

Division(s) and Transformation(s): Five Cognitive Stations in the Delimitation of Things

有分與物化：知物的五層封野

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若欲直破入最根本處，釜底抽薪找一個基礎點來探究，則如章太炎《齊物論釋》所提示，如果無法找到事物的“分際”，則根本無從說所謂事物的“本體”：“實在、實際者，本以據方分故言在，有邊界故言際，今究竟名中實在實際字，於所誰中不住不著，無有處所封畛，云何可說為實在實際？本體者，本以有形質故言體，今究竟名中本體字，於所詮中，非有質礙，不可搏掣，云何可說為本體？”是所謂皮之不存，毛之焉附。

If one is looking to directly cleave into the most fundamental locus, to pull the carpet out from under the rug, then it's like Zhang Taiyan points out, in his *Comments on the Equalizing Assessments of Things* chapter of the Zhuangzi--If there is no way to locate a thing's 'boundary', then one is in no kind of position to speak of "[its] fundamental substance" "What's substantial and actual--at bottom, it is on the basis of its division(s) that this is spoken of as registering. We speak of [a thing's] limit only given [its] border. Here in the determinations, ultimately, of the 'real' and the 'actual', they neither stay put nor attach themselves within anyone--if there were nowhere where a thing came to be bounded, how could one possibly speak of its reality(how about substantiality), its actuality? "Fundamental substance at bottom is only spoken of as being substantial on the basis of the givenness of [its] form and matter. Here in the ultimate determination of fundamental substance, in its explication--if there weren't something to snag on, it would be impossible to reach out and draw it in--how else could one speak of fundamental substance?"

This is what's called: with the skin gone, what is there left for the hair to adhere to?

對事物分際的認識和表述與人的心知作用不可分離。《莊子》中多處展現了這樣一個洞察：認識者的狀態與所認識到的內容密切關聯。如莊周夢蝶所說的物化，主體所據以為確定判斷當下之為真者，恰是其後確定判斷當下之為假者；確定性與真實性兩者，在莊子哲學中由於“化”的考量而有所區隔，是《大宗師》所說“知有所待而後當，其所待者特未定也”。一方面，由於知“所待”者未定，所以“當”者也未定，雖然未定而恆不知其所當，不確定性並不直接就否定真實性，人仍有獲得真知的可能；另一方面，“知”的主體也處於不定的狀態之中，這一脈絡底下，此處所說的真知並不是指某種理解事物的確定的對象化知識，而是一種主體在認識對象之時心知動態作用跨越主客對立的純粹地存在狀態，因此《大宗師》說“有真人而後有真知”，在主體的變化世界裡，知有所待，確定性的“當”懸而未決，只有成為真人才能夠獲得真知，“真人”之“真知”和《齊物論》“古之人”之“知有所至”是“以為未始有物”，都與“無”和“忘”的狀態連結。這裡的“古之人”其實也就是“真人”，喻射著人最理想的存在狀態，體現於天與人不相勝的無對之中。

The knowledge and narratives on the divisions of a thing is inseparable from the function of human beings' cognition. There are many places in the Zhuangzi in which a penetrating insight like this unfolds: the condition of the knower is inextricably interwoven together with the content so known. Like the 'transformation of things' exemplified in the mutual dream[-transformation] between Zhuangzi and the butterfly [in which each could equally be said to dream the other]--that upon which the subject depends in determining what's real within [its own] determinate judgment, is precisely what the determinate judgment of its obverse takes to be false. Determinacy and realness, the two of them are marked off within Zhuangzi's philosophy following from considerations of 'transformation'. This is what the *Master of Ultimate Origin* speaks of when it says: "For it is only through its relation of dependence on something that our understanding can be considered correct, but what it depends on is always peculiarly unfixed."

On the one hand, owing to the unfixedity of "that upon which" the understanding "depends," so its [capacity] "to match" is equally suspended. Despite its unfixedity, forever unknown with respect to its correctness, [this] indeterminacy doesn't just straightforwardly negate the realness [of the judgment concerning the object]. But people are still presented with the possibility of obtaining true knowledge.

On the other hand, the subject of the mind is also in an indeterminate state. In this particular context, the *real mind* spoken of here doesn't point to some kind of understanding of things [by way of] a determinate objectifying knowledge--but a pure state of existence in which the subject's mental capacity acts dynamically across the subject-object dichotomy when knowing the object. It's because of

this that the *Master of the Ultimate Origin* says that there can be “a Genuine Understanding” only after there is a “Genuine-Human”--and in the *Equalizing Assessments of Things* that “those ancient people’s “understanding [which had] really gotten somewhere” is [such that] “there had never existed any definite thing at all” All of this is linked together with “nothingness” and the state of “forgetting.” These “ancient people” are actually just the very same “Genuine Humans,” [and this] maps out human beings’ ideal state of existence, manifests the non-duality in which neither the heavenly nor the human wins out over the other.

《齊物論》有段文本對萬物在人的認識中的區分有特殊的闡述，該文本亦見於《庚桑楚》，分析這段文本能很好地說明莊子認為心知的四個層次和邊際與化的關聯：

古之人，其知有所至矣。惡乎至？有以為未始有物者，至矣盡矣，不可以加矣。
其次以為有物矣，而未始有封也。
其次以為有封焉，而未始有是非也。
是非之彰也，道之所以虧也。
道之所以虧，愛之所以成。

In the *Equalizing Assessments of Things*, there is a passage that expressly sets forth the differentiation of the ten thousand things within human knowledge. This passage can also be found verbatim in the *Gengsang Chu* Chapter. Analyzing this passage nicely illustrates what Zhuangzi takes to be the five stations of the cognition, as well as the interrelation between division and transformation.

- (1) The understanding of those ancient people really got somewhere! Where had it arrived? To the point where there had never begun to exist anything at all. This is really getting there, as far as you can go. When nothing exists, nothing more can be added!
- (2) Next there were those for whom things exist, but no sealed boundaries between them.
- (3) Next there were those for whom there were sealed boundaries, but never any rights and wrongs.
- (4) When rights and wrongs wax bright, the Course begins to wane.
- (5) What sets the Course to waning is exactly what allows preference for one thing over another to succeed in reaching its full formation.

(一)、未始有物

古之人，其知有所至矣。惡乎至？有以為未始有物者，至矣盡矣，不可以加矣。

- I. “Never having begun to exist at all” “The understanding of those ancient people really got somewhere! Where had it arrived? To the point where there had never begun to exist anything at all. This is really getting there, as far as you can go. When nothing exists, nothing more can be added!” (*The Equalizing Assessments of Things*)

至知，即是“其知有所至”，指最究竟無以復加之知，這個層次的境界是“以為未始有物”。楊國榮指出，未始有物是“就世界之‘在’而言，其原初的樣式既無時間上的先後之別，亦無本體論上的有無之分。”¹ 在“有”“無”的大問題之前，“未始”作為“開始之未有”，既無開始、亦無時空間一切存有。這並非本體論(ontology)或宇宙論(cosmology)的思辨，“未始有物”並不是指一片虛無寂漠、無物的世界，不是黃老思想中宇宙生成起初濕濕夢夢或太虛無形等模態，更確切來說，談的是人對事物的認識作為心知狀態的展現：“未始有物”是與物同體，不離於物而無彼我，未始有物即未曾有我，物我之間泯然相化，合而為一，處於化境之中，這同時是“與物無際”的另一表述，郭象解釋是：“外不察乎宇宙，內不覺其一身”，冥然與物俱往。² 這一種對世界的理解，處於“與物無對”的未進入將物對象化的認識之中，“物”不是相對於“我”的存在，“我”未曾認識到“物”，並非因為物不存在，而是在心靈混沌的活動中，既不分辨認識的對象也不察覺認識的主體，如《莊子·在宥》言：“渾渾沌沌，終身不離；若彼知之，乃是離之。”

The zenith of the capacity of the mind is the very same as this “understanding which has really

¹ 楊國榮：《莊子的思想世界》，上海：華東師範大學出版社，2009年，第79頁。

² [清]郭慶藩撰，王孝魚點校：《莊子集釋》，北京：中華書局，2012年，第82頁。

gotten somewhere,” and indicates that ultimate understanding to which nothing nothing more can be added. And the realm corresponding to this station [such that] “there has never begun to exist any definite thing at all.” Yang Guorong points out here that this ‘there never having begun to exist anything at all’ is “said in terms of the world’s being-there--its primordial modality admits neither of the temporal distinction between before and after nor the ontological distinction between presence or absence.”

Before the [emergence] of the great problem of “presence” and “absence,” “being” and “non-being,” reading its “not yet having had its beginning” for its “never having begun,” there is neither any beginning nor any [horizon of] time and space for anything to exist [within]. This really is neither an ontological nor cosmological discernment--and this “there never having begun to exist anything at all” really doesn’t mean some stretch of solitude within the void, [like] a world [simply] *without* things [in it]. This is not like the vaporous dream of the universe first springing forth or the [sheer] formlessness of the absolute / supreme nihility [found] within the ‘HuangLao School of Thought’, but more precisely the manifestation of humans’ awareness of things as a state of the power of the mind knowing.

This “there never having begun to exist anything at all” is of the very same substance as [definite] things. [Since] there is no ‘me’ without separating off from things, there never having begun to exist any definite things also just means there never having been any ‘me’ [for there to be]. Things together with ‘me’ are obliterated in mutual transformation, merged into one; and lodged within this realm of transformation, this is at once just another way of expressing “the absence of [any fixed] limits between things.” Guoxiang provides this explanation: “[Facing] outward, unaware of the universe’s existence--[facing] inward, unaware of the singleness of your body, gone off merging along with things.

[In] this way of understanding the world, stationed within “the indetermination between things” [that has] yet to enter into the objectifying awareness of things, “things” do not obtain over and against my existence--and “I” have never yet come to be aware of “things”--this isn’t actually because ‘things’ don’t exist, but rather [that] within the pure muddle of the mind’s numinous activity, neither the object of awareness, nor any kind of introspectively intuited subject of awareness can be discerned. It’s like Zhuangzi says in the *Being There and Giving Room* chapter: “Mixed and blended, in chaos and confusion—as long as they live they are never separated from it! If they knew it, they would then be separated from it!”

對象的取消同時意味主體的解離，也就是《齊物論》所說的“非彼無我，非我無所取”。“未始有物”包含自我本身的解消與散入萬物。如《齊物論》說“天地與我並生，而萬物與我為一”，與天地萬物的並生、為一意味著“同體”，也就是處於非對象化的認識狀態。我既不意識到我，所以我不作為我自己的對象，我也不意識到物，因此物也不作為我的對象，置身於不分的絕對狀態之中，必然處於無物無我的特殊意識活動。同時，主體與對象的失落導致了言說的不可能。語言的表述承載著思維活動中的意向性，既朝內顯明了指者，也朝外指向作為對象物的被指者（不論具體或抽象），表述本身不等同於指謂者與所指謂者。對物的表述本身既然不同於物，一旦言說，概念就形成分層，當混沌不分的世界被言說，即被分立成為了對象性的存在，誕生了 “不分的世界本身”與作為認識對象的“不分的世界本身”，而這兩者與 “所說的‘不分的世界本身’”便形成了更後退一步的 “三”，不斷循環倒退，是 “一與言為二，二與一為三，自此以往，巧曆不能得。”《齊物論》

The abolition of the object at once entails the disintegration of the subject. This is just what the *Equalizing Assessments of Things* means when it says: “Without that there is no me, and yet without me there is nothing selected out from it” “There never having begun to exist any definite thing at all”--this entails the dissolution of the ego along with its dispersal into the ten-thousand things. As *the Equalizing Assessments of Things* addresses: “Heaven and earth are alive simultaneously together with me, and the ten thousand things and I are one”--the simultaneous emergence along with heaven and earth of the ten-thousand things, [all] converging in bearing witness to “the same substance.” That is, they exist within a state of non-contrastive awareness.

I am not aware of myself, so I do not stand over and against myself as an object; I am not aware of [any] definite thing, and therefore [likewise] no [such a] definite thing stands over and against me as an object. Embedded in the absolute state of undividedness, installed within the singular awareness-activity in which there is neither things nor any me [for there to be]. At the same time, the

dropping away of the subject and object [as discriminable] occasions the impossibility of speech.

