813)	-1.278 (1.550)
Log(Population Density)	-1.975 (1.855)	-0.236 (0.559)	2.902** (1.368)
Distance to Nearest Base (First-Stage IV)	0.086** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)	0.086** (0.036)
Distance to Nearest Base ² (First-Stage IV)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
First-Stage F-statistic	11.20	11.20	11.20
Hansen J P-value	0.163	0.255	0.167
District Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3148	3148	3148

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.3 Figures


Figure 1: Select Party Vote Shares in 1975



(a) CDS 1975

(b) MDP 1975


(c) PCP 1975



(d) PPD 1975

(e) PS 1975


Figure 2: Select Party Vote Shares in 1976



(a) CDS 1976


(b) PCP 1976

(c) PPD 1976



(d) PS 1976

Figure 3: Select Party Vote Shares in 1979



(a) AD 1979

(b) APU 1979

(c) PS 1979

Figure 4: Enlistment, DRMs, and Military Bases




Figure 5: Voter Turnout Over Time




Figure 6: Effect of Enlistment on Voter Turnout Over Time

