Dylan Belton – “Animals as Means and Ends: Taking the Teleological-Chain of Being Seriously”
2:00 – 3:20 PM
Location: Swift 208

Co-Sponsored with the Animal Studies Workshop

Abstract:
A certain narrative has become prominent within the field of human-animal ethics, namely, that the vision of reality as a teleological-chain of being is simply a non-option for us in the 21st century as we try to urgently reformulate how it is that we ought to relate to non-human animals. This essay is the beginning of an attempt to push back against this narrative, which, while not without merit, is in the end misguided. As the title hints at, our stance towards non-human animals seems to be caught in a curious “in-between” state: on the one hand, we have little choice but to use non-human animals (and other organisms) and therefore treat them as means toward human ends. On the other hand, the aversion that many feel towards, for instance, the indifferent treatment of animals in factory farms reveals that we in some way see non-human animals as beings who have genuine, intrinsic teloi, the superfluous or indifferent thwarting of which is a wrong. Any viable human-animal ethical theory has to account for this situation and offer a means for us to properly navigate the dynamic between treating other animals as both means and ends. It is my contention in this essay that the teleological-chain of being in its Christian guise is able to do just this. It offers not only a coherent and realistic account of how we are to practically relate to other animals within a wider ecological context but also offers an ontological vision that is able to ground this practical relation. The two figures whose principles are used to make this case are Augustine and Aquinas, both of whom are often accused of promoting dangerously anthropocentric accounts of human-animal relations. I conclude by showing both how the denial of this position leads to serious difficulties and how the teleological-chain of being can perhaps solve some pressing issues in the field of human-animal ethics, most important of which is the need to account for why it is that the existence of a vast multiplicity of species is a good that ought to be preserved. Concerning this latter issue, I show the strength of the perspective outlined in the paper over those of Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism and Martha Nussbaums’ Capabilities Approach to human animal ethics.