The expressioning of language carries along with it the intentionality implicit in thinking activity. It points both inward to the pointing [itself], as well as outward to the intentional object which is pointed out (to say nothing of concreteness or abstraction). The expressioning [introduces an] inequality between the reference and the referent--the pointing out and the pointed out. Since the expressioning of thing(s) is not itself equal to the thing(s) [expressed]--just as soon anything is said, the strata of the concept have [already] taken shape.

By the time the world of chaos undivided is spoken out, it has by the very same token been separated off into oppositional[ly determined] existences--and the [minimal difference between] the world undivided *as such*, and the 'world undivided' [given form] as an object of awareness. And these [first] two, together with the 'world undivided' as [now] *spoken* of, then generates a further level back, which only just generates an uninterrupted regressive cycle. It's in this that "the one and the saying are already two, the two and the original unsaid one are three. Going on like this even a skilled chronicler could not keep up with it." (*The Equalizing Assessments of Things*)

沒有分際的表述必須是無表述——或者說，非語言的表述，需要“忘”。因此，體化至極的境界只能是無我與無言的“忘”，也就是心知寂漠的“未始有”。《齊物論》開篇論南郭子綦的吾喪我，言“荅焉似喪其偶”，“荅焉”形容“解體”，“喪偶”的意義無論是“失其所偶對”，或如解釋的“失其所寓寄”，都是所謂的“吾喪我”。³“吾的喪我”當中，形心兩者俱喪，如槁木死灰，但“喪我”之“吾”猶然不喪。雖然說我的存在解體，但又因為出於自我對自我的消解，所以在最根本意義上，自我仍保有了無法去除的對低限度的殘留，“似喪其偶”必須、也只能通過“似”來說，這作為著虛而言的罔兩半影之詞。喪我與坐忘，都是自我的解體而同於大通。化境之知也是不知之知，唐君毅極具洞察地指出，這就是“與物化而不以心稽”，是“直依於靈台天光之發，以神遇物，而忘心忘知之知也。”⁴

The expressioning of the undivided must itself go unexpressed. Which is just to say, the expressioning of the undivided [requires] a non-verbal expressive modality--requires the expresser to forget expression, the speaker (I) and speech (my words) altogether consigned into oblivion. Therefore, the ultimate realm of transformation can only be this “forgetting” altogether without ‘me’, without speech. That is to say, just the “never yet having begun to be” of the power of the mind-indifferent.

In the opening passage of the *Equalizing Assessments of Things*, Nanguoziqi's “I have lost *me*” is spoken of as “all in a scatter, as if loosed from a partner.” This “all in a scatter,” recounts a “falling apart.” And this “loosedness from a partner,” whether if it's taken to mean the “loss of one's counterpart,” or as Yuyue reads it, “loss of one's temporary lodgings,” in any case is this very same “I have lost *me*.” In the self-lost ‘me’ of the I, both the outward bodily form--like a withered tree, and the mind--like dead ashes, both lost altogether.

But the “I” which has “lost [its] me” is still *not lost*. Although it is said that my existence collapses, because this dissolution is drawn out from [the recoil of] the self upon itself, so at the level of the most fundamental meaning, the self nevertheless retains the residuum of an un-effaceable lower limit--it is necessarily “as if loosed from its partner,” and can only pass through the [semblant-register of the] ‘as if’. This functions as a virtual placeholder for the [closing passage in the *Equalizing Assessments of Things* chapter in which] the penumbra (i.e. the shadow of the shadow) interrogates the shadow over their causal sequencing. The ‘I’s loss of itself, together with [the expressive modality of] sitting and forgetting--both figure the collapse of the ego, its convergence into the transforming openness.

The mind station of the realm of transformation's embodiment is [the very same as] the knowledge of not-knowing. Tang Junyi points out, with paramount incisiveness, that this is just to “transform along with things, the mind never lingering to check or verify” to “encounter things with the imponderable spirit in direct reliance [only] on the radiance of the heavenly light from the numinous platform--the knowledge which forgets both the mind and itself (i.e. knowledge).

³ 黃錦欽：《新譯莊子讀本》，台北：三民書局，1974年，第67頁。

⁴ 唐君毅：《中國哲學原論：導論篇》，台北：台灣學生書局，1986年，第130頁。

(二)、以為有物, 未始有封
其次以為有物矣, 而未始有封也。

II. “Next there were those for whom things exist, but no sealed boundaries between them.”

“封”指界限、定義、劃界, 亦即規劃領域。“有物而未始有封”即是說事物存在而沒有邊界疆域加以範圍; 萬物不可定義、不可定位, 不能被確定把握。換言之, 也就是“萬化流行”。封疆是人對事物認知的人為畛域, 如《齊物論》所說: “夫道未始有封, 言未始有常, 為是而有畛也。”“未始有封”與“未始有始”形成了文本內部的相互映襯:

“有始也者, 有未始有始也者, 有未始有夫未始有始也者。有有也者, 有無也者, 有未始有無也者, 有未始有夫未始有無也者。俄而有無矣, 而未知有無之果孰有孰無也。今我則已有謂矣, 而未知吾所謂之其果有謂乎, 其果無謂乎?”

“Sealed boundaries” here means limit, definition, demarcation, also [known] as the structured realm of the delimited. “Things existing, but with no sealed boundaries between them”--this is just to say things *exist*, but without any borders or territories to set the limits between them, to discern the specificity of definite things. The ten-thousand things, each one of them unfixed with respect both to meaning and to positionality, unable to be affixed or lain ahold of. In other words, this is just “the ten-thousand transformations circulating through endless flow.” For this frontier [between them] is the artificial barricade [raised up] by human cognition of things.

This is like *the Equalizing Assessments of Things* puts it: “For Dao has never begun to have any sealed boundaries, and words have never begun to have any constant range. It is in the establishment of things as thus and so (“that’s it!”) that boundaries are raised [between them]. This “things existing with no sealed boundaries between them,” together with the “there not yet having begun to be a beginning” together set about the internal reflexive interplay within the text:

There is a beginning. There is a not-yet-beginning-to-be-a-beginning. There is a not-yet-beginning-to-not-yet-begin-to-be-a-beginning. There is existence. There is nonexistence. There is a not-yet-beginning-to-be-nonexistence. There is a not-yet-beginning-to-not-yet-begin-to-be-nonexistence. Suddenly there is nonexistence. But I do not-yet know whether “the existence of nonexistence” is ultimately existence or nonexistence. Now I have said something. But I do not-yet know: has what I have said really said anything? Or has it not really said anything?

有開始, 有還未開始有開始, 有還未開始有還未開始有開始; 有“有”, 有“無”, 有“還未開始有無”, 有“還未開始還未開始有無”; 忽然間有了“無”, 但不知“有”、“無”真正意義上何者是“有”、何者是“無”。這不是對有無的雙遣, 而是拋棄互斥的預設而給予容納矛盾的空間, 藉此言有無之化。如Steven Countinho所提及, 人、物, 及意義, 皆由“封”所劃界: 空間之界、時間之界、性質之界、認識之界, 人尤其生活在有與無的封界之中。《莊子》最顯著而反覆回繞的主題, 即是有無之間出入的變化過程, 然而, 莊子試圖使我們的注意力不只關注到變化過程, 還有所謂邊界自身。把對“物”的關注拉到“化”的過程, 藉由對“化”的關注, 意識到“有”與“無”之間的連續性, 如此, 邊界自身的清楚與明晰便被解消, 對立的二分轉為罔兩的半影。這樣的思想嘗試緩和人們將自身定位於轉瞬即逝的區間的自然傾性。世界處於變化過程, 因此永遠不會合於二分的邏輯。事物總是處於微妙的變化階段, 順始無窮, 通過某個可辨識的門檻之後而成為他者, 有時因著語言而能恰好地符合劃界的定義, 但其他時候, 在中介的過渡階段, 萬物的遁離則使同個封界的一致性和連貫性不可避免的落空。⁵萬物都不斷離開原來的自身又成為自身, 這就是萬物恆常的存在實態。“恆物之大情”, 也就是“化”。萬物之化除了前述的“未始有封”、“未始有始”, 也是“未始有極”:

夫藏舟於壑, 藏山於澤, 謂之固矣。然而夜半有力者負之而走, 昧者不知也。藏大小有宜, 猶有

⁵ Xiaogan Liu Edit., *Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy*. Steven Countinho, Conceptual Analyses of the *Zhuangzi*, Springer Netherlands, 2015, p.p. 186-187.

所遯。若夫藏天下於天下，而不得所遯，是恆物之大情也。特犯人之形而猶喜之，若人之形者，萬化而未始有極也，其為樂可勝計邪！故聖人將遊於物之所不得遯而皆存。善妖善老，善始善終，人猶效之，又況萬物之所係，而一化之所待乎！（《大宗師》）

There is a beginning, there has yet to so much as begin to be a begin, there has never yet begun to so much as even begin to be a beginning; There's "existence," there's "non-existence," there's "not yet having to be non-existence," there's "not yet having so much as begun to begin to be non-existence"; and then suddenly we have a "non-existence" in our midst—but we haven't a clue what this "existence," this "non-existence" really amount to, what it *is* that exists or doesn't exist. This is not some bidirectional repulsion of 'existence' and 'non-existence,' but the abandonment of mutually exclusive presuppositions, the opening up of a space to accommodate contradiction(s)--[it's] by way of this that the transformation between existence and non-existence, being and not-being is spoken of. Steven Countinho puts it this way: persons, things, and significances--all of these are demarcated only through [raising up] a [more or less] sealed boundary: delimited segments within space, time, natural quality, and awareness--humans especially unconsciously find themselves in the midst of the delimited boundaries between existence and non-existence, being and not-being.

The *Zhuangzi's* most manifest and recurrently zig-zagging theme is the courses of transformation, in and out and [across] between existence and non-existence, being and not-being. And yet Zhuangzi tries to direct our attention not only toward [such] courses of transformation, but also to the so-called *border itself*. Drawing attention from "things" onto the courses of "transformation," and following on the heels of this attention to "transformation," becoming aware of the continuity between existence and non-existence, being and not-being--like this, from where the clarity and transparency of the border itself is dissolved, and the [strictly] contrastive dichotomy [between existence and non-existence, being and not-being] shifts in the direction of [the (pseudo-)relation between the shadow and] the penumbra (its own shadow). Thinking like this ventures to mitigate humans' inborn tendency to situate themselves within intervals which pass by in the blink of an eye.

The world [and everything in it] is lodged in the courses of transformation, and is thus forever inimical to the logic of clear-cut dichotomization. Things are invariably installed within the subtle and wondrous phase(s) of becoming, following on the heels of beginning(s) without end, after having identified some threshold, becoming its [own] other[ness to itself]. At some moments, a spoken expression is able to tally *just right* with the definition [concomitant with] a given delimitation. But other times, in the phase of transitional intermediacy, the ten-thousand things in taking flight will cause the self-identical delimitations, in their integrity and consistency, to become ever anew--this is the eternal real-state of the subsistence of the ten-thousand things. "The vast realness of a thing eternal," this is just "transformation." The transformation of the ten-thousand things, outside of the above "having not yet begun to be any fixed boundaries [between them]," "having not yet begun to begin," equally "has [there] not yet begun to be any limit" :

"For you may hide a boat in a ravine or a net in a swamp, thinking it is secure there. But in the middle of the night a mighty one comes along and carries it away on his back, unbeknownst to you in your slumber. When the smaller is hidden within the larger, there remains someplace to which it can escape. But to *hide the world in the world*, so that there is nowhere for it to escape to, then it has the vast realness of a thing eternal. This human form is merely a circumstance that has been met with, just something stumbled into, but those who have become humans take delight in it nonetheless. Now the human form during its time undergoes ten thousand transformations, never stopping for an instant—so the joys it brings must be beyond calculation! Hence the sage uses it to roam and play in that from which nothing ever escapes, where all things are maintained. Early death, old age, the beginning, the end—this allows him to see each of them as good. People may

try to emulate him as their model, but how much more it would be to bind oneself equally to each and all of the ten thousand things, to let oneself rely on each transformation, on all transformation!” (*The Master of Ultimate Origin*)

萬物存在的真實情態，是萬物不斷地遁逃於原先的存在狀態。任何一種對物的“藏”都將不知不覺漏逃，宣穎說：“造化默運，而藏者猶謂在其故處。郭象的解釋是“無力之力莫大於造化者也。”⁶ “無力”說的就是這“昧者不知”，人人猶如睡夢渾然不覺，但卻身處於這使萬物日化的巨力之中，所以說是“大化之密移”。⁷ “萬化未始有極”也即《秋水》“物之生也若驟若馳，無動而不變，無時而不移。何為乎？何不為乎？夫固將自化。”無動而不變，指看似未曾移動，而刹那刹那不停地都已變化。萬物無有終窮的變化在《則陽》的描述是“隨序之相理，橋運之相使，窮則反，終則始。此物之所有，言之所盡，知之所至，極物而已。”

The true modality of the subsistence of the ten-thousand things--is just their incessant flight from the state of their former subsistence. Any kind of “refuge” unconsciously admits of discharge. Xuanying Chen says, “The creation-transformation silently carries everything away, while the one who seeks refuge goes on saying things ought to be in their given places.” And as Guo Xiang reads it, “there is no greater power than the power of the impotence of the creation-transformation.” This “impotence” speaks of the same “unbeknownst to you in your slumber” [that the mighty one comes to snatch away your boat from its refuge]--every last one of us [drifting about] as if in slumberous torpor, and yet nevertheless installed in the immeasurable power which sets the ten-thousand things a’turning--so is it spoken of as “the hidden trans-positioning of the great transformation.” “The ten thousand transformations never having begun to reach their limit,” this is the very same as how the *Autumn Waters* puts it--“The becoming of things is like a galloping horse, transforming with each movement, altering at each moment. What should you do? What should you not do? No matter what, everything will be spontaneously transforming.” This “transforming with each movement” means to come off like it’s never even once so much as budged, and yet from every waking moment to the next, [the ten-thousand things] have all already unceasingly gone about transforming.

