Academic Working Papers
- Wealth, Race, and Consumption Smoothing of Typical Income Shocks. with Damon Jones and Pascal Noel (April 2020).
- US Unemployment Insurance Replacement Rates During the Pandemic. with Pascal Noel and Joe Vavra (May 2020)
- The Initial Household Spending Response to Covid-19. with Natalie Cox, Pascal Noel, Diana Farrell, and Fiona Greig (May 2020)
Published and Forthcoming Papers
with Pascal Noel. Forthcoming, American Economic Review. Draft (May 2019).
Consumer Spending During Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications. with Pascal Noel. July 2019 American Economic Review. Online Appendix.
Spending Category Crosswalk. Replication Kit.The Decline, Rebound, and Further Rise in SNAP Enrollment: Disentangling Business Cycle Fluctuations and Policy Changes. with Jeffrey Liebman. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. November 2018. Online Appendix.
How Do Changes In Housing Voucher Design Affect Rent and Neighborhood Quality? with Rob Collinson. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. May 2018. Online Appendix.
A Permutation Test for the Regression Kink Design. with Simon Journal of the American Statistical Association. June 2018. Publisher’s Version. Stata function <rdpermute>.
Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined? with Daniel Shoag. Journal of Urban Economics. November 2017. Online Appendix. Publisher’s Version.
Work in Progress
- Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages? With Pascal Noel.
There are two prevailing theories of borrower default: strategic default when debt is too high relative to the value of the house and adverse cash-flow events”such that payments are too high relative to available resources. It has been challenging to test between these theories in part because adverse events are measured with error, possibly leading to attenuation bias. We develop a new method for addressing this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic default motive. We implement the method using monthly administrative data linking income and mortgage default. Our central finding is that adverse events are a necessary condition for 97 percent of mortgage defaults. Although this finding contrasts sharply with predictions from standard models of mortgage default, we show that it is consistent with models where the private cost of mortgage default is high.