Husserl’s method of epoché involves a suspension of subject-object dichotomies. This, he argues, addresses a “crisis of European sciences,” recovering our pre-theoretical, direct encounter with the world as a starting point for scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, Husserl’s methodology emphasizes the subjective pole. Indeed, it constitutes a type of idealism. This prioritization of the first-person, I argue, has been a mainstay of phenomenology ever since.

This presentation recruits Buddhist theories of omniscience as an intervention. I explore how Buddhist thinkers from the epistemological (pramāṇa) tradition—including Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, and Śāntarakṣita—understand omniscience as a return to our most natural, pre-theoretical state, where division between mind and world are elided. Their arguments thus provide a more thorough suspension of subject-object dichotomies, providing useful fodder for contemporary phenomenology. Borrowing from Linda Zagzebski’s notion of omnisubjectivity, I dub this intervention “omniphenomenology.”