This transformation never coming to an end, is rephrased in the picturing of the *Zeyang* chapter: “The mutual ordering of beings as they follow in succession, the bridgelike circulation of beings as they move each other around, reverting when they reach exhaustion, beginning again when they come to an end—this is what belongs to the realm of beings, to which words can utmostly exhaust and understanding can reach.”

萬物無不如此處於無所終止的化境。物與物的存在也在彼此的牴觸摩擦當中無法片刻止息，一往無前：“一受其成形，不亡以待盡。與物相相靡，其行盡如馳，而莫之能止。”（《齊物論》）物行盡如馳，而當形體前往到亡盡之處，出入之間更又轉化為他形，《大宗師》中，子犁說“造物”或將以子來“為鼠肝”，“為蟲臂”；《至樂》言“萬物皆出於機，皆入於機”、“...程生馬，馬生人，人又反入於機。”機，為事物至為微小的發動瞬間，同時一物的形體還可以分化成眾多形體，《大宗師》中描述人的死亡與轉生可能一臂為雞、一臂為彈，尻以為輪，以神為馬。也類似《寓言》所說的：“萬物皆種也，以不同形相禪，始卒若環，莫得其倫，是謂天均。天均者，天倪也。”

The ten-thousand things exceptionlessly lodged in the realm of transformation never drawn to a close. The subsistence between one thing and the next is granted not so much as a moment’s respite from the chafe of contradiction and mutual friction, but can press only endlessly forward:

“We receive of it some one completed form, a specific fully-formed body, and then we keep that alive only by constantly anticipating its end, grinding and lacerating it against all the things around us, everything it does just flashing by and away like an unstoppable galloping horse.” (*Equalizing Assessments of Things*)

Things carry on like an unstoppable galloping horse--but when the physical body comes around to the locus of its last dissipation, in the crossfire of outflux and influx, [it] is once more transfigured into an other-body--or as Zili speculates in the *Master of Ultimate Origin* chapter, [perhaps] the “Creator of Things” maybe will just reshape him, “perhaps into a mouse’s liver? Or perhaps an insect’s arm?” As the *Utmost Joy* has it, “all things emerge from minute wellsprings, and all go back into them.” “...the panther generating the horse, which generates humans, who then again return back into minute

⁶ 王叔岷：《莊子校詮》，台北：中央研究院歷史語言研究所，1988年，第227頁。

⁷ 錢穆：《莊子纂箋》，台北：三民書局，1981年，第59頁，轉引江適曰。

wellsprings.” The minute wellsprings of things are the junctures of their minutest arousals. And a single body can at once be [ever further] divided into a great many more bodies. [Take for instance] the death and cropping up again of the person described in *the Master of Ultimate Origin*--[his] left arm transformed into a rooster, [his] right arm into a crossbow pellet, [his] ass transformed into a pair of wheels and [his] spirit into a horse.”

All of this is quite similar to how *Words Lodged Elsewhere* has it: “All beings are seeds of one another, yielding back and forth their different forms, beginning and ending like a circle, so that no fixed groupings apply. This is called the Heavenly Equality, the turning of the Heavenly Potter’s Wheel.”

這些令人匪夷所思、神奇的超乎經驗的描述，猶如莊子全書開篇的“鯤鵬之化”一樣，並不是要去宣稱一種變形 (metamorphosis) 的形上學宇宙世界，而是通過超現實的狂言的敘述模式，突出萬物之間跨形體的密切關聯，在存在者與存在者的複數性的多重層次地相互成為下，萬物之化的不可思議與不近人情——超出一般人們的直覺、日常認識和測度的範疇，所以莊子在《逍遙遊》也假借肩吾問於連叔說接輿：“大而無當，往而不反...大有逕庭，不近人情...吾以是狂而不信焉”，人們多半要因這“無當”、“不反”而對莊子“狂而不信”。

These mind-boggling thoughts, these mystical, trans-experiential descriptions, just like the [momentous] Kun-fish’s transformation into the [even more prodigious] Peng-bird in the opening passage of the entire *Zhuangzi*, don’t have to claim [any] metaphysical cosmology of metamorphosis, but rather through the narrative modality of trans-experiential gobbledygook, break through [into] the trans-corporeal interrelational mesh between the ten-thousand things. Within the multi-layered interplay between any one existence and the next in the profusion [of existences], the inconceivable and [strictly] impersonal transformation of the ten-thousand things--far exceeds an ordinary person’s instincts [on the matter], the scope of [their] day-to-day awareness and takings measure [of things]. Just so the *Zhuangzi*, in the *Wandering Far-flung and Unfettered* chapter has Shoulder Self asked Unk Linkin into the madman Jieyu saying: “He talks big without fitting to anything, going on and on without recurrence...vast and excessive, not coming near to the way people really are...I regard his talk as crazy, which I refuse to believe.” And more often than not, people will dismiss [this kind of talk] as crazy and unbelievable, on the basis of its “not fitting to anything” and its “aversion to recursion.”

“化”除了是“物”存在的根本狀態，也是物的存在的展開與延續本身，在存在物無所間斷不知所終地成為另一存在物之流行轉化中，人的認知能力面對萬物主體存在狀態的變化不可避免地“終身失之交臂”，於流動之中錯失而無法加以預測與把握，往往是“彼已盡矣，而求之以為有”，這也是在事物已然離去的虛無之處進行必將撲空的把握，如同在空的馬廄尋馬。這段討論也見於《田子方》仲尼語顏淵：

吾一受其成形，而不化以待盡，效物而動，日夜無隙，而不知其所終，薰然其成形，知命不能規乎其前，丘以是日徂。吾終身與汝交一臂而失之，可不哀與！女殆著乎吾所以著也。彼已盡矣，而女求之以為有，是求馬於唐肆也。可不哀與！女殆著乎吾所以著也。彼已盡矣，而女求之以為有，是求馬於唐肆也。吾服女也甚忘，女服吾也亦甚忘。雖然，女奚患焉！雖忘乎故吾，吾有不忘者存。

“Transformation”, outside of being the fundamental condition of existence, is equally the unfolding and continuation of existence(s). In the uninterrupted circulatory transfiguration all throughout the exceptionless field of existents, each one endlessly going out into its other, the human being [with their] power of cognition, faced with the condition of transformation of the ten-thousand things’ subjective subsistence, unavoidably “loses and is lost by the other despite standing shoulder to shoulder [with the other] all their life”--letting [each other] slip, unable to foresee or lay ahold of it in the flow. More often than not, “that other one you speak of is already discharged, long gone! And yet you search for it as if it should be something existing.” This is the same locus of the void from which things have [as such] always-already departed, which executes the certainty of inevitably closing in on the nothing--just like searching for a horse in an empty stable. We see this same discussion in *Sir Squarescope of the Fields* where [Zhuangzi’s puppet] Confucius says the following to Yan Yuan:

I have received this fully formed body that remains unchanged as it awaits its end, but from the first I have nonetheless been moving in mimicry of all things day and night without the slightest

pause, never knowing in what it will end. Like gathering smoke, this body forms, knowing only that fate cannot be determined in advance, and for this reason I instead make sure to pass away every day. You and I are shoulder to shoulder all our lives and yet we lose each other—is it not sad? You are right now seeing more or less all there is of me that can be seen; that other one you speak of is already discharged, long gone! And yet you search for it as if it should be something existing. You are looking for a horse in an abandoned stable. What you are subservient to in me is something long forgotten, deeply forgotten --as is what I am subservient to in you. But don't worry about it. Even if you forget the previous me, there remains, there remains something of me untouched by any forgetting.”

第一、二重境界接近而有微妙的不同。“未始有物”本身即是化的體現而不可以言論，不知有物、有我，亦不知有化，而這才是縱身於大化。在心處於混沌喪忘的認知狀態之中，最高層次的存在狀態是無所偶對的無我，連一“恍惚之光與道相合”亦皆無有，徹徹底底和光同塵。任何言語道斷至多只能於第二個層次展開。但這兩個層次都作為“封”界線的開放，也意謂著“我”之化作為一種不可知的遍在。

These [first] two stations come near to one another, yet admit of subtle differences. “There never having begun to exist anything at all” is identical to the unutterable incarnation of transformation--unaware of any thing, unaware of any me [for there to be]. But only [through] unawareness [even] of transformation [itself] does one lodge oneself in the great transformation.

When one's mind is disposed within a state of chaotic and oblivious cognition, the zenith level state of existence is this counterpart-less without-any-me-for-there-to-be, altogether without even so much as the “dim glow merged with the Dao,” the dust thorough-goingly conjoined with the glow. Any verbal severance from the Dao can unfold only within the second station. And yet these [first] two stations act in the capacity of opening up [at the site of] the boundary's line of demarcation, meaning also that the transformation of the ‘self’ as such remains an un-knowing pervasion.

當指出第二層次的知是知化之時，盤旋不去的深層次的弔詭又再度出現。莊子明確提出過化的不可知。《大宗師》中仲尼稱讚孟孫才“進於知矣”，是因他“若化為物，以待其所不知之化”。這一種“不知”，則是出於“方將化，惡知不化；方將不化，惡知已化”的思考。當一切都在變化推移之中，在此刻我所以為的自我的存在之前是不知該如何知道的不知，自我的存在之後也是不知，一己之存在以及我的認識便不可避免地被限定於化與不化間的“方將”之時，認識不可能通變而知其往來，因而遇到不可跨越的坎限。“方將”指即將變化的剎那，剎那作為無法被具體切分的時間，其對象也永無落實之處，只能做出概念化的稱謂，或者也可以說，主體的存在處境和認識情境中，一方面萬物皆化無古無今，一方面萬物又只存在於無限親近的當下的“方將”。對化的不知，帶來自我的開散，因此孔子說“人之相與吾之耳矣，庸詎知吾所謂吾之乎？”郭象注“靡所不吾”，鍾泰進一步解釋：“且也相與吾之耳矣，吾本化物，強名為吾，故曰：‘吾之’。覆而求之，吾果安在？故曰：‘庸詎知吾所謂吾之乎？’”⁸莊子以萬物的主體於“化”之中，呈現為“虛”與“物”之間的來回往復，如畢來德所說，“在二者之間，是前者—虛空或是混沌—居於根本的位置。我們是憑藉這一虛空才具備了變化和自我更新的能力。使我們能夠在必要的時候，重新定義我們與自我、他人以及事物的關係。”⁹

But just as soon as we, here in the second station, have discerned knowledge of transformation from [the visages of] the understanding, the unbroken whorl of deep-level paradox(es) will surface and ever again re-surface.

