According to the Madhyamaka tradition in Indian Buddhist Philosophy, all things are empty of “svabhāva,” a term generally translated as “inherent existence” or “own-being.”  One of the basic arguments meant to establish this claim is an argument against the coherence of inherently existing things standing in causal relations to one another.   In this paper, I consider an objection against this view, put forward by Nāgārjuna’s interlocutor in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, according to which an argument of just the same form can be applied to the thesis of emptiness itself.  Though the particular version of this objection presented in the Vigrahavyāvartanī is straightforwardly dealt with by Nāgārjuna, I argue that there is a stronger version of this objection according to which an an argument of the same form can rule out not just events standing in causal relations to other events, but theses standing in inferential relations to other theses, for instance, the thesis of dependent origination ruling out the claim that things have svabhāva.  I argue that the Madhyamika should accept this extended application of the argument, and I articulate an account of conceptual emptiness in response.