Autumn Quarter 2018

This quarter, the German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

“Hertz’s dynamical models in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Josh Eisenthal (University of Pittsburgh)

November 30, 2018, 3-5:20 pm, Wieboldt 408

This meeting will be co-sponsored with the Theoretical Philosophy Workshop.

This Friday, June 8th: Rafeeq Hasan & Martin Stone

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

What is Provisional Right?

Rafeeq Hasan (Amherst College) and Martin Jay Stone (Yeshiva University)
 Friday, June 8th, 2:00 – 4:30 pm
Wieboldt 408

 

The paper can be found under papers. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Library.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

This Thursday, May 31st: Mathis Koschel

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Knowledge, Unconditionality and Freedom
Kant on the Limits of Causal Explanation

Mathis Koschel (University of Chicago)
 Thursday, May 31st, 1:00 – 3:00 pm
Cobb 409

 

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

This Friday, May 25th: Shana Crandell

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Hegel and Kant on Practical Cognition of Actuality

Shana Crandell (University of Chicago)
 Friday, May 25th, 2:00 – 4:30 pm
Wieboldt 408

The paper can be found under papers. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Library.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Friday, May 18th: Daniel Warren

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Kant’s Early Views on Ground and Force

Daniel Warren (University of California, Berkeley)
 Friday, May 18th, 2:00 – 4:30 pm
Wieboldt 408

 

 

The paper will be presented at the talk. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Library.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Wednesday, May 16th: Irad Kimhi

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to co-present with the Wittgenstein Workshop:

The Verb “to be” and the Subject of Philosophy

Irad Kimhi (University of Leipzig & University of Chicago)
 Wednesday, May 16th, 11:30 am – 1:30 pm
Harper 130

The paper will be presented at the talk.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Friday, March 30th: Matthias Haase

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Vegetation and Individuation

Matthias Haase (University of Chicago)
 Friday, March 30th, 2:00-4:30 pm
Wieboldt 408

 

The paper can be found under “papers”. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Lounge.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Thursday, March 15th: Lawrence Dallman

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Marxian True Criticism and the Myth of the Given

Lawrence Dallman (University of Chicago)
 Thursday, March 15th, 5:00-7:00 pm
Wieboldt 408

 

The paper, to be read in advance, can be found under “papers”.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Friday, March 2nd: Lucy Allais

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Disunity of the Self

Lucy Allais (University of the Witwatersrand & University of California, San Diego)
 Friday, March 2nd, 2:00-4:30
Wieboldt 408

 

 

The paper, to be read in advance, can be found under “papers”. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Lounge.

People who need assistance, please contact me at koschel at uchicago dot edu.

Friday, February 16th: Anastasia Berg

The German Philosophy Workshop is happy to present:

Practical Reason in Kant: Self-Conscious or Self-Opaque?

Anastasia Berg (University of Cambridge)
 Friday, February 16th, 2:00-4:30
Wieboldt 408

abstract:
Most interpreters attribute to Kant the claim that we can never know whether even our own actions are performed merely in accordance with the moral law or from it and that therefore we never know whether our actions are merely legal or have genuine moral worth. This claim, however, poses not only a threat of  skepticism concerning the possibility of moral self-knowledge, but seems to fly in the face of Kant’s philosophical teaching concerning our rational capacities: namely, that they are self-conscious. In this paper, I evaluate Kant’s so-called ‘self-opacity’ thesis and argue that, firstly, his claim applies asymmetrically to good and bad cases: when I act from the motive of self-love I may not know that I am not acting from duty, but it does not follow that when I do act from duty, I do not know that I do.  Secondly, and more importantly, I argue that the uncertainty Kant is concerned with is essential to his account of practical reason. This is so because the end of acting from the motive of “happiness,” or the sum of all my subjective and contingent desires and inclinations is an indeterminate concept, at any moment potentially self-contradictory, and therefore impossible to pursue coherently: it cannot guide practical reasoning and does not offer standards for its attainment. But precisely because pursuit of her ends is self-conscious, in order to pursue her ends, the subject pursuing happiness will be tempted to pursue the objects of her subjective inclinations and desires as if they were not derived from the unintelligible end of happiness, but from the moral law. Thus, far from undermining the self-consciousness of practical reason, we see that the self-opacity characteristic of bad action is not only consistent with self-consciousness, but is born of it.

The paper will be presented at the workshop. A light reception will follow in the Anscombe Lounge.