Zhuangzi pointed out for us clearly the unknowingness [of which] transformation consists. The [puppet] Confucius of the *Master of Ultimate Origin* in his eulogy for Mengsun, speaks of his knack for [going] “beyond mere knowing,” which follows from his “having already transformed into some [other] ‘thing’, which itself was but a waiting for the next unknown transformation.”

This sort of ‘un-knowing’ is drawn from this thought: “at the very ongoing *moment* of transformation, how could someone still know anything about what will be when done with this transformation, about what they have not yet transformed into? How could someone who has undergone a transformation know anything about what has already transformed away, what is over and gone? All things alapse in transfiguration, this is ‘un-knowing’ in the sense of not-knowing how in

⁸ 鍾泰：《莊子發微》，上海：上海古籍出版社，1988年，第160頁。

⁹ [法]畢來德 (Jean Francois Billeter)，宋剛譯：《莊子四講》，台北：聯經出版社，2011年，第110頁。

heavens I am supposed to know anything before this very solitary *taking myself to be* [as I am] in this moment, and un-knowing alike of the aftermath. When even so much as a splinter of selfhood, along with [the concomitant] awareness of myself [as such], is bound inevitably to “this ongoing *moment* of transformation” fixed between [the two extremes of] transformation and stagnation, [self-]awareness cannot know of the intercourse [between one moment and the next] by way of becoming, and thereby encounters one uncrossable abyss-threshold after the other.

“This *ongoing moment* of transformation” means this very solitary second within the [course] of transmutation, and ‘this very solitary second’ is a [strange unit] of time which [due to its nature] cannot be cut into specific pieces, and its objectal counterpart [accordingly] admits of no vantage from which it could be decided in advance. [One] can only then [resign oneself to] tarry with conceptualizing designations. Or, it could also be said: stuck between the the plight of the subject’s existence and the circumstances of [self-]awareness—the ten-thousand things on the one hand are ever transforming, equally without both a ‘before’ and a ‘now’; and on the other hand, lies in this very instant of unlimited nearness, this “*ongoing moment* of transformation.”

[This] un-knowingness about transformation brings about the opening up and dispersion of selfhood [into all things]. Following on this, [Zhuangzi’s puppet] Confucius says, “we temporarily get involved in something or other and proceed to call it ‘myself’¹⁰—but how can we know if what we call ‘self’ has any ‘self’ to it? Guo Xiang comments, “there’s nothing against which I can chafe that I do not take as ‘I.’” Zhongtai takes a step further, adding: “insofar as we temporarily get involved in something or another and proceed to call it myself, the kind of thing ‘*I am*’ is transformation at bottom, and just arbitrarily call this ‘myself’. Therefore I say to myself, “this is me.” I strive recurrently to verify it in reflection, but where and whence to come up with it? It’s for this reason that [Zhuangzi’s puppet Confucius] asks: “how can we know if what we call ‘self’ has any ‘self’ to it?”

Within the “transformation” of the subject-in-ten-thousand things, Zhuangzi ventures into the back and forth between ‘things’ & their ‘no-things’. Just like Jean Francois Billeter comments: “In the ‘-inter’ of the two [things & their no-things], the void or [we could equally say] chaos resides in the pivotal position. We are equipped with the power of transformation and self-renewal only in and through this void. It causes us, empowering us in critical moments to renegotiate the lines of relational demarcation between ourselves and other people, other things.”

(三)、以為有封，未始有是非

其次以為有封焉，而未始有是非也。

III. Sealed Boundaries, But No Rights and Wrongs

“Next there were those for whom there were sealed boundaries, but never any rights and wrongs.”

第三層次的知是“有封”之知，以抽象思維分化事物的方式以進行認識，也可說是物類之知，涉及形名與名實，既是對物的存在、物的分類及如何將物交付知識的組織系統秩序的認識，也是理解物與物之間相似性與等同性關係之知。這一類認識活動中較特殊之處在於承認“未始有是非”，有的或者藉由悖論的方式，使人注意到名與物關係的有限性和不可確定性。這一種抽象的思辨之知向來多被詬病為“上智之所難知，人事之所不用，耗精冥索，窮年於‘心’、‘物’、‘力’之推求”¹¹，莊子注意到這種知的流弊在於“馳蕩而不得，逐萬物而不反，是窮響以聲，形與影競走”，“弱於德，強於物，其塗隴矣”（〈天下〉），但同時他也仍給予物類辨析之知頗高的地位。

The third station of cognition is the “knowledge of sealed boundaries,” by which one comes to know things by means of the dividing transformation in abstract thought. This could also be said to be classificatory knowledge of things--verging into [the distinctions between] form and their names, names and their realities. The existence of contradistinctions in things, the classification of things, knowing how to consign things within the sequences of an organized system.

The special trademark of this type of cognitive activity lies in its acknowledgement of the

¹⁰ There’s a 相與 (‘reciprocally’ / ‘entangled together’, etc.) in this sentence we’ve struggled enormously to translate into English. Any suggestions?

¹¹ 伍非百：《中國古名家言》，北京：中國社會科學出版社，1983年，第10頁。

un-fixity of right and wrong, affirmation and negation. This sort of abstract-discursive knowledge has been perennially denounced by every mother's son just like this: "For the wisest of people, such knowledge is *still* hard to understand. For common folk, it's completely useless. It is a waste of energy, pondering in the darkness, frittering one's years away in the pursuit of "the mind," "the thingness of things", and "power." Zhuangzi notices this type of cognition falls into degeneracy when one "fruitlessly dissipates" their talents, "running after the ten-thousand things without ever turning back into oneself, like someone trying to chase an echo with shouts, someone trying to outrun their own shadow." Or when one is "weak in intrinsic virtuosity but forceful in their delimitation of things, so that their path before them turns dark in the end." But at the same time, he still esteems cognition by classificatory discrimination with a relatively high status.(compared to the forth and the fifth level.)

“有封”是認為事物之間具有分際，區分與對物的指涉二者一體兩面，指涉同時有劃限與定義的特性，然而這種定位並不同於認為有確定的是非判斷，換而言之，這一層對事物的認識，是承認事物的“名”、“類”、“稱”、“謂”、“彼”、“此”的存在，但指涉間的名實關係仍保有流動變化的空間。如《莊子·至樂》說“名止於實，義設於適”，這一思考的背景是名言與物的關係，亦即中國哲學中所謂的“名實關係”問題。“有封而未始有是非”蘊藏的含義，是語言對事物的指涉和把握僅僅出自人為的賦予，並不直接關涉到事物的實在性，或者說，懷疑人對事物的本體或本質可以進行根本而確定的把握，也因此“是非”的判斷被懸在“未始有”的狀態。中國古代名辯與近代哲學對語言和事物間關係的思考，許多都與這一層的認識和思考開展相關。比如後期的維特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)在《哲學研究》中便曾對於不同人心中能否做出共同清晰的界線劃分此點提出質疑，他清楚宣稱他根本就不願意畫出這條界線，並認為界限模糊的概念仍作為概念，又如同在沒有畫下任何界線之時，以“這邊”、“那邊”進行模糊性指向仍可發生意義，宣稱模糊性有時正是我們所需要的，封也具備開放性；¹²從這種空間性意象去理解名言和意義建構的場域，如米歇爾·福柯(Michel Foucault)也討論過事物被相互不同“停放”、“安置”和“排列”的場所，指出這是“物被正常整理並被賦予名稱的這一單調的空間”。¹³

The existence of “sealed boundaries” takes it that things have their limits in being divided from one another. To differentiate and make reference to things, these are two sides of the same coin. And reference has the distinguishing marks both of delimitation and definition. However, this positioning doesn't amount to taking there to be definitely discernible *rights* and *wrongs*, *affirmations* and *negations*. In other words, this station in the awareness of things recognizes the existence of things' 'names', 'classifications' 'denotations', 'senses', 'these ones', 'those ones', but the relational horizon between 'name' and 'reality' implicit in the act of reference nevertheless leaves the margins open for mobility and transmutation .

Just like Zhuangzi says in the *Reaching Utmost Happiness* chapter, “names come to rest in the real, and sense is established in accordance with what's appropriate in each.” The context for this reflection is the relation between sayings and the things [said], which is also the very same as the important philosophical concern in Chinese philosophy of “the relation between names and the real.” The implication embodied in [there being] “sealed boundaries, but never any rights and wrongs” is that language's reference to and grasping at things arises only out of human conferral, and doesn't directly come to bear on the reality of things. Which is to say, the skeptic can come to have a fundamental and certain grasp of the nature or essence of things, and therefore judgment is suspended in the state within which rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations “don't yet exist.”

A great chunk of Ancient Chinese nominalist disputes as well as modern philosophical reflections on the relation between language and things all carry out their relations at this station of cognition and reflection. For instance, the modernist Ludwig Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, the question was raised as to whether a clear common line of demarcation could be drawn between the minds of different people. He claims clearly that he is fundamentally unwilling to draw this demarcation-line, insisting that the concept of this boundary's ambiguity remains just that--a *concept*. And yet if we haven't yet drawn up any boundaries, how can it still make any sense to point to the conduction of [the slippages of] ambiguity? For sometimes this is exactly what we need, to claim the ambiguity [of a boundary], [to claim] that boundaries are of themselves equipped with the nature of openness. Understanding the field of the construction of words and their meaning from these kinds of images of spatiality--this is just like how Michel Foucault discusses the space in which things are

¹² [英]維特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein), 湯潮、范光隸譯:《哲學研究》, 北京:新華書店, 1992年, 第51頁。
Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, p.p. 19, 34, 36.

¹³ [法] 米歇爾·福柯(Michel Foucault):《詞與物:人文科学的考古学》, 上海:三聯書店, 2016年, 第4-5頁。

placed, settled and arranged at variance with one another, pointing this out as “the monotonous space within which things are regularly sorted and given designations.”

中國古代的名家對形名析辭探究之知，如鄧析、楊朱、惠施、公孫龍等，雖有不同側重向度，在未涉及政治與道德等價值判斷層面時也接近此列。《尹文子·大道上》區分“名有三科”：“一曰命物之名，方圓白黑是也。二曰毀譽之名，善惡貴賤是也。三曰況謂之名，賢愚愛憎是也。”第一種名即表達事物與名稱之間的關係，可以與道德、倫理、政治無關，以惠施、公孫龍為代表的思想研究的基本都是“命物之名”。¹⁴ 龐樸指出“‘離’是公孫龍學派的靈魂”¹⁵，公孫龍學派以“白馬非馬，形名離也。”（《列子·仲尼》）和“合同異、離堅白、然不然、可不可”（《秋水》）挑戰傳統“以名定實”、“名副其實”的形名理論；¹⁶又如惠施歷物以分析物理及其“子非魚安知魚樂”之辨，和《莊子·天下》辨者二十一事之悖論、楊朱“名者實之賓”、“實無名，名無實。名者，偽而已矣。”（《列子·楊朱》）等論題，都是就著事物表象進行概念劃分來加以認知與論述。

The thinkers of the School of Names in ancient China explored [the] knowledge [which] parses between objects and names. This is like Dengxi, Yangzhu, Huizi, Gong Sunlong, etc., who, though the emphases fall in different places, come close to thoughts like the ones above, steering clear yet of the level of political and moral judgment. Yin Wenzhi, in the first part of *the Great Way*, divides between “three dimensions of naming.” “The first [dimension] names the attributes ordained of things, like ‘square’ or ‘round’, ‘white’ or ‘black’. The second [dimension] names praise or condemnation, such as [saying something] is good or evil, noble or base. And the third dimension names [one’s] condition, whether it’s wise or foolish, in love or enmity.”

The first sort of name just gives expression to the relation between things and their names, and can thus circumvent moral, ethical, political entanglements. The famous nominalists, represented by Huishi, Gongsun Long, are basically “the names of ordained things”. Pu Pang points out that “separation” is the soul of Gong Sunlong’s faction of thought. For them, it’s said in the *Confucius* Chapter of the *Liezi* that “[saying] ‘the white horse is not a horse’ is [a matter of] separating a body from its name.” Or as the *Autumn Waters* chapter of the *Zhuangzi* puts it, they “merge the same and the different, separate the whiteness and the solidity [of the stone], make the not-so appear so and the unacceptable appear acceptable.” Or [we might also think of] theories in the martial tradition concerning [the relation between] a body and its name, e.g. “fixing the real to a name,” “a name fit to the real.”

This is also like Huizi’s encountering things by means of his dynamical analysis or [the logic behind] his famous dispute [with Zhuangzi in the *Autumn Waters* chapter of the *Zhuangzi*]-“You are not the fish, so whence do you know the happiness of fish?” Or like the twenty-one paradoxical propositions these sophists collected in the *Heaven and Earth* Chapter of the *Zhuangzi*. Or we could again think of Yangzhu, who tells us “the name is a guest of the real,” or that “the real has no name, and the name no reality--all of these names nothing but a hoax!” Or like the problems in the *Yangzhu* chapter of the *Liezi*--all of these draw conceptual divisions in the representation of things, giving them over to the aforementioned cognizing and dissertating.

對於這類“知”，《齊物論》評以：“夫道未始有封，言未始有常”、“故分也者，有不分也；辯也者，有不辯也。曰：何也？聖人懷之，眾人辯之以相示也。故曰：辯也者，有不見也。”所辯相示而生彼此，各處於概念堆砌設定的封閉系統中，自彼則不見，自知則知之，固受其黷闇而不能相知，亦不能正之，這也是《天下》評論說所謂“能勝人之口，不能服人之心。”《齊物論》提及惠子的據梧而辯是“知幾乎”——辨名析理是知的能力的高度展現，但這種知卻可能淪於耗竭生命的精神去追逐外部之物，《德充符》因而批評惠子的“據槁梧而瞑”“以堅白鳴”是“外乎其神”“勞乎其精”。這也是《天下》評論說所謂“能勝人之口，不能服人之心。”《齊物論》提及惠子的據梧而辯是“知幾乎”——辨名析理是知的能力的高度展現，但這種知卻可能淪於耗竭生命的精神去追逐外部之物，《德充符》因而批評惠子的“據槁梧而瞑”“以堅白鳴”是“外乎其神”“勞乎其精”。

Commenting on this type of “knowledge,” the *Equalizing Assessments of Things* chapter tells us, “courses have never had any sealed boundaries between them, and words have never had any constant range”; “For wherever a division is made, something is left undivided. Wherever debate shows one of two alternatives to be right, some- thing remains undistinguished and unshown. What is it? The sage hides it in his embrace, while the masses of people debate it, trying to demonstrate it to one another.

¹⁴ 曹峰：《中國古代“名”的政治思想研究》，上海：上海古籍出版社，2017年，第5頁。

¹⁵ 龐樸：《中國的名家》，北京：中國國際廣播出版社，2010年，第72頁。

¹⁶ 鄭開：鄭開：《道家形而上學研究》（《公孫龍子·指物論》譯指），第389-406頁。

Thus I say that demonstration by debate always leaves something unshown.” This debate over ‘it’, [the masses] trying to demonstrate ‘it’ to one another, gives rise to the contrary positions ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘this’ and ‘that’, each of which is [now] lodged in sealed-boundary systems set up through the stacking of concepts. And [as Zhuangzi also says] one is oneself also a ‘that,’ an other, but without being able to directly see this, aware of it only through one’s own vantage on the situation. And [a third person intervening] would be even more in the dark about it, [on top of] our each being unable to know ‘it’, unable to straighten anything out in the end. This is the same as the *Whole World* chapter criticizing [those who are] “able to defeat their mouths but not to convince their hearts.”

The *Equalizing Assessments of Things* chapter brings up Huizi, who [excels at] leaning over his desk as he makes contentions--his “understanding waxing full” therein. Discerning names and analyzing the principles in things is the highest expression of the capacity of the understanding. But this type of knowledge can also degenerate into needless expenditure of one’s vital numinousness chasing after outside things. The *Fragmentations Betokening Full Virtuosity* chapter criticizes Huizi in the same light, his “reciting [his] disputations under the trees or nodding off across [his] dried-wood desk,” “crowing on about ‘hardness’ and ‘whiteness,’” “treating [his] spirit like a stranger and laboring [his] vitality.”

然而，莊子自己的彼是方生之說，其實也可以看作是一種“有封而未始有是非”。《齊物論》說的：“物無非彼，物無非是。”“彼出於是，是亦因彼。”“彼是，方生之說也。”“是亦彼也，彼亦是也。彼亦一是非，此亦一是非，果且有彼是乎哉？果且無彼是乎哉？彼是莫得其偶，謂之道樞。樞始得其環中，以應無窮。”展現出彼與此作為一種不同於明確定義的分別、界域——“封”，作為對物的認識與判斷，彼此相因而生、相互變化，在彼此中被辨識，但彼不永遠是彼，此不永遠是此。彼此的分別、界線只是物進入人們認識的暫時權宜，這一暫時卻可以無窮變動下去。

However, Zhuangzi’s own ‘otherness’, ‘thatness’ is said in the sense of the simultaneous, mutual generation of self and other, ‘this’ and ‘that’. And really this can also be considered a version of “the presence of sealed boundaries without there being any rights and wrongs.” The *Equalizing Assessments of Things* tells us “there is no thing that is not a ‘that,’ no thing that is not a ‘this.’” And that “‘thatness’ emerging from ‘thisness,’ and ‘thisness’ following from ‘thatness’--this is its theory of the simultaneous generation of the ‘this’ and the ‘that.’”

“for to be a ‘this’ is in fact also to be a ‘that,’ and every ‘that’ is also a ‘this.’ ‘THAT’ is then itself already both ‘this’ and ‘not-this,’ both a right and a wrong. But ‘THIS’ is also itself already both ‘this’ and ‘not-this,’ both a right and a wrong. So is there really any ‘this’ as opposed to ‘not-this,’ any right as opposed to wrong? Or is there really no ‘this’ as opposed to ‘not-this,’ no ‘right’ as opposed to ‘wrong’? A state where ‘this’ and ‘not-this’—right and wrong—are no longer coupled as opposites is called Course as axis, the axis of all courses. When this axis finds its place in the center, it responds to all the endless things it confronts, thwarted by none. For it has an endless supply of ‘rights,’ and an endless supply of ‘wrongs.’ ”

The demonstration of ‘this’ and ‘that’ marks a division and divided partitions unequal to the fixation of definitions——“sealed boundaries” are those by which we become aware and make judgments regarding things, ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘this’ and ‘that’, each generating each other through mutual causation, each transforming into the other, and recognizing itself in their interface. And yet the other is not eternally other, the self not eternally self; ‘that’ is not eternally ‘that’, ‘this’ is not eternally ‘this’. For the division between ‘this’ and ‘that’ the [resulting] line of demarcation is merely a temporary expedient for things to penetrate into human awareness, where these temporary [configurations of ‘this’ and ‘that’] *can* [on the contrary] carry on changing for evermore.

(四)、是非之彰

是非之彰也，道之所以虧也。

IV. The Waxing of Rights & Wrongs

When rights and wrongs wax bright, the Course begins to wane.

“名物之知”再下落一層則是“是非之知”，對事物進行分別之外，認為有“正”與“當”的確定對應來定論所謂的“是、非”。這一正當性是理性的作用，也帶來價值的指向，當名分與權力結合形成確定的標準並形成了規範，便能由此劃定政治、社會、與倫理關係的秩序。這一個認識向度中，個體生命被理解為具有固定的理想型態，因此存在著可供效法的範式和模型，亦即存在“模範”，也就是在此意義上，“道”因而虧損。莊子批判這種知在對事物的意義賦予和定位中剝奪了生命原初的整全和無量的可能，進而限制變化的發生。通過建立起“物”、“形”、“名”、“實”之間的穩固關係，總而歸於政治語言。名物之定形與定名在和政治權力、道德性相互結合之後，封界便成為生命的樊籠，將人圈養其中加以規訓，在政治力量的澆鑄下安排生活世界秩序的應然性。儒家與墨家的“是非”即屬於這種知的思想典型。西晉的魯勝在《墨辯注敘》中言：“名者所以別同異、明是非，道義之門，政化之準繩也。孔子曰：‘必也正名，名不正則事不成。’墨子著書作辯經以立名本，惠施、公孫龍祖述其學，以正別名顯於世。孟子非墨子，其辯言正辭則與墨同。”

One level further down in the cognition of things by means of names is the knowledge of rights and wrongs which, outside of drawing distinctions in things, takes there to be a definite correspondence between “getting it right” and “having to tally with it,” pinning right and wrong down [where they stand]. This tallying with the right way is a function of reason, and brings along a value-directionality. For when name and power are combined to form definite standards and norms, the political, social, and ethical order of relations can be delineated. In this orientation of knowledge, individual life is understood to have a fixed ideal shape, and therefore there are common paradigms and matrices to be observed, i.e., there are “exemplary models,” and in just this sense, the Dao wanes as a result.

Zhuangzi criticizes this type of knowledge as stripping life of its original wholeness and limitless possibilities by endowing and anchoring things with meaning, thus limiting the occurrence of transformation. By means of the establishment of stable relations between “things,” “bodies,” “names” and “realities,” [all of this] revert to political language. As soon as the fixation of bodies and names in things’ denomination is joined together with political power and morality, sealed boundaries become the cage of life, in which people are held captive and disciplined, and the normality of the order of our lives is arranged to fit the cast of political power. The rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations of the Confucians and Mohists belong to the thought-prototype characteristic to this kind of cognition. Lusheng of the Western Jin, in his *notes on the Mohist disputes*, says:

“Names are used to separate the same and different, to illustrate right and wrong, affirmation and negation; [they are] the gate of morality and justice, the measure of political indoctrination. Confucius said: ‘The names must be rectified. If the names are not rectified, nothing will be accomplished.’ Mozi wrote books on disputation to establish the foundation of names. Huizi, Gongsun Long inherited and recounted this course of study, wielding the rectification and division of names to put the world on display. Mencius is not Mozi, but unites with Mozi in his language of disputation and narrative rectification.”

對事物的命名、分類，在“正”的意識當中，與是非、道義、甚至政治化的標準和規範深刻關聯。對與莊子同時的孟子而言，是非判斷之知是“我固有之”的、作為人的“才”的本質性能力，有強烈道德意味。《孟子·公孫丑上》說：“是非之心，智之端也。”又說“無是非之心，非人也。”同樣的表述也出現在《孟子·告子上》：“是非之心，人皆有之。”“是非之心，智也。”另一方面，在墨家看來，是非的判斷是理性思辨的一種明察，具有必然性與普遍性，也決定著人的存在價值，如《墨子·修身》說：“辯是非不察者，不足與游”、《墨子·非儒下》則說：“仁人以其取舍是非之理相告，無故從有故也，弗知從有知也，無辭必服，見善必遷。”《墨子·小取》說：“夫辯者，將以明是非之分，審治亂之紀，明同異之處，察名實之理，處利害，決嫌疑。焉摹略萬物之然，論求群言之比。以名舉實，以辭抒意，以說出故，以類取，以類予。”《墨子·經說上》說“恕也者，以其知論物，而其知之也著，若明。”主張認識在理性推斷中具有普遍性與確定性，可以通過思辨論爭來得出確當與否，故曰：“辯，爭彼也。辯勝，當也。”（《經上》）《經說上》說：正名者，彼此。彼此可：彼，彼止於彼，此，此止於此；彼此不可：彼且此也，彼此亦可。彼此，止於彼此，若是而彼此也，則彼亦且此，此也。”“悖，不可也。人之言可，是不悖，則是有可也。人之言不可，以當必不當。”（《經說下》）“當”指恰當、正確，若符合事實，即是“當”於物，當於物則“是”，不當於物則“非”，這一立場積極肯定“知”對“物”的分析和把握能力，承認事物有是非判斷的確當性與實在性而拒絕矛盾性。

The names ordained of things and the classes into which they’re divided, within the sphere of the consciousness [oriented to] getting things right, are deeply intertwined with [the awareness of] rights

and wrongs, affirmations and negations, the sense of righteousness, and even standards and norms of political indoctrination.

For Mencius, Zhuangzi's contemporary, the knowledge by which right(s) and wrong(s) are judged is something of which "I am inherently in possession," as our intrinsic capacity, this distinctively human "knack"--all of this reeks intensely of morality. Mencius, in the first part of the *Gongsunchou* chapter, says that "the cognition of right and wrong, of what [ought to be] affirmed and negated, is the sprout of wisdom," and that "one who is without the mind [bent on] rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations, is not human." He again says, in the first part of the *Gaozi* chapter, that "all humans possess the mind [bent on] rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations," and that "wisdom is the mind [bent on] rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations."

On the other hand, in the view of Mohists, the judgment concerning right and wrong is a kind of rational discernment, necessary, universal, and determinative of the value of human existence. Like Mozi says in the *Self-Cultivation* Chapter, "anyone incapable of discerning rights and wrongs, [what ought to be] affirmed and negated, is an unworthy companion." Mozi also says this, in the latter part of the *Anti-Confucianism* chapter: "The magnanimous tell each other of the principle of right and wrong, what to select and what to discard. Those who do not have this follow those who do. Those who do not know this follow those who do. Running short on arguments, they can only give in to it, can only convert upon perceiving the good." Mozi again says in the *Lesser Selection* Chapter:

"'Distinguishing' is employed to clarify the distinction between right and wrong; interrogate the rules of order and chaos; illustrate the locus of similarity and difference; discern the coherence of names and their realities; locate benefit and harm; and resolve what ought to be held in disfavor and doubted. Only then can one trace in approximation the aspect of the ten-thousand things, and speak of seeking out contestations among a variety of sayings. Names are used to select out the real; phrases used to express meaning; explanations used to bring reasons out--choosing according to the kind, giving way according to the kind."

And in the first part of the *Exposition of the Canon* chapter, he says that "wisdom is that which one's knowledge becomes apparent, clear as day, by means of one's cognition in discoursing about the thing." [Mozi] claims that cognition in rational inference is universal and certain, and that it is possible to arrive at certainty regarding what matches the case and what does not through discursive argument. Thus he says, in the first part of the *Canon* chapter, "'disputation' is [a matter of] contending over contrary claims. Winning in disputation is a matter of matching [the case at hand]." And in the latter part of the same chapter, that "saying a disputation has resulted in no winner, can only be the [result of] not having matched [the case at hand], and [requires that we] turn back to the dispute." In the latter part of the *Exposition of the Canon* chapter, we're told that "contradiction is inadmissible, such that anyone's saying something is admissible is *de facto* non-contradictory insofar as it is indeed admissible; and [on the contrary] anyone who takes it to be inadmissible to say that it fits [the case at hand] is saying that it must not fit."

"To match" means what's proper and correct, if it conforms to the facts, it is "proper" to things, and when it is proper to things, it is "right", "affirmed"--and when it is not, it is "wrong", "negated." This is also a positive affirmation of the capacity of the "understanding" to analyze and grasp "things", acknowledging that things admit of a fittingness and dependability of judgment concerning what's right and wrong, what ought to be affirmed and negated, and foreclosing on all contradictoriness.

取莊子之說多有交融會心的僧肇在《般若無知論》論及“是”、“當”、“取”、“知”的關係，在此也值得參考：“智不取所知，此智何由知！[...]難曰：無取則無是，無是則無當[...]？答曰：然，無是無當者。夫無當則物無不當，無是則物無不是。物無不是，故是而無是；物無不當，故當而無當。”憨山進一步解釋：“‘是’者，印‘可’於物而不謬之稱，能知之心也。”認識者與所認識的對象的符合確當，亦即“知之所知”的符合要成立，其要關鍵處即在於“是非”與“心”的關聯。正當性的判斷有且僅有來自於“心”，莊子從根本上指出，“心”有“成心”，“是非”只能來自於既有前識的“成心”，並且，人的認識活動往往不用察覺到是非的變化和判斷的流動，心便自動地作用而有所取，是“奚必知代而心自取”：

夫隨其成心而師之，誰獨且無師乎？奚必知代而心自取者有之？愚者與有焉。未成乎心而有是非，是今日適越而昔至也。是以無有為有。無有為有，雖有神禹，且不能知，吾獨且奈何哉！夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於轂音，亦有辯

乎，其無辯乎？道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？道惡乎往而不存？言惡乎存而不可？道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。（《齊物論》）

Seng Zhao, whose heart converges, melding and intertwined with Zhuangzi's teaching, speaks in his *Prajna is Without Cognition* of the relations between "affirmation," "matching," "selection," and "cognition." It's worth keeping this in our sights:

"Prajnic cognition does not select out anything to be known, for on what basis could this be cognized [in the ordinary sense]?! Objection: 'If indeed nothing is selected out, then there's accordingly nothing affirmed, and if nothing has been affirmed, then there can be no question of it matching (or failing to match) [the case at hand].' Response: 'Indeed, it is as you say--if nothing has been affirmed, then there can be no question of its matching (or failing to match) [anything else]. And if there is nothing to which it either matches [or fails to match], then there can be no single thing with which it *doesn't* match. And furthermore, if it affirms nothing [at the expense of anything else], then there isn't a single thing that goes un-affirmed. And [from the other end] if nothing goes unaffirmed, this affirmation thus affirms nothing whatsoever; and [similarly] if there isn't so much as a single thing with which it does not match, this matching is thus altogether without anything to match up to.'"

Han Shan takes the next step in explaining this: "This so-called 'affirmation' tallies with the affirmability of things without generating contradictions in speech, this is the mind of the capacity for cognition." The fitting conformity between the cognizer and the [purported] object of cognition, if this conformity [characteristic of] "that which is cognized in cognition" is to be established, the key point lies precisely in the linkage between the "mind" and the [judgment concerning] right and wrong, what ought to be affirmed and negated." This judgment of fittingness to a standard of legitimacy can come from nowhere else than the mind, which Zhuangzi points out is at bottom an "already formed mind," and the [judgment concerning] right and wrong, what ought to be affirmed and negated, already contains the preconscious [germ] of this "mind already formed."

And besides, human cognitive activities often need not become aware of variations in right and wrong and circulations in judgment--[and yet] the mind spontaneously produces this function, selecting something out [from the field], which is [just what Zhuangzi refers to in the when he asks] "how could it be necessary first to know all the alternating states and then actively to select [some] out for itself from among them?"

"If we were to follow whatever completed form of our minds has so far taken shape, making that our Master and Master, who would be left alone and without a Master? How could it be necessary first to know all the alternating states (of knowledge and feeling) and then actively to select [something] out for itself from among them?" This is something the stupid and unthinking are always doing without fail. For the mind to be able to do that *before* any completed form has already taken shape in it, to make such an affirmation or negation about which form it will regard as right and which as wrong without already having taken some shape—that would be like leaving for Yue today and arriving there yesterday. This is to regard the nonexistent as existent. The existence of the nonexistent is beyond the understanding, so that even the divine sage-king Yu could not have known how to do this, so what possible sense could it make to someone like me?"

But human speech is not just a blowing of air. Speech has something *of which* it speaks, something it refers to, but what it refers to is peculiarly unfixed. So is there really anything it speaks of? Or has nothing ever been spoken of? You take it to be different from the chirping of baby birds. But is there really any difference? Or is there no difference? Is there any dispute going on there? Or is there no dispute? Is anything demonstrated by it? Or is nothing demonstrated by it? How could Dao(s) become so concealed and unnoticed that there could be 'a True' and 'a False' in it? How can sayings become so concealed and unnoticed that there could be 'the Right' and 'the Wrong' about them? But Dao(s) qua Dao(s) get concealed behind the small formations that they themselves succeed in shaping, and speech qua speech gets concealed behind the garlands of honor it itself brings on. Hence we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and Mohists, each affirming what the other denies and denying what the other affirms. But if you want to affirm what they deny and deny what they affirm, nothing compares to the Illumination of the Obvious." (*The*

“成心”與“成形”相呼應，所謂“成”有“一成而不變”的意涵。心不可能在沒有通過執著和前見做出取捨的狀況下做出是非判斷。“今日適越而昔至”的比喻是說“時光無停，當其適越之頃，倏成過去”既然已經成為過去，所以稱為昔至；這相當於在說是非也是如此在剎那間無有隙縫地交互相反相成的狀態，“當其是也，是即旋往；當其非也，非亦旋往。”¹⁷然而，即便認識和判斷的狀態總處於變遷中而相代不定，判斷當下卻必然脫離不了執而不變的成心，也因成心而有是非，而是非之知並不如突破單一是非的“兩行”、“以明”。

This “mind already formed” sounds an echo with “a fully formed body,” this so-called “fully formed-ness” carries the connotation of “fully formed, fixed and unchanging.” The mind cannot possibly, without in a moment of foresight selecting out some determinate shape and dispensing with the rest, exercise a definite judgment with respect to right and wrong, what ought and ought not be affirmed. “Like leaving for Yue today and arriving there yesterday” metaphorically expresses the idea that, as Zhongtai puts it, “time never stagnates--the moment someone has set off to Yue, this moment will have already passed.” It's having already become a moment of the past, this is the sense it makes to speak of “arriving there yesterday.” This is [all] equivalent to saying that right and wrong, what you affirm and negate at once both controvert and complete each other, without so much as a moment's interval separating one from the other--or as Zhongtai puts it, “wherever there is affirmation, this affirmation has *ipso facto* already turned and gone; and wherever there is negation, this negation has *ipso facto* already turned and gone.”

However, even if the state of cognition and judgment is always in flux, unfixed within the alternation of things, *this* very present moment of judgment is inevitably unable to extricate itself from the mind already formed, to which it will invariably have affixed itself. On the heels of the mind already formed, there come to be rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations, but this knowledge pales in comparison to breaking through any singular configuration of right and wrong, affirmation and negation, [opening into] “Walking Two Roads,” and the “Illumination of the Obvious.”

如前已述及的，莊子提出“知有所待而後當，其所待者特未定。”知需依賴條件才可成立當否，成玄英闡釋：“夫知必對境，非境不當。境既生滅不定，知亦待奪無常。”知的成立依據於其所對之境，也即其疆界境域，心與物的境域皆處於變化生滅之中無法固定，知也因此待定而無常。莊子也指出了知者的心知處於是非相化的境地之中，《則陽》說：“蘧伯玉行年六十而六十化，未嘗不始於是之而卒訕之以非也，未知今之所謂是之非五十九年非也。萬物有乎生而莫見其根有乎出而莫見其門。人皆尊其知之所知，而莫知恃其知之所不知而後知，可不謂大疑乎！已乎已乎！且無所逃。此所謂然與，然乎？”類似的表述也出現在《寓言》中：“莊子謂惠子曰：‘孔子行年六十而六十化，始時所是，卒而非之。未知今之所謂是之非五十九年非也。’”這也可以被理解為是非之間的相互轉化，亦即“是非之化”，是非的相代作為“化聲”，是非變化無常，處於未知之化中。莊子並質疑墨家認為可以通過辯論的勝負得出是非之“正”的主張：

既使我與若辯矣，若勝我，我不若勝，若果是也？我果非也邪？我勝若，若不吾勝，我果是也？而果非也邪？其或是也，其或非也邪？其俱是也，其俱非也邪？我與若不能相知也，則人固受其黜闇。吾誰使正之？使同乎若者正之，既與若同矣，惡能正之！使同乎我者正之，既同乎我矣，惡能正之！使異乎我與若者正之，既異乎我與若矣，惡能正之！使同乎我與若者正之，既同乎我與若矣，惡能正之！然則我與若與人俱不能相知也，而待彼也邪？何謂和之以天倪？曰：是不是，然不然。是若果是也，則是之異乎不是也亦無辯；然若果然也，則然之異乎不然也亦無辯。化聲之相待，若其不相待。和之以天倪，因之以曼衍，所以窮年也。忘年忘義，振於無竟，故寓諸無竟。

As we already noted above, Zhuangzi brings up [the idea that] “speech has something *of which* it speaks, something it refers to, but what it refers to is peculiarly unfixed.” Cognition must depend on [some] condition before it can form the standard with respect to which it could be judged to either match or not match. Cheng Xuanying comments, “cognition must set a boundary [for itself], for without a boundary there could be nothing to which it could be judged to match. But since boundaries, in their unfixity, arise and dissolve, cognition is impermanent [in its] dependence on this decision.”

Cognition's set-up rides on the object over and against which it sets itself, this frontier boundary realm. Both the mind and [this] boundary realm [on which it rides] are lodged in the unfixity of transformation, arising and dissolution, and thus cognition in riding on this fixation, is impermanent.

¹⁷鍾泰：《莊子發微》，上海：上海古籍出版社，1988年，第35頁。

Zhuangzi also points out that the cognizer's cognition of the mind is also lodged in such straights within which right and wrong, affirmation and negation mutually transform. The *Zeyang* chapter of the Zhuangzi tells us, on this point:

“Qu Boyu went along for sixty years and transformed sixty times. There was nothing he didn't initially affirm as right that he didn't later repudiate as wrong. So he could never be sure if what he presently called right was not fifty-nine times wrong. All beings have that from which they are born, but no one can see their root; they have that from which they emerge, but none can see through what door they enter. Everyone esteems what his knowing knows, but no one knows how to know only by relying on what his knowing does not know. Is this not the greatest doubt of all? Enough! Enough! There is nowhere to escape it! This is called saying both 'It is right!' and 'Is it right?'”

A similar description also appears in the *Words Lodged Elsewhere* chapter: “Zhuangzi said to Huizi, “Confucius went along for sixty years and transformed sixty times. What he first considered right he later considered wrong. He could never know if what he presently considered right were not fifty-nine times wrong.” This can also be understood as the mutual “transformation between rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations,” the process of reciprocal alternation between rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations, Zhuangzi looks on as the “transforming voices,” their impermanence in transformation, their residence in the transforming unknowingness. Zhuangzi also questioned the Moist claim that the “correctness” of right and wrong could be derived from the victory or defeat in disputation:

“Suppose you and I get into a debate. If you win and I lose, does that really mean you are right and I am wrong? If I win and you lose, does that really mean I'm right and you're wrong? Must one of us be right and the other wrong? Or could both of us be right, or both of us wrong? If neither you nor I can know, a third person would be even more benighted. Whom should we have straighten out the matter? Someone who agrees with you? But since he already agrees with you, how can he straighten it out? Someone who agrees with me? But since he already agrees with me, how can he straighten it out? Someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already disagrees with both of us, how can he straighten it out? Someone who agrees with both of us? But since he already agrees with both of us, how can he straighten it out? So, then neither you nor I nor any third party can ever know how it is—shall we wait for yet some ‘other’?”

What is meant by harmonizing with them by means of their Heavenly Transitions? It means ‘right’ is also ‘not right,’ and ‘so’ is also ‘not so.’ If right were ultimately right, its differentiation from not-right would admit of no debate. If so were ultimately so, its differentiation from not-so would admit of no debate. Thus even though the transforming voices may reciprocally depend on something, it is tantamount to not depending on anything at all. Harmonize with them all by means of their Heavenly Transitions, follow along with them in their limitless overflowings, and you will be able to fully live out your years—by forgetting each year, by forgetting what should or should not be, letting yourself be jostled and shaken by the boundlessness! For that is precisely how to lodge yourself securely in the boundlessness.”

面對是非，莊子並不是主張無是無非，或主張一切皆是皆非，而提出“是非之化”，“是”與“非”之間既是相生而起的對立兩面，又內在性地相互轉化生衍，是生非、非生是，是可以轉為非、非可以轉為是，謂“和之以天倪”，即“是以聖人之和之以是非而休乎天均，是之謂兩行”。《寓言》直接指出天均也即天倪：“天均者，天倪也”、“卮言日出，和以天倪；因以曼衍，所以窮年”。莊子中，所謂“天均”是：“萬物皆種也，以不同形相禪，始卒若環，莫得其倫，是謂天均。”天均指天如陶鈞，天倪即“天研”，言天如石磨，都是廣大不已轉動的意象，另一方面，倪也即開端，一切的開端在曼衍而無窮無盡的轉動中首尾相連，無有終窮。這當中使用了流動不已的化的語言——亦即卮言，載浮載沉著“是”與“然”的確定性判斷，用一種日新的“化”的語言重新思量表述這遷流不已的世界。化的狀態之中，事物之名與稱都難以實質意義地粘附在事物之上。不論“鯢”化為“鵬”、“蝶”化為“周”，必有不同的名，也“必有分”，但當事物穿梭在不同的定義之間，仍舊維繫著自身的同一，便出現了“有分”而又“為一”，也因此，描述化的語言挑戰著語言表述矛盾的能力之邊界。在正名的固化之中，當人們以名言

之知論證規範的價值合理性並習以為常，猶有甚者，當先秦許多政治思想家提倡強化“正名”做為對統治者的期待和要求時，莊子“化”的思想也指引人們考慮到是非之化以及形體和心知的轉化可能，重新評估概念指稱何以建構權力規範。

With regard to interposing affirmations and negations, Zhuangzi isn't claiming not to affirm or negate anything, or claiming either to straightforwardly affirm or negate all things, but rather puts forward the "[mutual] transformation of rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations"--the two sides of "affirmations" and "negations" not only mutually arouse and generate one another, but also each from within itself transforms, running out into--the other, affirmations and negations born from one another, turning over into the other from within.

This is what Zhuangzi in the *The Equalizing Assessments of Things* calls "harmonizing things through their heavenly transitions." [Or he also says] that "the Sage uses various rights and wrongs to harmonize with others, and yet remains at rest in the middle of Heaven the Potter's Wheel. This is called Walking Two Roads." The *Words Lodged Elsewhere* chapter directly points out the identity between "Heaven the Potters Wheel," and "heavenly transitions": "It is this equality of Heaven the Potter's Wheel turning that we see in their Heavenly Transitions." And elsewhere [in the same chapter tells us] "all words are actually spillover-goblet words, giving forth [new meanings] constantly, harmonizing them all through their heavenly transitions. They extend on and on without break and thus can remain in force to the end of one's years."

What Zhuangzi calls "Heaven the Potter's Wheel" is just this: "All beings are seeds of one another, yielding back and forth their different forms, beginning and ending like a circle, so that no fixed groupings apply. This is called the Heavenly Equality, the turning of the Heavenly Potter's Wheel." (*Words Lodged Elsewhere*) [The notion of] Heaven the Potters Wheel compares the Heavenly to a potter's wheel turning, and [so we can infer] that heavenly transitions are just the Heavenly envisioned like a pestle, like a mortar and pestle--all of these images of a boundless and unceasing rotation.

Another facet of this is that [Zhuangzi's sense of] 'transitions' is just the wellsprings [of things], the wellsprings of all things connected from head to tail in the unbroken and inexhaustible rotation like the spillover goblet, with no end in sight. In this case, he employs the language of transformations ineluctably flowing on, these spillover goblet words, floating up and sinking down into various definite "affirming" judgments that things are "thus and so," using the language of evernew transformation to re-think and re-formulate an ever-shifting world.

In [this] state of transformation, it is difficult to qualitatively affix names and designations to things. Whether it's the [colossal fish] Kun transforming into the [equally prodigious] Peng-bird, or Zhuangzi [dreaming and within the dream] transforming into the butterfly, [this transformation] cannot but yield different names, for there "must be division." But when [any] given thing traverses the span between different designations, it nevertheless carries along something of its own singularity, manifesting the simultaneity of division and singularity. And following this, descriptivizing language quickly runs up against the outermost bounds of its capacity to capture contradiction [within its snares].

In the course of the fossilization of [a thing's] proper name, we vindicate the value and reasonableness of the norm by the knowledge of the name spoken, becoming accustomed to it in turn--and even moreso, when many political thinkers of the pre-Qin dynasty advocated strengthening the "rectification of names" as an expectation and requirement for the ruler. Zhuangzi's thought of "transformation" also leads us to consider the [mutual] transformation of rights and wrongs, as well as the possibility of transfiguration between [someone's] tangible body and their mental cogitations, and to reassess how it is conceptual designations come to construe the norms of power.

(五)、愛

道之所以虧，愛之所以成。

V. "What sets the Course to waning is exactly what allows preference for one thing over another to succeed in reaching its full formation."

愛究竟是否屬於認知的一種，或僅僅作為情感，或許有些人會提出爭議。然而，若要將認知和情感二者在人的心理活動中截然劃分開來，也不免有些危險。莊子將知的境界逐次展開，最後在此

轉出了“愛”，這一思維本身就饒富深意。應該注意到，以孔子為主的儒家思想和以墨子為主的墨家思想都高舉著“愛”——前者主張“仁愛”而後者強調“兼愛”；反於一般人的常識和傾向地，莊子中“愛”卻屬心知活動的最末層次，故曰：“道之虧而後有愛之成”。“愛之成”是人對事物認識最深刻層次的僵固，認識一旦進入了這一層次，人心從此再難隨順轉化，甚而出現《大宗師》提到的“怛化”這般阻止變化發生的行為。愛的內容，具體而言是“好惡”，“好惡”是“知”牽引人心理活動與身體行動的顯現。是非和好惡既有微妙差異，也密切交聯。

Is preference [for one thing over another] a structural concomitant of cognition *tout court*, or merely a kind of affective attachment--this will perhaps be a point of contention. However, it would be dangerous to rend a sharp division in psychological activity between [pure] cognition and affective attachment. Zhuangzi's expansion of the realm of cognition little by little, opening out here in the last [station] into "preference [for one thing over another]" is profound in itself. It should be noted that both Confucianism, principally represented by Confucius, and Mohism, principally represented by Mozi, exalt "preference" - the former advocating "preference in accordance with human kindness" and the latter emphasizing "universal love"¹⁸ Contrary to the common sense inclinations of ordinary people, "preference [for one thing over another]" for Zhuangzi is the rock-bottom station of mental-cognitive activities, and for this reason he tells us "what sets the Course to waning is exactly what allows preference for one thing over another to succeed in reaching its full formation."

The "full formation of a preference" is the deepest level of rigidification in our cognition of things. For once the understanding has entered this level, it is all the more difficult to follow transformation in people's hearts. And this even [marks] the appearance of the act of "tampering in transformation," brought up in the *Master of Ultimate Origin* chapter, which [refers to] behavior which impedes the happening of transformation. Concretely speaking, the content of [such a] preference [for one thing over another] is [a matter] of "what one finds pleasing and displeasing," where this very "finding of [things] pleasing or displeasing" [is what] draws human psychological activity and bodily movement into manifestation. Thus although rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations, on the one hand, and "finding pleasing or displeasing," on the other--admit of subtle shades of difference, they are nevertheless intimately intertwined.

《德充符》中，莊子認為是非好惡即“人之情”，並認為人如果無“人之情”則“是非不得於身”：

惠子曰：“人而無情，何以謂之人？”莊子曰：“道與之貌，天與之形，惡得不謂之人？”惠子曰：“既謂之人，惡得無情？”莊子曰：“是非吾所謂情也。吾所謂無情者，言人之不以好惡內傷其身，常因自然而不益生也。”

“有人之形，無人之情。有人之形，故群於人；無人之情，故是非不得於身。眇乎小哉！所以屬於人也。警乎大哉！獨成其天！”

在《大宗師》中，知之至的境界體現在“天人不相勝”的天與人關係間的無對與模稜性；愛“人之情”的境界則明確而單一地落入“人”的世界裡。這也呼應著《道德經》第五章所說的“天地不仁”。但莊子事實上並沒有全盤徹底的否認“愛”。如《人間世》也提及：“天下有大戒二：其一，命也；其一，義也。子之愛親，命也，不可解於心。”《德充符》描述豚子愛它們的母親：“所愛其母者，非愛其形也，愛使其形者也。”外雜篇中，《外物》也說“人親莫不欲其子之孝，而孝未必愛。”《天運》商太宰蕩問仁於莊子曰：“請問至仁。”莊子曰：“至仁無親。”所謂“至仁無親”，並不是說“至仁不愛親”，太宰蕩進一步追問：“蕩聞之：‘無親則不愛，不愛則不孝。謂至仁不孝，可乎？’”莊子回答：“不然。夫至仁尚矣，孝固不足以言之。此非過孝之言也，不及孝之言也。[...] 以敬孝易，以愛孝難；以愛孝易，以忘親難；忘親易，使親忘我難。”

In the *Fragmentations Betokening Full Virtuosity* chapter, Zhuangzi thinks that affirmation and negation, taking something to be right or wrong, pleasing or displeasing, is precisely the "human inclination", and that were a person to be lacking in this "human inclination", this would mean that rights and wrongs, affirmations and negations, hadn't gotten through to them:

"Huizi said to Zhuangzi, 'Can a human being really be without the characteristic human inclinations?' Zhuangzi said, 'Yes.' 'But without the characteristic human inclinations, how can he

¹⁸ note for English readers: this word "love" in Mozi's "universal love," is the same character for what we've translated here as "preference [for one thing over another]"

be called a human being?’ ‘A course gives him this demeanor, Heaven gives him this physical form, so why shouldn’t he be called a human being?’ ‘Since you call him a human being, how can he be without the characteristic human inclinations?’ Zhuangzi said, ‘Affirming some things as right and negating others as wrong are what I call the characteristic human inclinations. What I call being free of them means not allowing likes and dislikes to damage you internally, instead making it your constant practice to follow along with the way each thing is of itself, going by its spontaneous affirmations, without trying to add anything to the process of generation.’”

“He has the physical form of a human being but not the characteristic inclinations of a human being. Since he shares the human form, he lives among men. Since he is free of their characteristic inclinations, right and wrong cannot get at him. Minute and insignificant, he is just another man among the others. Vast and unmatched, he is alone in perfecting the Heavenly that is his.”

In the *Master of Ultimate Origin* chapter, the utmost realm of cognition is that wherein “neither the heavenly nor the human wins out over the other,” i.e. in which the relation between the heavenly and the human is made fully ambivalent, such that they cannot obtain in contradistinction to one another; thus to prefer one thing to another, the realm of this “human inclination,” is to fall clearly and singularly into the world of the “human.” This also sounds an echo of the fifth chapter of Laozi’s *Daodejing*, which tells us that “heaven and earth have no human-kindness.”

And yet in fact, Zhuangzi does not just unequivocally negate “preference [for one thing over another.” It’s like, as it’s put in the *In the Human World* chapter, “in all things under heaven there are two great cautionary considerations: the one is the requirement implanted [in one’s nature]; the other is the conviction of what is right. The love of a son for his parents is the implanted requirement, and can never be separated from his heart.” The *Fragmentations Betokening Full Virtuosity* chapter describes the selective love little piglets have for their mothers: “What they loved in their mother was not her bodily form, but what set her shape to moving.”

In the *External Things* chapter in the Miscellaneous Chapters, it’s also said that “parents always want their children to be filial but aren’t certain to love them even if they are!” Washaway, the Grand Overseer of Shang, asked Zhuangzi about human-kindness: “What is the utmost in human-kindness?” Zhuangzi replied, “to really reach the state of kinship, perfect kindness, is to feel no kinship with anyone.” Zhuangzi further replied, after being pressed by Taizai, that “the most perfectly kind feel no kinship with anyone” does not mean that the most perfectly kind do not selectively love their blood-relatives. Taizi then says, “I have heard that without the feeling of kinship there is no love, and without love there is no filial piety. Surely perfect kindness cannot be lacking in filial piety!” Zhuangzi replies “not so! Reaching perfect kinship, perfect kindness, is a lofty thing; it is quite impossible to talk about it in terms of filiality. And by this I don’t mean it goes beyond filiality, but just the contrary: it does not even reach filiality. [...] [Hence it is said that] ‘to be filial as a part of reverence is easy, but to be filial as a part of love is difficult.’ If it may be easy as a part of love, it is nevertheless difficult to forget one’s parents. It may be easy for me to forget my parents, but it is difficult to make my parents forget me.”

此處文本中，顯然愛高於孝，而忘更高於愛。比起相親相愛，莊子更提倡“相與於無相與”的“相忘”。《大宗師》中描述“無相與”的“相與友”：“子桑戶、孟子反、子琴張三人相與友，曰：‘孰能相與於無相與，相為於無相為？孰能登天遊霧，撓挑無極，相忘以生，無所終窮？’三人相視而笑，莫逆於心，遂相與友。”《大宗師》泉涸之寓言說“泉涸，魚相與處於陸，相呴以溼，相濡以沫，不如相忘於江湖。與其譽堯而非桀，不如兩忘而化其道。”所說的即是《駢拇》言：“屈折禮樂，矜侷仁義，以慰天下之心者，此失其常然也。”提倡仁義的溫暖親愛，是物失於大道，失其常然。物與物間理想狀態應是以無為無己之相忘而相與，使人與人處於無目的性的純粹中相互親愛，即《天地》說的“相愛而不知以為仁”。《山木》篇仲尼擔心顏回“廣己而造大也，愛己而造哀也”所以說“無受天損易，無受人益難。無始而無卒也，人與天一也。”這和前所述及《田子方》中孔子對顏回彼此相服以相忘一脈相承，指出主體在若有似無的遷流中的延續，也與此呼應：“吾服女也甚忘，女服吾也亦甚忘。雖然，女奚患焉！雖忘乎故吾，吾有不忘者存。”

Here it is clear that Zhuangzi esteems preferential love over filial piety, and yet forgetfulness is even more highly esteemed than love. In comparison to mutual familial-relations and mutually preferential love, Zhuangzi advocates moreso that we mutually forget one another, come “to be together in our not being together.” The *Master of Ultimate Origin* chapter of the Zhuangzi describes this modality of

“making friends” through “not having anything to do with each other”:

“Sir Berrydoor, the elder Sir Reversal, and Sir Zitherspread came together in friendship, saying, ‘Who can be together in their very not being together, doing something for one another by doing nothing for one another? Who can climb up upon the heavens, roaming on the mists, twisting and turning round and round without limit, living their lives in mutual forgetfulness, never coming to an end?’ The three of them looked at each other and burst out laughing, feeling complete concord, and thus did they become friends.”

The fable of the spring drying up in the same chapter tells us:

“When the springs dry up, the fish have to cluster together on land, they spit moisture at each other and soak each other in the foam to stay wet. But that is no match for forgetting all about one another in the rivers and lakes. Rather than praising sage Yao and condemning tyrant Jie, we’d be better off forgetting them both, letting their Ways(Daos) melt away in their transformation.”

What’s spoken of here is put in different words in the *Webbed Toes* chapter: “And bending and scraping before ritual and music, warmly eulogizing humankindness and responsible conduct ‘to comfort the hearts of everyone in this world’—all that is really just a way of destroying the normal and sustainable way of things.” Advocacy for the tender preferential love of human-kindness is for things to lose the Great Way and to lose sight of the normal and sustainable way of things. The consummate state between one being and the next would be that in which they come together through mutual forgetting, being no one and doing nothing in particular—bringing people to the point of mutual intimacy in the midst of utter purposelessness.

This is what the *Heaven and Earth* chapter refers to as “loving and caring for one another without knowing it—this determined as ‘humankindness.’” [Or we might equally think of when, in] the *Mountain Tree* chapter, Confucius [caught in dire straits on a long journey with nothing to eat] worries that his disciple Yan Hui “would make too much of the situation due to his esteem for him, or grieving over it due to his love for him” and so says to him “Hui! It is easy to remain unperturbed by harms coming from Heaven, but difficult to remain unperturbed by benefits coming from man. But there is no beginning that is not also an end. So the human and the Heavenly are really one!” In the same passage from the *Sir Squarescope of the Fields* chapter we had occasion to reference above, Confucius, with respect to his and Yan Hui’s mutual subservience by means of mutual forgetfulness traceable to a singular strain of thought, points out the continuity of [evacuated] subjectivity within the passage of flow in which they are as if nothing at all—and sounds this call back: “What you are subservient to in me is something long forgotten, deeply forgotten—as is what I am subservient to in you. But don’t worry about it! Even if you forget the previous me, there remains something of me untouched by any forgetting.”

道家式弔詭的思維特點也在此：不知愛人，方能愛人。親緣上子之愛親如此；政治上聖人之愛民也如此。《天地》說：“愛人利物之謂仁”又說“愛人利物”卻是“不為愛人”。這是響應《大宗師》所說“利澤施於萬世，不為愛人。”“有親，非仁也。”“不為愛人”也是出於“不知愛人”。《則陽》說：“聖人之愛人也，人與之名，不告則不知其愛人也。若知之，若不知之，若聞之，若不聞之，其愛人也終無已，人之安之亦無已。”《齊物論》將知的最末層次落到了愛，翻過來看，愛的最高層次，或者說，莊子眼中真正的、無已的愛，則只有在不知愛的若知、若不知之間。這一個“若”字，正是表達著似有若無、不定的彷彿、模糊、兩行。一種真正自由自在，合於化道的愛，也只能在處於對事物認識最高層次與物化的無際交融之中發生。

This is where Daoist paradoxical thought comes to the fore: You can only love someone if you have no idea of loving them. Just so is the love a son has for his blood relatives; just so is the political love a sage feels for his people. The *Heaven and Earth* chapter tells us: “Loving people and creating benefit for all beings: that is what is meant by humankindness.” And furthermore, “loving people and creating benefit for all beings,” just *is* to “not go out of one’s way to love.” This is responsive to formulations from the *Master of Ultimate Origin* chapter, [which says of the Genuine-Human that their] “benefits and favours might enrich ten-thousand generations but not because he harbors any love for man.” And also that “he who favors his blood relatives lacks true humankindness.” To “not go out of one’s way to love” comes out of “having no idea of loving people” And then the *Zeyang* chapter tells us: “The love of the sage for others receives its name from them. If they did not tell him of it, he would

not know that he loved them; and when he knows it, he is as if he knew it not; when he hears it, he is as if he heard it not. His love of others never has an end, and their rest in him has also no end.” In the *Equalizing Assessments of Things* chapter, the bottommost echelon of cognition descends into “preferential love.” And turning the other way, the highest echelon of love, or to be more precise, the true love that is entirely without self, is just that which positions itself, within the love that knows not, in the between of ‘as if knowing’ and ‘as if not-knowing’. This word “as if” expresses just the sense of ‘as if present but equally as if absent’, an unfixed as-if-ity, ambiguous, Walking Two Roads. The sort of true love, free and at ease, joined with the course of transformation, can only transpire at the highest station of the cognition of things, adrift in the boundaryless co-mingling of things-in-transformation.

小結、

莊子所討論人的“知”是“化”中之“知”，關涉著主體如何在轉化之餘互攝的理解中開展對世界的根本認識，思維的內容因此並非單純面對物理世界求知其往來，而是萬物皆作為主體而相互主客交織地轉化，又彼此不斷產生不可測影響的變化，在世界與自我內在關聯的流動中映照出對事物存在狀態的深層理解，直接影響著存有者自身的生命情態。

A small concluding remark,

The notion of “knowing” which Zhuangzi entertains is a “knowing” within “transformation”—having to do with how the subject, through an understanding of the mutual absorption of all residua of transformation, unfolds into a fundamental cognition of the world. And so the content of [its thought] isn’t strictly a matter of [an abstract subject] facing the recalcitrant world of things head-on, knowing their comings and goings [from afar]; rather, [within this cognition] the ten-thousand things are all made the subject(s), transforming by the mutual entwinedness of subject(s) and object(s) unremittingly generative in their interplay of incalculable changes. A deep level of understanding of the state of things’ existence is thus reflected in this circulation between world and self [always-already] internally conjoined, and this cannot but directly impact the condition of life of these existences in themselves.

冉相氏得其環中以隨成，與物無終無始，無幾無時日。與物化者，一不化者也，闔嘗舍之！夫師天而不得師天，與物皆殉，其以為事也若之何？夫聖人未始有天，未始有人，未始有始，未始有物，與世偕行而不替，所行之備而不洩，其合之也若之何？湯得其司御門尹登恆為之傳之，從師而不圍，得其隨成；為之司其名之名，羸法得其兩見。仲尼之盡慮，為之傳之。容成氏曰：「除日無歲，無內無外。」

[The *Zeyang* chapter tells us:]

“Mr. Renxiang was one who found such a center of the circle. He brought himself to completion by following along with whatever he encountered, participating in things without ending and without beginning, no matter what their moment or season. It is only someone who transforms every day together with all things who can remain always one and unchanging—when need he abandon them for even so much as a moment? Indeed, if you deliberately make the Heavenly your Master, the Heavenly will not teach you, and you will instead end up martyring yourself to each thing you encounter. So what point is there in having any concerns? To the sage there have never existed any such things as the Heavenly or the human—to him there have never been any beginnings at all, never any beings of any kind, for he just moves along with the world without replacing anything, going through every kind of activity without getting stuck in any ruts. So how could he have any thought of ‘merging’ with them? Tang found his charioteer in Gateman Deng Heng and took him as his personal tutor. He ‘followed’ this Master without being confined by him; he had learned from him how to complete himself by following after others. If he had similarly put him in charge of handling the names of things, the excess standards that would then belong to each name would have provided him with double vision. It was in this way that Confucius treated as his private tutor even his own exhaustive thinking. As Mr. Rongcheng (the creator of the calendar in ancient time) said, ‘Remove the days and there are no more years. Without what is internal there will be nothing external.’”